Davis v. State

Decision Date26 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 49S05-0408-CR-349.,49S05-0408-CR-349.
Citation813 N.E.2d 1176
PartiesDonald DAVIS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Kimberly A. Jackson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Donald Davis assaulted his former girlfriend, and the court found him guilty of criminal recklessness involving serious bodily injury, a class D felony. The question on appeal is whether a lacerated lip and a broken pinky finger constitute serious bodily injury. We hold they do not.

After K.R. and Davis had broken up, he appeared at her home asking to use the bathroom, and she agreed. While Davis was still in the house, one Roy Bush telephoned to ask K.R. to return his jacket. This communication angered Davis, who figured Bush to be the replacement boyfriend. K.R. left the house with the jacket, and Davis returned to his car.

K.R. began walking down the sidewalk to return the jacket, and Davis pulled up alongside her cussing her out. He then sped ahead and unsuccessfully tried to run over Bush, who was up the street. Davis stopped his car and exited, ran up to K.R., and pushed her down to the street. As she attempted to stand, Davis punched her in the mouth. A moment later as K.R. tried to flee, Davis attempted to run her over. Fortunately, a police car appeared, and K.R. ran to it for protection as Davis drove away. The officer noted that her lips were swollen and bleeding and that she appeared to have an injured finger.

K.R.'s mother drove her to the hospital for treatment. The medical records reflect that she had an "abrasion" and some "slight" swelling on her knee (Exhibits at 5, 7), a "very superficial laceration to the middle portion of the upper lip on the inside" (Id. at 5-6), and a fractured little finger on her right hand. Medical personnel gave K.R. a splint for her finger (Exhibits at 19, 21). They recommended Tylenol or Advil for any pain. (Exhibits at 8.)

After a bench trial, the court found Davis guilty of criminal recklessness. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West 1998 & Supp.2004). It found him not guilty on counts of domestic battery and criminal recklessness with a motor vehicle. It concluded that conviction on the recklessness count barred a conviction on yet a fourth charge, battery as a class A misdemeanor. The court sentenced Davis to two years, as executed time.

The legislature has defined the crime in question as follows: "A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs... an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person ... commits criminal recklessness[,] ... a Class B misdemeanor." Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2(b). Subsection (d) says that a person "who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally ... inflicts serious bodily injury on another person ... commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony." The Code defines "serious bodily injury" as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus." Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-1-25 (West 1998 & Supp.2004).

It is the task of finders of fact, juries or judges, to determine in the first instance whether the evidence in a particular case adequately proves the elements of an offense. When a defendant contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, and we affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Our commitment to the role of fact-finders tends to produce considerable deference on a matter as judgmental as whether a bodily injury was "serious." The appellate courts have sometimes been willing to sanction convictions resting on rather slim levels of injury. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 520 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind.1988)

(injury held "serious" when victim was struck in face and back of head, causing...

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    • United States
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