Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 8/29/90, In re

Citation81 F.3d 570
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,625 In re AIR DISASTER AT RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, GERMANY, on
Decision Date29 August 1990
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Ralph Oliver Anderson, Mark W. Hicks, Gary Allen Magnarini, Hicks, Anderson and Blum, Miami, FL, for all plaintiffs-appellants and intervenors plaintiffs-appellants.

James Teague Crouse, Speiser, Krause and Madole, San Antonio, TX, for all plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert L. Parks, William L. Petros, Anderson, Moss, Parks and Sherouse, Miami, FL, for all Perez parties.

Charles F. Krause, Speiser, Krause & Madole, New Orleans, TX, for Ofelia Wilson, plaintiff-appellant.

Ronald D. Krist, Krist, Gunn, Weller, Neumann & Morrison, Houston, TX, for Barbara J. Knutson, intervenor plaintiff-appellant.

James D. Guess, Groce, Locke & Hebdon, San Antonio, TX, for Lockheed Corporation.

Ron A. Sprague, Neil Howard Stone, Thomas Walter Gendry, Robert Mathy Lair, Gendry and Sprague, San Antonio, TX, for all defendants-intervenors defendants-appellees.

D'Anne Keller Haydel, Edward John O'Neill, Jr., Kelly J. Kirkland, Clements, O'Neill, Pierce & Nickens, Houston, TX, Paul K. Holloway, Porter and Hedges, Houston, TX, Jerry L. Mitchell, Kasowitz, Hoff, Benson and Torres, Houston, TX, Francis A. Anania, Miami, FL, for General Elec. Co.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and GOODWIN 1 and DUHE, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs, bringing product liability claims arising out of a fatal crash of an Air Force C-5A in Germany, appeal the summary judgment in favor of defendants, Lockheed and General Electric. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The crash occurred approximately 17 seconds after takeoff from Ramstein Air Base in Germany on August 29, 1990. Thirteen of the seventeen servicemen aboard the aircraft were killed. Plaintiffs sued on theories of manufacturer's liability based upon Georgia state law failure to warn, breach of warranty and gross negligence.

A. The Crash Aircraft

The C-5A was designed, manufactured and delivered to the Air Force pursuant to a government contract with Lockheed Corporation. 2 Although the original procurement contract may have contained only general specifications, the actual development of the C-5A resulted in detailed specifications designed by both the defendants and the Air Force. Lockheed subcontracted with General Electric to design and manufacture engines for the C-5A. 3 General Electric manufactured and designed the thrust reversers in Ohio. Lockheed installed the General Electric engines into the C-5A and conducted the remainder of its work on the C-5A in Georgia. The first C-5A was delivered to the Air Force, in Georgia, in 1971. The crash aircraft was maintained at Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, but flew missions all over the world.

B. Modification of the Crash Aircraft

From time to time, the C-5A, including the crash aircraft, has undergone modifications based on recommendations from the Air Force and from Lockheed itself. The modification relevant to this case was made pursuant to Engineering Change Proposal ("ECP") 7054. As requested and agreed to by the Air Force, the purpose of ECP 7054 was to reconfigure the engine pylons to maximize the separation of flammable substances from ignition sources. This reconfiguration also involved the relocation of the ground stud whose failure allegedly caused the accident. Importantly, however, the relocation of the ground stud did not change the original design of the circuit. Lockheed designed and manufactured a kit, based on ECP 7054, that was used to retrofit the pylons on all C-5As. The Air Force was to begin taking delivery of these kits in 1981. The Air Force, and not Lockheed or General Electric, installed the kits on the aircraft.

C. Air Force Involvement in the Design and Manufacture of the C-5A

The Air Force was at all relevant times, and still is, closely involved in the design, manufacture and maintenance of the C-5A. The Air Force directly participated in the design of nearly every part of the aircraft. In the instances where the Air Force was not directly involved, it approved the designs after reviewing them in detail with the relevant personnel of the defendants. As the planes were being manufactured and developed, the Air Force required Lockheed to put the various components through rigorous testing to ensure that all of the contract specifications had been satisfied. The Air Force reviewed and approved these tests. The Air Force did not merely "rubber stamp" the tests and data, but placed its officers on site to observe the development and manufacture of the C-5A, including the electrical circuit design at issue in this case. Once the planes were built, the Air Force and Lockheed conducted joint tests before putting them into active military service.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Seven separate lawsuits were filed in Texas and Florida state courts. Representatives of eleven of the decedents and one of the survivors filed products liability lawsuits asserting claims based on strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, breach of warranty, and gross negligence in the design, manufacture and marketing of the C-5A aircraft. 4

The plaintiffs theorized that the aircraft crashed because of an uncommanded and undetected deployment of the thrust reverser on one of the two engines on the left side of the aircraft. The plaintiffs alleged that this deployment was caused by the defective design and manufacture, or modification, of the electrical system contained in the pylon (the component that attaches the engine to the wing). Although the plaintiffs' brief characterizes this as "one of the theories of liability" it is the only one mentioned in the record.

The electrical system was configured so that the circuit that sends the signals to deploy or retract the thrust reverser, the "enunciator", and the circuit that sends signals back to the cockpit control panel, the "indicator", were grounded by physical attachment to the same ground stud. The plaintiffs believe, but offered no proof, that this ground stud failed, causing a single point electrical failure, and simultaneously disabled both the enunciator and indicator circuits, making it impossible for the crew to know that the thrust reverser was deployed.

The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the accident was caused by crew inattention.

The defendants removed all of the lawsuits to federal district courts in Texas and Florida on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, transferred the cases to the Western District of Texas for pretrial proceedings because most of the plaintiffs are Texas residents and many relevant documents and witness were located at Kelly Air Force Base.

The district court, applying Texas conflicts-of-law rules borrowed from the Restatement (Second) of the Conflicts of Law, held that Georgia substantive law, instead of Texas law, governed the dispute. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiffs' claims based on the original design of the electrical system in the pylons, and the pylon kit modifications, because they were time barred by Georgia's statute of repose. 5 (Memorandum and Order of July 14, 1994 and Memorandum and Order of January 6, 1995, respectively). The court also applied the statute of repose to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim because there was no evidence that the defendants had actual knowledge of any danger that the system may have harbored. 6 The court rejected the plaintiffs' breach of warranty claims because no privity of contract existed between the parties as required under Georgia law. Finally, the court rejected the claim based upon allegations of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct (gross negligence) because the plaintiffs offered no evidence to support recovery under this theory. The court did not rule on the defendants' government contractor immunity defense because at the time it was presented the plaintiffs had not sufficiently articulated what they thought was the cause of the accident. Therefore, the court could not make the necessary factual findings to determine whether government contractor immunity applied. See Memorandum and Order of November 14, 1994 at 13. The court considered the defenses based upon the statute of repose, and the lack of any duty to warn the Air Force of obvious design characteristics in which the Air Force had participated as sufficient grounds to grant summary judgment.

Plaintiffs' timely appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte.

III. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY
A. Standard of Review

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. FDIC v. Ernst & Young 967 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir.1992). Once a motion for summary judgment has been properly made, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and by his or her own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions to come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e).

Although, as noted, the district court did not specifically rule on government contractor immunity, that defense is properly briefed in both the trial court and this court. All the depositions and affidavits relevant to the defense were before the court at the time of its final ruling. We hold that the contractor immunity defense was itself a sufficient basis for summary judgment with respect to all claims, except possibly the "failure to warn" claim. We are...

To continue reading

Request your trial
305 cases
  • Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Peter J. McNulty Law Firm
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • July 27, 2012
    ...litigation panel, the law applied is that of the jurisdiction from which the case was transferred....”); In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger., 81 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where a transferee court presides over several diversity actions consolidated under the multidistrict rul......
  • Gauthier v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • March 25, 2009
    ...the factual matters to be considered when applying the Section 6 principles to a given case. Perez v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base), 81 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir.1996). These factual matters are determinative as to which state has the most significant relationship wi......
  • Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • August 17, 1998
    ...government's own immunity from suit "where the performance of a discretionary function is at issue." In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 81 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S.Ct. 2510). The Court further noted that "the selection of the appropri......
  • Terry v. Mcneil-Ppc, Inc. (In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg.)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • May 20, 2015
    ...litigation panel, the law applied is that of the jurisdiction from which the case was transferred...."); In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger., 81 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1996)("Where a transferee court presides over several diversity actions consolidated under the multidistrict rul......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT