Schneider v. Pullen

Citation198 Md. 64,81 A.2d 226
Decision Date23 May 1951
Docket NumberNo. 161,161
PartiesSCHNEIDER v. PULLEN et al., Constituting State Board of Education.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Jacob Blum, Baltimore (Sidney Blum, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Kenneth C. Proctor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen. on the brief), for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

MARBURY, Chief Judge.

Appellant, individually, and trading as City Barber Schools, filed his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the State Superintendent of Schools and the Maryland State Board of Education, asking for a declaration that Section 14A of Article 77, as amended by Chapter 489 of the Acts of 1947, Code Supp.1947, art. 77, § 14A, is void and unconstitutional, and that proposed rules and regulations issued by the State Superintendent of Schools under this statute are invalid. He also asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing any provisions of the act, and for further relief. Respondents demurred, the demurrer was sustained to complainant's amended bill, and the bill was dismissed with costs. From that decree the case was appealed here.

Appellant has been since 1913 the proprietor of a barber school, teaching the barber trade and conducting a barber shop for the use of the students of his school. He sues on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and he contends that Section 14A of Article 77 is in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Constitution of the United States, because it is an improper delegation of a legislative function and deprives him of his property rights without due process of law.

Section 14A was first adopted by Chapter 1043 of the Acts of 1945, and by the title of that act it is intended to provide 'for the certification and regulation of private trade schools which operate a program of trade and/or technical education * * * or which will give pre-employment or supplementary training in certain occupational fields * * *'. Chapter 489 of the Acts of 1947, which enacts Section 14A in its present form, states in its title that its purpose is to provide 'with certain restrictions, that every school or educational institution charging tuition or fees for attendance must secure a certificate of approval from the State Superintendent of Schools'. In the body of the statute, it is provided that: '* * * every private school or educational institution, however designated, which charges tuition or fees for attendance, and which offers a program of college, professional, preparatory, high school, junior high school, elementary, kindergarten, or nursery school work, or any combination thereof, or which offers a program of trade or technical education, or both, or which gives pre-employment or supplementary training, or both, in the fields of trade or industry, and any and every private school or educational institution charging tuition or fees for attendance, except those operated by bona fide church organizations, must secure a certificate of approval issued by the State Superintendent of Schools, before it may begin or continue to operate or function in this State.' There is a proviso that this shall not have any application to a school or college now operating under a charter granted by the Legislature.

The act further provides that the State Superintendent of Schools shall issue a certificate of approval 'to any applicant operating or proposing to operate such a private school or educational institution whose conditions of entrance, scholarship, educational qualifications, standards and facilities are adequate and appropriate for the purposes, program, training and courses to be taught or given therein.' This certificate may be revoked by the State Board of Education. Any applicant who has been denied a certificate is given a hearing before the State Board of Education, and, if the decision of that body is adverse, he can appeal to the circuit court of the county, or the Superior Court of Baltimore City. There is a further right of appeal to this court on the question of denial or revocation of a certificate. The act also provides that there shall be no other remedy in any other courts by way of mandamus, injunction, certiorari, or otherwise.

The Legislature cannot, of course, interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding. We have consistently held that where a special form of remedy is provided, the litigant must adopt that form and must not bypass the administrative body or official, by pursuing other remedies. We have, however, been careful to point out that where constitutional questions are involved, the litigant has the right to raise them in a court of equity, and such court has the right to consider them. That is true whether the question is raised in an ordinary suit for injunction, or in a bill for a declaratory decree. Kahl v. Cons. Gas Electric Light & Power Co., 191 Md. 249, 258, 60 A.2d 754. Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Co., Md., 64 A.2d 151. Francis v. MacGill, Md., 75 A.2d 91. Kracke v. Weinberg, Md., 79 A.2d 387. Appellant has a special interest in bringing this proceeding because he is engaged in the business of operating a trade school, and therefore must, under the terms of the...

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41 cases
  • State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. Clark
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 4, 1977
    ...be an administrative remedy, a court of equity may intervene and act when a constitutional question is involved. See Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A.2d 387 (1951). The law on the matter was made clear in Poe. It declared th......
  • Madison Park N. Apartments, L.P. v. Comm'r Housing
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    ...223, 334 A.2d 514 (1975)). In Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500, 331 A.2d 55 (1975) (quoting Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951)), the Court of Appeals explained: “The Legislature cannot, of course, interfere with the judicial process by depriving li......
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    ...ground that the title of the statute is not descriptive of the body, as required by the State Constitution"); Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68-69, 81 A.2d 226, 228-229 (1951) (litigant "does not have to" invoke and exhaust his administrative remedy "in order to raise the constitutional q......
  • Danaher v. Dept. of Labor
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    ...a litigant must first pursue the applicable administrative process; other remedies cannot be pursued prematurely. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 81 Md.App. 54, 62, 566 A.2d 792 In this case, appellant clearly pursued ......
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