Grimm v. Grimm
| Decision Date | 31 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | (AC 22315) |
| Citation | 812 A.2d 152,74 Conn. App. 406 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BEVERLY L. GRIMM v. ROBERT L. GRIMM |
Foti, Bishop and Dupont, Js.
Thomas P. Puccio, pro hac vice, with whom were John Wayne Fox and, on the brief, Patricia M. Gaug, for the appellant (defendant). Gaetano Ferro, with whom was Norman A. Roberts II, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The tortured history of this case demonstrates the detrimental effect that procedural dysfunction in a marital dissolution action can have on the judicial process.1 The specific questions presented in this appeal are whether the court improperly (1) refused to vacate the plaintiff's withdrawal of the action and (2) declined to restore the case to the docket to permit the defendant to seek counsel fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Reasonable discussion of those issues requires a cursory review of the court's voluminous file. This marital dissolution action was commenced in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk by complaint dated August 25, 1997, and initially claimed to the trial list on December 8, 1997. Trial of the matter was scheduled to commence on June 10, 1998, July 30, 1998, December 15, 1998, March 16, 1999, July 20, 1999, May 16, 2000, and July 7, 2000; on each of those dates, the trial was continued. It thereafter was set for trial on September 12, 2000.
The transcript of the September 12, 2000 proceeding indicates that when the defendant's counsel stated that he was not prepared for trial on that day, the court commented: In response to the request for a continuance by the defendant's counsel, the court stated:
After further colloquy with counsel, the court stated: When the defendant's counsel persisted in his argument that it would not be reasonable to commence evidence on that date, the court relented, in part, but indicated its intention to give the case an on trial status so that both counsel would be insulated from the demands of other courts. To effectuate that proposition, the court had the plaintiff take the witness stand. The court stated to the plaintiff: Once the plaintiff had been sworn in and had testified as to the date of the marriage, the court stated:
The trial then was continued to September 21, 2000, at 9:30 a.m., but for reasons not clear from the record, the trial did not resume on September 21, 2000. The parties were next in court on December 12, 2000, when the court heard evidence concerning contempt motions filed by the plaintiff. That hearing continued through December 13, 2000, and was scheduled to resume on December 14, 2000. When the parties returned on December 14, however, the plaintiff brought to the court's and the defendant's attention that she had withdrawn the action at the end of the day on December 13. The court then concluded that there was nothing else to do.
On the next day, the plaintiff commenced a marital dissolution action in the judicial district of Danbury. After the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to have the Danbury action dismissed or transferred to Stam-ford, he filed two motions in this matter, both dated April 12, 2001, one seeking to have the withdrawal vacated, and the other to have the case restored to the docket for the purpose of seeking counsel fees incurred in defending the plaintiff's motions for contempt.2 It is from the denial of those motions that the defendant has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw her complaint without leave of the court, as is required by General Statutes § 52-80, after the commencement of a hearing on the merits. We agree, but hold that the issue is moot.
General Statutes § 52-80 provides in relevant part: See also Smith v. Reynolds, 54 Conn. App. 381, 383, 735 A.2d 827 (1999).
The issue in this case is whether the court improperly determined that the plaintiff did not need permission to withdraw her action in accordance with § 52-80. Pivotal to that determination is the question of whether the court had commenced a hearing on an issue of fact in the marital dissolution action. If it had, then by operation of § 52-80, the action could not be withdrawn without the court's permission. Implicit in the court's ruling was its determination that prior to the filing of the withdrawal, the court had not commenced a hearing on an issue of fact in the action. We disagree.
In its memorandum of decision regarding the defendant's motion to vacate the plaintiff's withdrawal, the court noted: That finding was improper.
A review of the transcript of the September 12, 2000, proceeding indicates that when the plaintiff was called to testify, she gave the date of the marriage as set forth in the complaint. Additionally, the trial court file reflects that the case had been assigned for trial on that date. Thus, no matter how brief, the plaintiff's testimony signified the commencement of a hearing on the merits of her complaint. The court's further observation to the effect that the purpose of commencing the hearing was to give counsel an "on trial" status is legally insignificant. The reason for the commencement of the hearing is not relevant to the application of § 52-80.3
Having determined that the court improperly determined that the provisions of § 52-80 were inapplicable, we next turn to the question of relief. At oral argument, the defendant conceded that he would not want the eventual dismissal of the Danbury action that could be triggered by this court's reversal of the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate the plaintiff's withdrawal. See Nielsen v. Nielsen, 3 Conn. App. 679, 682, 491 A.2d 1112 (1985) (...
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...the appraiser's formal appointment by the court." Id.6 In the context of marital dissolution actions, this court in Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn.App. 406, 410, 812 A.2d 152 (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 911, 821 A.2d 766 (2003), held that testimony limited to one question on the day that trial......
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...appraiser's formal appointment by the court." Id.6 In the context of marital dissolution actions, this court in Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn. App. 406, 410, 812 A.2d 152 (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 911, 821 A.2d 766 (2003), held that testimony limited to one question on the day that trial wa......
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Grimm v. Grimm
...detrimental effect that procedural dysfunction in a marital dissolution action can have on the judicial process." Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn. App. 406, 407, 812 A.2d 152, (2002), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 911, 821 A.2d 766 (2003). In this appeal, the defendant, Robert L. Grimm, claims that (1) G......
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