Brock v. Richardson

Citation812 F.2d 121
Decision Date23 February 1987
Docket NumberNos. 86-3118,C,86-3119,No. 86-3119,No. 86-3118,86-3118,s. 86-3118
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
Parties27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1689, 106 Lab.Cas. P 34,878 William E. BROCK, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant inross-Appellee in, v. Homer Alan RICHARDSON, d/b/a Richardson Construction, Appellee inross-Appellant in.

Marshall Harris, Regional Solicitor, George R. Salem, Deputy Solicitor of Labor, Monica Gallagher, Associate Solicitor, Linda Jan S. Pack, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, Carol Arnold (argued), Attorney, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for appellant/cross-appellee.

Henry Miller, III (argued), Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before SLOVITER and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and GREEN, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

The district court found that Homer Alan Richardson, d/b/a Richardson Construction, discharged his employee George F. Banyas in violation of section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 215(a)(3), because he believed Banyas had filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor. Richardson appeals, arguing that the district court erred in failing to find the discharge was for good cause and in holding that a discharge of an employee for mere suspicion of engaging in protected activities is covered by the statute.

The district court ordered the employer to pay Banyas $14,000 in back wages, but did not award either pre-judgment or post-judgment interest. The Secretary of Labor appeals from the denial of the interest awards.

I.

Richardson, together with his wife Virginia, operates a construction company in Tarentum, Pennsylvania, which employs from three to six skilled and unskilled employees. Banyas was hired by Richardson in 1977 as a laborer. He was discharged on October 6, 1980. According to Richardson, he discharged Banyas for good cause because of his careless work habits, poor performance, and belligerent attitude. Richardson points to evidence that he had previously discharged Banyas on September 6, 1980 because Banyas caused damage to equipment, and rehired him a few days later only after discussions with the union. He points to other instances of alleged inadequate work, particularly the instance on October 2, 1980 when Banyas and another employee incorrectly cut beams on a construction project. It is undisputed that Banyas and the other employee returned to fix that job.

The Secretary, however, introduced evidence presenting the discharge in a different light. In early September 1980, Donovan Durbin, a compliance officer with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, contacted Richardson regarding an investigation of the firm for overtime violations, apparently in response to an employee complaint dated January 2, 1978. This complaint was not filed by Banyas. As part of this investigation, Durbin interviewed Banyas on September 24, 1980. Banyas told Durbin that he had worked overtime hours for which he had not been compensated, and signed a written statement to that effect. On October 3, Durbin met with the Richardsons to review employment records and to discuss possible violations, including Banyas' claims. Banyas' claims were denied by the Richardsons. As noted above, Banyas was fired three days after this meeting. The overtime wage investigation was closed in November 1980, after the Richardsons paid the claims.

Banyas filed a formal complaint of discriminatory discharge with the Wage and Hour Division, which was assigned for investigation to Donald Swanson. In the course of Swanson's investigation, Virginia Richardson told him on the telephone that Banyas had caused trouble for them before with the government. She stated on another occasion that the reason Banyas had been fired was because he was a troublemaker, had caused them problems with the government and the union, and had ruined equipment and not done jobs properly. Shortly thereafter she told John Linkosky, Assistant Area Director of the Wage and Hour Division, Pittsburgh Area Office, that one of the reasons Banyas had been discharged was because she believed he had filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division. Also, contemporaneously with Banyas' firing, Richardson told Banyas' father, who also worked for the Richardson firm, that the firing occurred because Banyas had reported Richardson to the government. In fact, Richardson testified that he believed Banyas "had caused the Wage Hour investigation to take place in the first place," App. at 81, and that at the time he let Banyas go, he believed Banyas had lied to Durbin about his overtime.

There was evidence in the record from which the trier of fact could have found for either party on the factual issue of the reason for Banyas' termination. At the conclusion of the testimony, the district court stated:

I have taken into consideration the testimony I have heard here. Of course, as a finder of fact I have to determine questions of credibility.

I find as a fact that the defendant discharged Mr. Banyas on October 6, 1980, because he believed that Mr. Banyas had filed a complaint against him with the Wage and Hour Administration.

App. at 17. Although Richardson contests the finding of causation, we conclude that it is not clearly erroneous. 1

II.

Richardson next argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in applying section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That section prohibits the discharge of or discrimination in any other manner against an employee "because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the Fair Labor Standards Act], or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 215(a)(3).

Richardson argues that in order to prove a violation of section 15(a)(3), the government must show both that the discharged employee engaged in one of the specified overt acts and that the employer was aware of the act. He contends that because Banyas did not in fact file a complaint, and because the court did not find that Banyas engaged in one of the acts specifically protected under the statute, 2 there can be no violation of the statute. According to Richardson, the employer's mere belief that the employee has engaged in protected conduct is not enough.

The parties have directed us to no case, nor have we found one, considering whether an employer's belief that an employee has engaged in protected activity is sufficient to trigger application of section 15(a)(3). Nonetheless, we reject Richardson's argument that the section is inapplicable if the employer's perception turns out to be mistaken. The Fair Labor Standards Act is part of the large body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during the Great Depression, and has been liberally interpreted. As the Court stated in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944), in describing other provisions of that Act:

But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. Those are the rights that Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.

Id. at 597, 64 S.Ct. 703.

The anti-retaliation provision was designed to encourage employees to report suspected wage and hour violations by their employers. In Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960), the Court explained why a workplace environment conducive to employee reporting is important to the enforcement of the substantive rights created by the Fair Labor Standards Act:

For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. This end the prohibition of Sec. 15(a)(3) against discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions. Cf. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 [18 S.Ct. 383, 390, 42 L.Ed. 780] [(1898) ]. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in Sec. 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary pursuant to Sec. 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.

Id. at 292, 80 S.Ct. at 335. Thus, the Court has made clear that the key to interpreting the anti-retaliation provision is the need to prevent employees' "fear of economic retaliation" for voicing grievances about substandard conditions.

It follows that courts interpreting the anti-retaliation provision have looked to its animating spirit in applying it to activities that might not have been explicitly covered by the language. For example, it has been applied to protect employees who have protested Fair Labor Standards Act violations to their employers, see Love v. RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.1984), who have refused to release back pay claims or return back pay awards to their employers, see Marshall v....

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