State v. Rice
| Decision Date | 12 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-155-C.A.,2001-155-C.A. |
| Parties | STATE v. Kenneth S. RICE. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present LEDERBERG, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ., and SHEA, J. (Ret.).
Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Paula Lynch Hardiman, Paula Rosin, Providence, for Defendant.
This appeal from the denial of a motion to reduce sentence came before the Court for oral argument on November 6, 2002, pursuant to an order that had directed the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the arguments of counsel and the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and shall proceed to decide the case at this time.
The defendant, Kenneth S. Rice, was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree child sexual molestation, one count of second-degree child sexual molestation and two counts of solicitation with intent to commit a felony. The facts of the case may be found in State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137 (R.I.2000), in which this Court upheld his convictions. The defendant was sentenced to serve a cumulative term of imprisonment of seventy years on the various convictions. One of the sentences imposed was an additional ten-year term of imprisonment as a habitual offender. The trial justice also ordered that defendant would not be eligible for parole for thirty years.
The only question before the Court is whether a trial justice may sentence a defendant to be ineligible for parole for a term that is longer than the habitual offender portion of his or her sentence. The defendant maintains that G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21(B), P.L. 1988, ch. 402 § 1 the habitual offender statute, does not give the trial justice such authority and that it was error to impose a thirty-year restriction on his eligibility for parole. Instead, he asserts that the trial justice was limited to sentencing him to a maximum of ten years without parole because that was the sentence he received as a habitual offender. It is argued that this thirty-year restriction on parole prevents defendant from being able to participate in certain counseling and rehabilitative services that normally would be available at the prison.
"Generally when a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this [C]ourt will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute." State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996)). In cases in which there is ambiguous statutory language "the primary object of the [C]ourt is to ascertain the legislative intention from a consideration of the legislation in its entirety, viewing the language used therein in the light, nature, and purpose of the enactment thereof." Id. (quoting Mason v. Bowerman Bros., Inc., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 776 (1963)). "When the meaning of a criminal statute is ambiguous, the policy of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes requires that the less harsh of two possible meanings be adopted." Id. (quoting State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I.1980)). That is because "[p]enal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed." Id. (quoting Bryant, 670 A.2d at 779).
Section 12-19-21(B), the habitual offender statute, provided in pertinent part that:
"If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence presented that the defendant is an habitual criminal undersection 12-19-21, he [or she] shall be sentenced by the court to an additional consecutive term of imprisonment of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years; and provided further, that the court shall order the defendant to serve a minimum number of years of said sentence before he [or she] becomes eligible for parole." (Emphasis added.) The state argues that the use of the terms "sentence" and "term of imprisonment" in the statute have different meanings and urges us to interpret "term of imprisonment" to refer only to the additional habitual offender portion of the sentence, and the "minimum number of years of the sentence" to refer to the entire sentence. In view of our mandate to strictly construe penal statutes, we are of the opinion that the Legislature's use of different terms in the statute is not significant in this case — those terms appear to have...
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State v. Rice
...term of no more than ten years in prison before becoming eligible for parole under that portion of his sentence." State v. Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I.2002). Upon remand, a new judgment of conviction and commitment was entered, again reciting fifty-year sentences on both counts 2 and The......
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State v. Rice, No. W1/96-0257A (R.I. Super 4/10/2007), W1/96-0257A
...eligibility for parole greater than the habitual offender portion of his or her sentence. That decision is reported at State v. Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I. 2002). On February 22, 2007, defendant moved this Court to correct his sentence, arguing that (1) discrepancies between his judgmen......