Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. C-8843,C-8843 |
| Parties | 56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 527, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,960 Thomas C. SCHROEDER, Petitioner, v. TEXAS IRON WORKS, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
The primary issue in this case is whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to bringing a civil action for age discrimination in employment. Thomas Schroeder sued his former employer, Texas Iron Works, Inc. ("TIW"), for damages for wrongful discharge, asserting causes of action for age discrimination, breach of contract and misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims. The court of appeals affirmed. 769 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989). We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Because this case involves our review of a summary judgment, we take as true the facts most favorable to Schroeder, principally his deposition testimony. TIW employed Schroeder from 1943 to 1984 (except for two years when he was in the Navy). No written employment contract between Schroeder and TIW was ever executed. Schroeder started as a helper and then worked variously as a machinist, mechanic, welder and shop foreman. He transferred to and became manager of TIW's Corpus Christi plant in 1980.
In 1982 Schroeder purchased a lot on Lake Mathis in San Patricio County for the purpose of building a retirement home. After building a seawall and pier, digging a well and obtaining electricity for the new home, he sold his existing home in Corpus Christi in November 1983.
In November or December 1983, Schroeder telephoned his supervisor in Houston, Gary Jordan (TIW's vice-president in charge of manufacturing). Schroeder told Jordan he knew the company had financial difficulties, and he asked about his job. He told Jordan he was about to build his home and "did not want to just get it built or just moved in and get laid-off." According to Schroeder, Jordan replied: "No, don't worry about that, go ahead and build it."
Shortly thereafter, Schroeder telephoned Jordan again. Schroeder asked to speak to Steve Pearce, TIW's president, to ask about his job and building his house. Jordan told him that "he had talked to Steve about it and Steve said to go ahead and build it."
There was no mention in these discussions of employing Schroeder for any specific time period. Schroeder's own idea, however, was that he would be employed by TIW for another eight to ten years, until he reached retirement age.
When TIW's Corpus Christi plant ceased operations in early 1984 because of the oil industry decline, TIW offered and Schroeder accepted a position in sales and service as operations manager. Schroeder then completed his retirement home and occupied it in July 1984. The next month, TIW notified Schroeder that he would be laid off on November 1, 1984, for economic reasons.
Schroeder brought this action against TIW in August 1985. He alleged that contrary to TIW's assurances about the security of his job, he was laid off after 41 years of employment while younger men were kept on TIW's payroll. He also alleged that in answer to his inquiries he was told by TIW that his job was secure, and in reliance on such statements he built his retirement home. 1
TIW moved for partial summary judgment on the age discrimination claim on the grounds that (1) Schroeder had failed to file a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") as required by the Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987) ("CHRA"), and (2) the CHRA's limitations period for filing suit based upon such a complaint had expired. 2 The trial court granted summary judgment on these grounds and dismissed the age discrimination claim. 3 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a person who seeks relief under the CHRA must first file a complaint with the Commission, which Schroeder failed to do.
Schroeder asserts that the trial court and the court of appeals erred in so construing the CHRA. We disagree. We hold that a person claiming a CHRA violation must first exhaust the CHRA's administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil action for such violation.
Our analysis of the CHRA begins with its general purposes, as set forth in § 1.02(1). These purposes include correlation of state law with federal law in the area of discrimination in employment. One purpose of the CHRA is "to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq.)." Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). A second purpose of the CHRA is "to create an authority that meets the criteria" under section 2000e-5(c) of Title VII and section 633 of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), which prohibits discrimination in employment against persons 40 years of age or older. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII and the ADEA.
Both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and 29 U.S.C. § 633 provide that if a state has its own anti-discrimination laws and fair employment practice agency, the EEOC must defer its processing of a discrimination complaint until the state has had at least 60 days to investigate and resolve it. Thus, one of the CHRA's purposes was to create a Texas "deferral agency" (i.e., one that the EEOC would defer to) so that the investigation and resolution of employment discrimination complaints could be handled at the state level. 4
The CHRA establishes a comprehensive administrative review system to carry out the policies embodied in Title VII. It creates the Commission and describes its powers; prohibits various "unlawful employment practices"; 5 provides for administrative review of complaints of such practices; and provides for judicial review of administrative decisions. §§ 3.01 et seq., 5.01 et seq., 6.01, and 7.01. Under CHRA Article 6, a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice may file a complaint with the Commission. Such a complaint must be filed within 180 days after the date the alleged practice occurred. § 6.01(a). This time limit has been held to be mandatory and jurisdictional. See Green v. Aluminum Co. of America, 760 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex.App.--Austin 1988, no writ).
After the complaint is filed, the Commission is required to invite the complainant and the respondent to try to resolve their dispute voluntarily before making an investigation. If the complaint is not voluntarily resolved, the Commission then conducts its investigation. § 6.01(a). If it finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission must try to eliminate such practice by "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." § 6.01(c). Thus, the CHRA clearly encourages compliance through voluntary resolution, conference, conciliation and persuasion--informal processes other than litigation. 6
CHRA Article 7 provides for judicial enforcement. If the Commission finds reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, and if efforts to resolve the matter through conciliation have been unsuccessful, the Commission may bring a civil action against the respondent. If the Commission dismisses a complaint, or if within 180 days after the complaint was filed the Commission has not filed a civil action or successfully negotiated a conciliation agreement, the Commission shall so inform the complainant. The complainant may request from the Commission a written notice of the complainant's right to file a civil action. After receipt of this notice, the complainant has 60 days in which to bring a civil action against the respondent. No civil action may be brought under the CHRA more than one year after the filing of the complaint to which the action relates. § 7.01(a). 7
Schroeder contends that a party claiming a violation of the CHRA may at its option proceed under either the administrative review procedures in Article 6 or the judicial review procedures in Article 7. He relies on § 6.01(a), which provides in part as follows:
A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice, or that person's agent, may file with the commission a complaint ... stating that an unlawful employment practice has been committed....
(Emphasis added). Schroeder argues that the word "may" in this subsection indicates a legislative intention for the Commission to be optional, not an absolute prerequisite to filing a civil action. However, for reasons explained below, the use of the word "may" indicates only that a person who believes a violation of the CHRA has occurred may, but is not obligated to, seek redress for such violation.
Schroeder also relies on § 6.01(f), which provides as follows:
No person who has initiated any action in a court of competent jurisdiction or who has an action pending before any administrative agency under any other law or any local ordinance of any political subdivision of the state based on an act that would be an unlawful employment practice under this article may file a complaint under this section with respect to the same grievance.
Schroeder argues that this provision means a party cannot file a complaint with the Commission after filing a civil action, confirming his view that litigation without prior administrative review is an optional procedure. However, this subsection is inapplicable. Section 6.01(f) precludes filing a complaint with the Commission where there are proceedings...
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