State v. Boykin

Decision Date28 January 2003
Docket Number(AC 21209)
Citation74 Conn. App. 679,813 A.2d 143
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. NATHANIEL BOYKIN.
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Foti, Schaller and Mihalakos, Js.

Richard W. Callahan, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Robin S. Schwartz, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Cornelius P. Kelly, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

FOTI, J.

The defendant, Nathaniel Boykin, appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of the crimes of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a),1 and sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1).2 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion for a mistrial after the state, during its case-in-chief, introduced evidence of his prior arrest record and (2) refused to permit him to testify as a surrebuttal witness. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of April 9, 1999, the female victim spent time socializing in a bar in Bridgeport. At around 2 a.m. on April 10, 1999, the victim left the bar and walked to a nearby McDonald's restaurant to purchase food. Upon arriving, the victim encountered the defendant, an acquaintance. McDonald's was not open for business at that hour, and the victim accepted the defendant's invitation to walk with her to a diner in Fairfield.

Upon their arrival at the diner, the victim and the defendant learned that it also was not open for business. At that point, the victim told the defendant that she intended to go to an empty parking area behind the diner to urinate. Shortly thereafter, while the victim was behind the diner partially undressed, the defendant pushed her to the ground and began to choke her. Despite the victim's efforts, both verbal and physical, to fend off the assault, the defendant forcibly positioned himself on top of the victim and forced her to perform oral sex and to engage in vaginal intercourse.

After he completed his sexual assault, the defendant told the victim that he could not trust her and began to choke her again. The victim freed herself from the defendant's hold on her neck and ran to a nearby motor inn where she summoned police assistance. When police arrived, they found the victim to be hysterical. The victim had scratch marks on her neck that were consistent with her allegation that the defendant had choked her. She told police that she had been raped, and the police found items of her personal property behind the diner. The results of rape kit tests performed on the victim after the assault were consistent with a finding that the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. After further investigation, police arrested the defendant and charged him with the crimes of which he was convicted. Additional relevant facts will be provided as necessary in the context of the defendant's claims.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial after the state, during its case-in-chief, introduced evidence of his prior arrest record. We disagree.

The following additional facts underlie the defendant's claim. As part of its case-in-chief, the state called Frederick Hine, a detective in the Fairfield police department who had investigated the case, to testify. Hine testified as to the course of the investigation and, specifically, how the police came to identify the defendant as a suspect. Immediately after the incident, the victim identified the assailant solely as "Nate." Hine testified that by virtue of his interviews with the victim and on the basis of evidence that she provided to him, he ultimately learned the defendant's full name and interviewed him.

The prosecutor then asked Hine how he used the information that he learned during his initial interview with the defendant at the defendant's residence. Hine's response to that inquiry forms the basis of the present claim. The following colloquy occurred:

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. Now, after you went to [the defendant's residence] . . . did you do anything with the information that you had received while you were [there] concerning [the defendant]?

"[The Witness]: Yes. We then went to the Bridgeport police department now having the name Nathaniel Boykin and the date of birth. We completed a criminal history check on the name, uh, hoping to find that with an arrest record there may be a photograph."

The defendant's counsel immediately objected to Hine's response. The court ordered the response stricken and ordered the jury to ignore the response. The prosecutor then continued his examination of Hine "[Prosecutor]: Now, Detective Hine, you said that you went to the Bridgeport police department. After you conducted your investigation or an inquiry at the Bridgeport police department, did you do anything else with respect to this particular case? Do you remember what you did?

"[The Witness]: Yes. I asked the Bridgeport police department if—

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. Based upon your discussions with the Bridgeport police—let me couch it this way. Based upon your discussions with the Bridgeport police, did you get some information from them?

"[The Witness]: Yes.

"[Prosecutor]: General information.

"[The Witness]: Yes.

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. And based upon that information that you received from them, what did you do next in this investigation?

"[The Witness]: I was able to obtain a photographic array consisting of eight similar looking black male subjects, one of which was [the defendant].

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. And with that photographic array—what did you [do] with the photographic array?

"[The Witness]: That evening . . . we took the array and went to the home of [the victim] and showed it to her.

"[Prosecutor]: Okay. And was [the victim] able to make an identification at that point in time?

"[The Witness]: Yes. She immediately looked at— pointed to photograph number five and said, absolutely, without doubt, 100 percent sure she [was] that the subject in photograph number five was a photograph of the person who sexually assaulted her.

"[Prosecutor]: I'm going to show you what has been previously marked as a full exhibit. State's exhibit four. Do you recognize this particular document, sir?

"[The Witness]: Yes.

"[Prosecutor]: And what is this?

"[The Witness]: That's the photographic array, uh, that I obtained from the Bridgeport police department."

Shortly thereafter, the state rested its case. The defendant's counsel requested a mistrial. In support of his motion, the defendant's counsel argued that Hine testified that "he had contacted the Bridgeport police department, that they had a rap sheet on [the defendant] and that they had a photograph of [the defendant] . . . from a previous arrest, and that's how he got the photo array." The defendant's counsel posited that the defendant's "right to remain silent may have the effect of not allowing the jury to consider his previous felony conviction." Counsel further argued that he believed that the court's curative instruction would not remedy the prejudice caused to his client.

The prosecutor opposed the defendant's motion by arguing that Hine indicated merely that he had obtained a photograph of the defendant from the Bridgeport police department and that this testimony did not necessarily imply that the department possessed such photograph because the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime. The prosecutor also argued that contrary to the defendant's counsel's interpretation of Hine's testimony, Hine did not indicate that the Bridgeport police department had a "rap sheet" on the defendant. The prosecutor further pointed out that the photographic array submitted to the jury as an exhibit contained the phrase "Bridgeport police department." The court denied the motion for a mistrial. It reasoned that any prejudice caused by Hine's remark was cured by the court's immediate cautionary instruction. The court noted that the statement was not "deliberate." Further, the court noted that Hine's testimony was not so severe as to lead to a conclusion that the jury would be unable to follow the court's instruction to disregard Hine's statement. The court also found it persuasive that the photographic array previously introduced as a full exhibit contained the phrase "Bridgeport police department." The court informed the defendant's counsel that should he so desire, the court would deliver another cautionary instruction to the jury in regard to Hine's testimony.

We begin our analysis by identifying the standard by which we will review the defendant's claim. "The decision as to whether to grant a motion for a mistrial. . . is one that requires the trial court to exercise its judicial discretion. . . . Our review of the trial court's exercise of its discretion is limited to questions of whether the court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . Every reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the trial court's ruling. . . . It is only when an abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done that a reversal will result from the trial court's exercise of discretion. . . .

"While the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored. . . . If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . The general rule in Connecticut is that a mistrial is granted only where it is apparent to the court that as a result of some occurrence during trial a party has been denied the opportunity for a fair trial. . . . The trial court enjoys wide discretion in deciding whether a mistrial is...

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11 cases
  • State v. Nash
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 20, 2006
    ...of specificity leads us to conclude that the remark did not unfairly prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury." State v. Boykin, 74 Conn.App. 679, 687, 813 A.2d 143, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 901, 819 A.2d 837 To the extent that the jury arguably could have interpreted the isolated sta......
  • State v. Gilbert I.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • April 8, 2008
    ...but is not a clear expression of prior misconduct on the part of the defendant. (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., State v. Boykin, 74 Conn.App. 679, 687, 813 A.2d 143 ("[s]imply stated, the remark's lack of specificity leads us to conclude that the remark did not unfairly prejudice the defendant......
  • Outing v. Warden
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • November 20, 2017
    ... ... petitioner to fifty years of imprisonment. The ... petitioner's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal ... State v. Outing , 298 Conn. 34, 3 A.3d 1 (2010). The ... Supreme Court held that the jury could have reasonably found ... the following facts: ... of the court, and cited the following language from State ... v. Boykin , 74 Conn.App. 679, 691-92, 813 A.2d 143, cert ... denied, 263 Conn. 901, 819 A.2d 837 (2003): " Rebuttal ... evidence is that which is ... ...
  • State v. Anderson
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    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • March 15, 2016
    ...concluded as it did in denying the motion for a mistrial." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boykin, 74 Conn.App. 679, 685–87, 813 A.2d 143, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 901, 819 A.2d 837 (2003).5 Before the trial court and this court, the defendant consistently cha......
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