United States v. Wright

• Decision Date: 27 January 2016
• Docket Number: Nos. 14–2335,14–2337.,s. 14–2335
• Citation: 812 F.3d 27
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Christopher B. WRIGHT, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

812 F.3d 27

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Christopher B. WRIGHT, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 14–2335

14–2337.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Jan. 27, 2016.

Robert C. Andrews, for appellant.

Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, LYNCH, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

This case concerns the reading of a federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), in the context of revocation of a federally supervised release imposed after a criminal contempt conviction. We conclude that the criminal contempt here must as a matter of statutory construction be treated as a Class A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). We therefore respectfully disagree with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.

Christopher Wright appeals from an order that revoked his supervised release on underlying convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and criminal contempt, and imposed a sentence of thirty months of imprisonment. The district court found, inter alia, that Wright violated the terms of his release by breaking state law. In sentencing, the court classified criminal contempt as a Class A felony, which carries a maximum five-year (sixty-month) term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Wright received a sentence of thirty months of imprisonment.

Wright raises two issues: first, he challenges the court's determination that he violated state law and, second, he argues that his maximum imprisonment exposure was two years, on the theory that criminal contempt is a Class C felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). We affirm the decision and sentence.

I.

On review of an appeal of revocation of supervised release, "we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government," and "we recognize the district court's broad legal power to determine witness credibility." See United States v. Portalla, 985 F.2d 621, 622 (1st Cir.1993).

In 2007, Christopher Wright pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighty months of imprisonment on each offense; three and five years of supervised release on the charges, respectively, to be served concurrently; and a $200 fine. One condition of his release was that he "not commit another federal, state, or local crime." Another was that he not use a controlled substance. In 2012, only a few months after his supervised release started, Wright was arrested for theft; he admitted to violating the terms of his release and was sentenced to twelve months and a day of imprisonment, with twenty-three months of supervised release for the firearms conviction and twenty-four months for the criminal contempt conviction.

Once out on release for a second time, Wright used drugs and engaged in conduct leading to his arrest.¹ On July 20, 2014, Wright contacted Jonathan Trayes to pay for hallucinogenic mushrooms. Later that day, Justin Corsaro drove Wright in Corsaro's pickup truck to Trayes's house where several people, including Trayes's acquaintance, Harry Fay, were present. Fay testified that he watched from his truck as Trayes approached the passenger side of Corsaro's vehicle and began speaking with Wright. After a brief conversation, Wright grabbed Trayes by the arm through the window and told the driver to "go, go, go." Fay and Trayes testified that as the vehicle accelerated forward, Wright dragged Trayes along for at least fifty feet, dangling outside the window, as Wright punched Trayes in the head. While the car was in motion, Wright released Trayes, whose leg was then run over by the vehicle. Trayes was later taken to the hospital for medical care, including for a wound

to his ankle, road-rash, internal bleeding, and a sprained or broken wrist.

As a result of this incident, Wright was arrested on September 11, 2014, and charged with aggravated assault under Maine law. Maine defines aggravated assault, in relevant part, as follows:

1. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes:

A. Serious bodily injury to another; or

B. Bodily injury to another with use of a dangerous weapon; or

C. Bodily injury to another under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. ...

Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17–A, § 208 (2014).

After Wright's arrest, the government filed petitions to revoke his supervised release on two grounds: use of narcotics and violation of state law. Wright challenged only the latter charge. At the ensuing proceedings, Trayes and Fay testified, and afterward the parties submitted additional briefing. On December 16, 2014, the court heard additional arguments and then ordered revocation, finding that Wright had violated two prongs of the Maine aggravated assault statute, as he "recklessly used a dangerous weapon, [Corsaro's] car," and manifested "extreme indifference to human life." Turning to sentencing, the court found that Wright's underlying criminal contempt conviction was a Class A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), which carries a maximum revocation imprisonment sentence of five years, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court considered the relevant sentencing factors and then sentenced Wright to below the five-year maximum, sentencing him to thirty months of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.

We review the district court's ultimate decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion, and the underlying finding of a violation of supervised release for clear error. United States v. Oquendo–Rivera, 586 F.3d 63, 66–67 (1st Cir.2009) ; United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528, 532 (1st Cir.1996). We review the revocation sentence the court imposes for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Butler–Acevedo, 656 F.3d 97, 99 (1st Cir.2011), though our review of legal questions is plenary, United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 294 (1st Cir.1993).

A. Aggravated Assault under Maine Law

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), a court may revoke a term of supervised release if the court "finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Wright challenges the court's finding that he violated the term of his release that prohibits commission of a state crime. He argues that he did not commit aggravated assault under Maine law. We agree with the district court that Wright's conduct during the July 20, 2014, incident constituted aggravated assault under § 208(1)(B), the "use of a dangerous weapon" prong of the Maine statute. See Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17–A, § 208(1) (2014). As a result, we need not reach whether his conduct also qualifies under the "extreme indifference" prong, id. § 208(1)(C).

Under applicable Maine law, criminal liability for aggravated assault attaches when a person "recklessly" causes bodily injury with "a dangerous weapon." Id. § 208(1)(B). Maine courts have recognized that a vehicle can qualify as a dangerous weapon if the vehicle is "used ... in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury." State v. Pierre, 649 A.2d 333, 334 (Me.1994) ; see State v. York, 899 A.2d 780, 783 (Me.2006) ; Pierre, 649 A.2d at 334–35 & 334 n. 3 (discussing Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17–A, § 2(9)(A), defining "use of a dangerous weapon").

Wright asserts that "the circumstances in this case do not allow finding that the truck was used as a dangerous weapon," as "[n]ot every instance of driving away causes the motor vehicle to be defined as a weapon under Maine law." Even were that so in other situations, it is not true here. Here, Wright grabbed a man through the passenger-side window of a vehicle and instructed the driver to "go, go, go," leaving the man dangling as the vehicle sped forward, before the man was released and run over by the vehicle. While the victim, Trayes, survived without life-threatening injuries, Wright's use of the vehicle was certainly "in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury." Pierre, 649 A.2d at 334. Wright has not even attempted to explain how the facts could otherwise be viewed.² There was no error in the district court's determination that Wright violated the term of his release proscribing a violation of state law.

B. Classification of Criminal Contempt

As a result of his violations of supervised release, Wright was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment.³ Wright contends that his underlying conviction for criminal contempt should be classified as a Class C felony, not a Class A felony, and that he was incorrectly exposed to a maximum prison term of five years. In fact, he was sentenced to less than that maximum prison term. His argument is that, nonetheless, his maximum exposure was to no more than two years, and his actual sentence of thirty months, or two and a half years, was more than that.

In revocation sentencing, after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court may revoke a term of supervised release and "require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release."

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). However, maximum imprisonment exposure is limited as follows:

[A] defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any other case.

Id. Crimes are classified for purposes of § 3583 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) :

An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment

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