Tookes v. United States, Civil Action No. 07–2049 (RBW).

• Decision Date: 19 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07–2049 (RBW).
• Citation: 811 F.Supp.2d 322
• Parties: Angela TOOKES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

811 F.Supp.2d 322

Angela TOOKES, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07–2049 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 19, 2011.

Angela Tookes, Washington, DC, pro se.

Christopher Aldo Porco, Law Offices of Christopher Aldo Porco, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Harry B. Roback, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

Angela Tookes, the plaintiff in this civil case, seeks damages for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent-training-and-supervision under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), resulting from an incident involving members of the United States Marshals Services (“Marshals Services”) on January 21, 2003. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 9, 18–22, 23, 25, 26, 29. Currently before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the plaintiff's claims of (1) false imprisonment, and (2) negligent training and supervision. After carefully considering the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, and all memoranda of law relating to that motion,¹ the Court concludes for the following reasons that the motion is granted as to the negligent-training-and-supervision claim, and denied as to the false imprisonment claim.

I. Background

On an unknown date but relatively near in time to January 21, 2003, a Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued a bench warrant for the plaintiff's arrest after she failed to comply with a subpoena. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Three United States Deputy Marshals then executed the bench warrant on January 21, 2003, and arrested the plaintiff at her home. Id. After taking the plaintiff into custody, the deputy marshals transported her to the Superior Court, where she was fingerprinted and placed in a holding cell while awaiting her initial appearance before the court. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 2 (Dec. 3, 2009 Deposition of Angela Tookes (“Tookes Deposition”)) at 94:23–25, 95:11–17. The plaintiff was then escorted into the courtroom, at which point she realized that she had left her United States and Nigerian passports, airline ticket, and keys in the holding cell. Desiring to use the passport and airline ticket as evidence that her recent travels prevented her from complying with the aforementioned subpoena, id. at 100:3–12, the plaintiff sought permission to reenter the holding cell to retrieve her items, but one of the deputy marshals in the courtroom denied her request, id. at 100:23–25. The plaintiff then appeared before the Judge and was subsequently released from custody. Am. Compl. ¶ 11.

After the hearing, the plaintiff was returned to the “basement” area near the holding cell, where she asked a deputy marshal whether she could retrieve her personal items from the holding cell. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 2 (Tookes Deposition) at 108:23–24. The deputy marshal eventually retrieved her items from the cell for her, but after questioning the legality of her having two passports, the deputy marshal told the plaintiff that he was going to keep her Nigerian passport because it was “unlawful to have two passports.” Id. at 113:6–10. He then instructed her to leave the basement area. Id. at 114:11–12. The plaintiff initially refused to leave the basement area and instead asked the deputy marshal for his name, to which he responded by summoning other deputy marshals and instructing them to “get her out of here.” Id. at 114:12–16. The plaintiff alleges that the deputy marshals then “forcefully tossed [her] out of a side door of the courthouse,” Am. Compl. ¶ 13, and when she realized that she still did not have her keys, “the plaintiff knocked on the door and asked for her keys.” Id. ¶ 14. At this point, the plaintiff asserts that “[s]everal [deputy marshals] went outside and began to physically attack [her].” Id. ¶ 15. The plaintiff further asserts that, after the attack, the deputy marshals handcuffed her, “dragged” her back into the courthouse, and left her sitting on a chair. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 2 (Tookes Deposition) at 138:7–9, 12. After some period of time, a District of Columbia police officer approached her because he had heard someone “crying [for] a long time.” Id. at 141:4. The officer then called an ambulance. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. While waiting for the ambulance to arrive, the courthouse medical clinic evaluated the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 17.

On July 3, 2003, the plaintiff submitted a Standard Form 95 (“SF–95”) to the Marshals Service,² Def.'s Mem. at 3, which is a form used by a party seeking redress for tort claims against the United States, GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 904 n. 16 (D.C.Cir.1987). The Marshals Service did not respond to the plaintiff's claim. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. As a result of the Marshals Service's non-response, the plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court on November 13, 2007, which she later amended on January 8, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).³

In her Amended Complaint, the plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ... [deputy m]arshals intentionally and maliciously assaulted and battered [her],” id. ¶ 19, and that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the assault and battery, [she] suffered permanent and serious physical injuries,” id. ¶ 21, which led to “medical expenses, lost wages, [and] pain and suffering,” id. ¶ 22. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that the “[deputy m]arshals falsely imprisoned and arrested [her] by confining her again in a cellblock without legal justification and without her consent.” Id. ¶ 24. The plaintiff further asserts that the “Marshal Service was under a duty to properly train and supervise the actions of the ... [deputy m]arshal[s] in their employ,” id. ¶ 27, and that “[t]he ... Marshal Service breached this duty to properly train and supervise the actions of the ... [deputy m]arshals, which was the proximate cause of the permanent and serious physical injuries, ... medical expenses, loss of income[,] and pain and suffering by [the plaintiff],” id. ¶ 28. For these claims, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages of $3 million ($1 million per count), the costs associated with these proceedings, “and any and all relief justice so requires.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 29.

The defendant has now moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligent-training-and-supervision claim, as well as her claim for false imprisonment. As to the plaintiff's negligent-training-and-supervision claim, the defendant provides four arguments in support of its assertion that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim. Def.'s Mem. at 8. First, the defendant asserts that “claims involving the training or supervision of government personnel are excluded from the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity” pursuant to the discretionary function exception, id. at 8, and “[t]hus, [the] plaintiff cannot bring a claim of negligent training and supervision [against the Marshals Service] under the FTCA,” id. at 9. Second, the defendant argues that the “[p]laintiff failed to exhaust [all] administrative remedies for her negligent[ ]training[-]and[-]supervision claim,” id. at 10, because she “did not provide the [Marshals Service] with any notice in her administrative claim that would have led to an investigation into the training or supervising of [deputy] marshals with no alleged prior or subsequent misbehavior,” id. at 11. Third, the defendant argues that the negligent-training-and-supervision claim is without merit “because [the p]laintiff has not even alleged any facts, much less produced evidence, that support such a claim” and instead relies on “vague and conclusory assertions that the [Marshals Service] should [have] done more to train its deputies.” Id. at 12. Fourth, the defendant states that the “negligent[-]training[-]and [-]supervision claim fails because [the plaintiff] has not identified an expert to establish the standard of care applicable to the training and supervision of Deputy U.S. Marshals,” id. at 13, which “generally is necessary [to bring] claims of negligent[-]training[-]and[-]supervision of police officers,” id. (quoting Cotton v. Dist. of Columbia, 541 F.Supp.2d 195, 207 (D.D.C.2008)).

With regard to the plaintiff's false imprisonment claim, the defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because “[i]n her SF[-]95, [the p]laintiff provided no notice to the [Marshals Service] of any false arrest and imprisonment claim”; specifically, the defendant contends that the SF–95 “makes no reference to the [p]laintiff being reincarcerated in a cellblock, nor does it allege any injury caused by a false arrest or imprisonment apart from physical injuries compensable under the tort of assault and battery.” Id. at 15. In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff provides contradictory accounts of the events related to the alleged false imprisonment in various documents, such as the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the plaintiff's SF–95, and the transcript of the plaintiff's deposition, id. at 17, and that “a plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting her own testimony,” id. (citing Pyramid Sec., Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991)). The defendant also argues that the plaintiff's claims for total damages should be limited to $250,000 because that is the amount the plaintiff sought in her administrative complaint submitted to the Marshals Services. Id. at 1.

The plaintiff opposes the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, but she only responds to the defendant's arguments regarding the false imprisonment claim. The plaintiff argues that she exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to her for the false imprisonment claim because her SF–95 states that “[she] was assaulted and falsely arrested.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. Although the plaintiff acknowledges that she used the words “falsely arrested” rather than “falsely imprisoned,” she argues that “there is...