National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

• Citation: 810 F.2d 295
• Decision Date: 10 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1361,85-1361
• Parties: 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489, 258 U.S.App.D.C. 176, 55 USLW 2467 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent. NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Page 295

810 F.2d 295

124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489, 258 U.S.App.D.C.

176, 55 USLW 2467

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent.

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent.

No. 85-1361

.

United States Court of Appeals,

District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 27, 1986.

Decided Feb. 3, 1987.

As Amended Feb. 10, 1987.

Gregory O'Duden, with whom Lois G. Williams was on the brief, for petitioner.

Stevens H. Svartz, Deputy Sol., F.L.R.A., with whom Ruth E. Peters, Sol. and William R. Tobey, F.L.R.A., were on the brief, for respondent.

William J. Stone and Mark D. Roth, were on the brief for amicus curiae, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, urging reversal.

Before ROBINSON and RUTH B. GINSBURG, Circuit Judges, and EDWARD D. RE, ^* Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge RE.

RE, Chief Judge:

Petitioner, the National Treasury Employees Union, seeks review of two decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), which held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had no duty to bargain over union-initiated proposals made during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement. In effect, the Authority upheld the contention of the IRS that it had no duty to bargain over midterm proposals made by the union.

The question presented is whether the IRS, a federal agency, during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement, may refuse to bargain with the union over union proposals that pertain to negotiable issues not mentioned in the agreement. Since the decisions of the Authority are contrary to the intent and purpose of the governing statute, they are set aside, and the case is remanded.

This case arises under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FLRS), 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-7135 (1982 & Supp. II 1984), which was enacted as Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The FLRS establishes a statutory framework to regulate labor relations between federal agencies and their employees. A key component of the statute is the Federal Labor Relations Authority, an independent agency, which performs a role analogous to that of the National Labor Relations Board. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 92-93, 104 S.Ct. 439, 441-42, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983); Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam). The Authority, whose responsibility is to carry out the purpose of the FLRS, is to "provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters under [the statute]." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7105(a)(1) (1982). Among its other duties, the FLRA hears appeals pertaining to charges of unfair labor practices, including the refusal to bargain in good faith. See Sec. 7105(a)(2)(A)-(I).

FACTS

Petitioner, the National Treasury Employees Union, is the exclusive representative of employees of the IRS in its national, regional, and district offices, as well as at the Detroit Data Center and the National Computer Center. The union and the IRS entered into two separate collective-bargaining agreements covering IRS employees represented by the union. On two separate occasions, the union made written requests to bargain with the IRS over issues not addressed in the existing collective-bargaining agreements. In both instances, the IRS refused to bargain, contending that it had no duty to negotiate over union proposals in the middle of the agreements' terms. The duty to bargain midterm, the IRS asserted, arose only when the IRS, i.e., the agency, proposed changes. In both cases, the union filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge.

In the first case, the administrative law judge found that the agency had committed a ULP because its statutory duty to bargain included midterm, union-initiated proposals. In the second case, the administrative law judge found that the delegation of certain recruitment functions from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to the IRS constituted a change in circumstances sufficient to create a duty to bargain.

The Authority reversed the decisions of the administrative law judge. In the first case, the union made a written request to bargain with respect to certain conditions of employment, such as the use of government cars, permission to work at home, and worksite selection. The IRS contended that it had no duty to bargain because the agency had made no changes in the areas covered by the proposals. The Authority The Authority also purported to rely on the congressional mandate to interpret the statute "in a manner consistent with the requirements of an effective and efficient Government." See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7101(b). The Authority concluded that the statutory duty to bargain did not include union-initiated, midterm proposals because midterm negotiations would undermine stability, and discourage the parties from anticipating future issues at the time of the basic contract negotiations. See 17 F.L.R.A. at 736-37.

                held that the duty to bargain extended only to negotiations leading to a basic agreement and to midterm proposals initiated by the agency, not to midterm proposals initiated by the union.   IRS v. National Treasury Employees Union, 17 F.L.R.A. 731, 738 (1985).  The Authority found support for this position in a Senate Committee Report that accompanied a Senate bill, which, although not enacted into law, contained certain provisions that were similar to the FLRS, as enacted.  See 17 F.L.R.A. at 735-37 (citing S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1978))
                

In the second case, the Authority also reversed the decision of the ALJ. IRS v. National Treasury Employees Union, 18 F.L.R.A. 361, 363 (1985). The Authority stated that the IRS would have a statutory duty to bargain only if the negotiations were directed toward a basic collective-bargaining agreement, or if the negotiations concerned a management-initiated change in employment conditions. The Authority rejected the ALJ's conclusion that a change in employment conditions had occurred as a result of the IRS assuming the recruitment duties previously performed by the OPM. Since it was undisputed that the IRS had not altered the recruitment process that it had acquired from the OPM, the Authority concluded that the IRS had committed no unfair labor practice because the IRS had no duty to bargain over the union's proposals. See 18 F.L.R.A. at 362-63.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In establishing the FLRA, Congress intended the Authority "to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the act." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983) (BATF ) (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963)); see 15 U.S.C. Sec. 7105. Pursuant to well established principles of administrative law, it is appropriate for a reviewing court to accord due weight to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency has been entrusted to administer. See, e.g., United States v. City of Fulton, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1422, 1428, 89 L.Ed.2d 661 (1986); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 60 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979). Thus, the court will defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute, if the interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the intent of the legislature, or with the guiding purpose of the statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, the deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to result in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress. BATF, 464 U.S. at 97, 104 S.Ct. at 444 (quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 967, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965)). Indeed, it may be said that deference to an agency's interpretation reflects a judicial determination that the agency's interpretation falls within the scope of the authority that has been properly delegated by Congress to the agency. See Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 246, 88 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985).

Section 701 of the FLRS provides that judicial review of FLRA orders "shall be on the record in accordance with section 706" of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706 (1982). See 5 U.S.C.

Sec. 7123(c). The Administrative Procedure Act provides:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall--

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(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be--

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse or discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

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(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right....

Administrative Procedure Act Sec. 10(e), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706 (1982).

It is axiomatic that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114 provides in part:

(a)(1) A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents and is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the unit....

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