Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn

• Decision Date: 11 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-20695,94-20695
• Citation: 81 F.3d 521
• Parties: MEADOWBRIAR HOME FOR CHILDREN, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.B. GUNN, et al., d/b/a CORP, Defendants, Donald L. Smith, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 521

81 F.3d 521

16 A.D.D. 745

MEADOWBRIAR HOME FOR CHILDREN, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.B. GUNN, et al., d/b/a CORP, Defendants, Donald L. Smith, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-20695.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 11, 1996.

David W. Holman, Kevin Dubose, Holman & Hogan, Houston, TX, Peter Linzer, Univ. of Houston Law Center, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Andrea Chan, A.C.A., Houston, TX, for Smith, et al.

Richard O. Patterson, Wendy E. Sinceloff, Patterson & Siceloff, Houston, TX, for Lucy Hebron.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before SMITH, WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Meadowbriar Home for Children ("Meadowbriar") is a non-profit corporation During this time, certain local residents who were opposed to the treatment center formed a community group called Citizens Organized for Residential Protection ("CORP"). Among the CORP members was Defendant Lucy Hebron, a local citizen.

                which planned to develop a treatment center for emotionally disturbed women in Harris County, Texas.   In August 1989, Meadowbriar acquired four tracts of land in Harris County and began remodeling the two homes located on this land.   Meadowbriar intended to use these homes as residences for females "who are emotionally disturbed and [who] need residential care and treatment in a home-like setting."   In the same month, Meadowbriar applied to the Texas Department of Human Resources ("TDHR") for licensing as a medical treatment center.   Sometime thereafter, Meadowbriar began to negotiate with Spring Shadows Glen Hospital ("Spring Shadows"), a health care provider, seeking to provide treatment to some Spring Shadows patients
                

CORP argued that there are valid deed restrictions on Meadowbriar's newly-purchased land which preclude the building of a treatment center. CORP brought its complaint to the Houston City Attorney's Office, where CORP allegedly discussed its concerns with Assistant City Attorney Edwin T. Grauke.

On November 14, 1989, Grauke allegedly instructed the city's Public Works Department to refrain from issuing Meadowbriar an occupancy permit. On December 5, 1989, Grauke allegedly contacted the city's Fire Marshal to prevent the issuance of a fire permit.

On January 17, 1990, Senior Fire Inspector Donald L. Smith informed Meadowbriar that a fire permit which previously had been issued to Meadowbriar on September 14, 1989, was inadequate and needed to be withdrawn. Because fire inspections are conditions to the issuance of state licenses, the TDHR could not perform its final evaluation. Consequently, Meadowbriar was not awarded the permits which it needed to open its treatment center.

In August 1990, a Harris County, Texas, court determined that the deed restrictions are unenforceable. However, by this time, Spring Shadows had decided that it would not enter into the proposed contractual arrangement with Meadowbriar and negotiations were abandoned.

Meadowbriar accuses the CORP members of disseminating false information in an attempt to delay and frustrate the development of the treatment center. Meadowbriar also accuses Grauke, Smith, and the City of Houston of taking an active role in preventing the opening of the treatment center. Meadowbriar claims that these actions created obstacles to the opening of the center which Meadowbriar argues resulted in the denial of dwellings for the handicapped. Meadowbriar argues that such conduct violates the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its amendments, as well as the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. Finally, Meadowbriar argues that the delay caused by Defendants' actions was the reason that Spring Shadows abandoned negotiations, which resulted in a loss of revenue to Meadowbriar. Because the Defendants allegedly acted together, Meadowbriar alleges that their conduct constitutes conspiracy in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Meadowbriar brought suit in federal district court in November 1991. Defendant Lucy Hebron was added in June 1992. Over the course of litigation, Meadowbriar filed six amended complaints ¹ and the parties jointly filed over 200 motions. On January 28, 1993, the district court dismissed the suits against Defendants Grauke, Smith, and the City of Houston. Following these dismissals, the remaining parties, with the exception of Lucy Hebron, reached settlement. In November 1993, the district court granted Hebron's motion for summary judgment. In August 1994, the district court awarded Hebron approximately $44,163.63 in attorney's fees and

                costs. 2  Meadowbriar now appeals the district court's dismissal of its suit against Grauke, Smith, and the City of Houston, as well as the summary judgment in favor of Hebron, and the attorneys' fees and costs award
                

DISCUSSION

I. Appellate Jurisdiction

First, we must address Defendant Hebron's contention that this Court is without appellate jurisdiction. ³ Hebron argues that Meadowbriar's notice of appeal, which was filed on September 15, 1994, is untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the district court entered its final judgment which, Hebron argues, was entered on November 17, 1993. Meadowbriar disagrees and argues that the district court's final judgment was entered on August 19, 1994, thus making its notice of appeal timely. For the following reasons, we conclude that Plaintiff timely filed its notice of appeal.

Jurisdiction in this case is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which states, in relevant part: "The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1995). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) states, in relevant part, that "the notice of appeal ... must be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...." F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a)." ⁴ F.R.C.P. 58.

On November 17, 1993, the district clerk entered two orders--one order entitled "Memorandum," and a second order entitled "Order." ⁵ The document entitled Memorandum is 20 pages long and makes rulings upon approximately 12 separate motions including Defendant Hebron's motion for summary judgment. At the end of this memorandum, under the sub-heading "Conclusion," the district court states: "The Court, having considered all other contentions presented, concludes for the reasons set forth above, that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted, making the remaining pending motions moot." No specific relief is otherwise granted in this memorandum.

The second order entered on November 17, 1993, is a two page document entitled, "Order." In this order, the district court states, in relevant part: "For the reasons stated in the Memorandum of November 12, 1993, the Defendant Lucy Hebron's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED." The order further states that the parties' various motions "are DISMISSED AS MOOT," and the parties are ordered to submit briefs and affidavits in support of attorney's fees. Hebron argues that this second order of November 17, 1993, constitutes the final order or judgment from which Meadowbriar's 30 days to file a notice of appeal ran.

Meadowbriar disagrees and argues that a third order of the district court entitled, "Amended Final Summary Judgment," entered on August 19, 1994, constitutes the final, appealable order or judgment in this case. In relevant part, the district court's Amended Final Summary Judgment order states:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment having been granted by Order of this Court dated November 12, 1993, the Court

ORDERS that FINAL JUDGMENT for Defendant Lucy Hebron is GRANTED and,

ORDERS that Plaintiff Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. take nothing, and that the Defendant Lucy Hebron recover of Plaintiff Meadowbriar Home for Children her costs of action and, additionally, her attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $44,163.63 pursuant to the Court's Memorandum & Order of July 15, 1994, as corrected by Memorandum & Order of even date.

Meadowbriar argues this order was the district court's final order or judgment and that its 30 days to file a notice of appeal ran from this August 19, 1994 date. We agree.

"A judgment is final when it terminates litigation on the merits and leaves the court with nothing to do except execute the judgment." Zink v. United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir.1991). However, a judgment is not final until both liability and damages are determined. Deloach v. Delchamps, 897 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.1990). "Although there is no statute or rule that specifies the essential elements of a final judgment and the Supreme Court has held that no form of words and no peculiar formal act is necessary to evince the rendition of a judgment, a final judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify the means for determining, the amount of the judgment." Zink, 929 F.2d at 1020 (internal citations omitted). "This Court has held previously that a ruling which grants a motion for summary judgment by itself is not an appealable order." Calmaquip Eng'g West Hemisphere Corp. v. West Coast Carriers, Ltd., 650 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir.1981).

In the district court's second order of November 17, 1993, the district court does not make a finding of liability, nor does it award damages. It merely reiterates the rulings from its first order of November 17 and orders the parties to submit briefs on the issue of attorney's fees. Because neither of the November 17, 1993, orders made a finding of liability or specified the amount of judgment, they were not final. Zink, 929...