814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), 307PA15-2, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. North Carolina Department of Revenue
|Citation:||814 S.E.2d 43|
|Opinion Judge:||JACKSON, Justice.|
|Party Name:||The KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE|
|Attorney:||Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Thomas D. Myrick, Neil T. Bloomfield, Jonathan M. Watkins, and Kara N. Bitar, for plaintiff-appellee. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, Tenisha S. Jacobs, Special Deputy Attorney General, and James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor ...|
|Judge Panel:||Justice ERVIN dissenting.|
|Case Date:||June 08, 2018|
|Court:||Supreme Court of North Carolina|
Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 October 2017 .
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A - 31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 789 S.E.2d 645 (2016), affirming a n opinion and order of summary judgment dated 2 3 April 201 5 entered by Judge Gregory P. McGuire , Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A - 45.4 , in Superior Court, Wake County .
Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Thomas D. Myrick, Neil T. Bloomfield, Jonathan M. Watkins, and Kara N. Bitar, for plaintiff-appellee.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, Tenisha S. Jacobs, Special Deputy Attorney General, and James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General; and Law Office of Robert F. Orr, by Robert F. Orr, for defendant-appellant.
In this case we consider whether defendant North Carolina Department of Revenue could tax the income of plaintiff The Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 solely based on the North Carolina residence of the beneficiaries during tax years 2005 through 2008. Because we determine that plaintiff did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina to satisfy due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina, we conclude that the taxes at issue were collected unconstitutionally and, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the North Carolina Business Courts 23 April 2015 Opinion and Order
on Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff.
As the Business Court noted, the underlying, material facts of this case as established by the evidence in the record are not in dispute. The Joseph Lee Rice, III Family 1992 Trust was created in New York in 1992 for the benefit of the children of the settlor Joseph Lee Rice, III pursuant to a trust agreement between Rice and the initial trustee, William B. Matteson. In 2005 Matteson was replaced as trustee by David Bernstein, who was a resident of Connecticut. Bernstein remained in the position of trustee and remained a Connecticut resident during the entire period of time relevant to this case. The trust was and is governed by the laws of the State of New York, of which Rice was a resident. No party to the trust resided in North Carolina until Rices daughter and a primary beneficiary of the trust, Kimberly Rice Kaestner, moved to North Carolina in 1997.
On 30 December 2002, the trust was divided into three share sub-trusts one each for the benefit of Rices three children, including Kaestner. The sub-trusts were divided into three separate trusts in 2006 by Bernstein for administrative convenience. Plaintiff is the separate share trust formed for the benefit of Kaestner and her three children, all of whom resided in North Carolina during the tax years at issue.
During the tax years at issue, the assets held by plaintiff consisted of various financial investments, and the custodians of those assets were located in Boston, Massachusetts. Documents related to plaintiff such as ownership documents, financial books and records, and legal records were all kept in New York. All of plaintiffs tax returns and accountings were prepared in New York.
None of the beneficiaries of plaintiff had an absolute right to any of plaintiffs assets or income because distributions could only be made at the discretion of Bernstein, who had broad authority to manage the property held by plaintiff. No distributions were made to beneficiaries in North Carolina, including Kaestner, during the tax years at issue; however, in January 2009, plaintiff loaned $250,000 to Kaestner at Bernsteins discretion to enable her to pursue an investment opportunity. This loan was repaid.
The terms of the original trust provided that the trustee was to distribute the trust assets to Kaestner when she reached the age of forty. Before her fortieth birthday on 2 June 2009, Kaestner had conversations with her father and Bernstein about whether she wished to receive the trust assets on that date. Ultimately, she requested to extend the trust, and accordingly, Bernstein transferred the assets of plaintiff into a new trust, the KER Family Trust, in 2009. That transfer occurred after the tax years at issue, and KER Family Trust is not a party to this case.
In managing plaintiff, Bernstein provided Kaestner with accountings of trust assets, and she received legal advice regarding plaintiff from Bernstein and his firm. Kaestner and her husband also met with Bernstein in New York to discuss investment opportunities for the trust and whether Kaestner desired to receive income distribution as set forth in the original trust agreement.
During tax years 2005 through 2008, defendant taxed plaintiff on income accumulated each year, regardless of whether any of that income was distributed to any of the North Carolina beneficiaries. Plaintiff sought a refund of those taxes totaling more than $1.3 million, including $79,634.00 paid for 2005, $106,637.00 paid for 2006, $1,099,660.00 paid for 2007, and $17,241.00 paid for 2008. Defendant denied the refund request on 11 February 2011.
On 21 June 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court, Wake County, alleging that defendant wrongfully denied plaintiffs request for a refund because N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 is both unconstitutional on its face and as applied to collect income taxes from plaintiff during those tax years. Plaintiff claimed that the taxes collected pursuant to section 105-160.2 violate the Due Process Clause because plaintiff did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina. Plaintiff also claimed that the taxes violate the Commerce Clause on several grounds, including that the tax was not applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
to the taxing state. Plaintiff claimed that consequently, the tax also violated Article I, Section 19 of the state constitution. Based on these claims, plaintiff requested a declaration that section 105-160.2 is unconstitutional and an order from the court requiring defendant to refund any taxes, penalties, and interest paid by plaintiff for tax years 2005 through 2008, and enjoining defendant from enforcing any future assessments against plaintiff pursuant to section 105-160.2. Subsequent evidence indicated that penalties were assessed against plaintiff for tax years 2005 and 2006. These penalties were not paid by plaintiff and were ultimately waived at plaintiffs request, rendering moot that specific portion of plaintiffs claim for relief.
In accord with N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b), this case was designated as a mandatory complex business case by the Chief Justice on 19 July 2012. On 11 February 2013, the Business Court issued an Opinion and Order on Defendants Motion to Dismiss in which it granted the motion as to plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, but denied the motion as to plaintiffs constitutional claims.
Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on its constitutional claims on 8 July 2014, and defendant filed its own motion for summary judgment on 4 September 2014. In its Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, the Business Court observed that when a taxed entity such as plaintiff is not physically present in the taxing state, the taxed entity must "purposefully avail[ ] itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum state" for the tax to satisfy due process requirements. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. N.C. Dept of Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County (Bus. Ct.) Apr. 23, 2015), affd, __ N.C.App. __, 789 S.E.2d 645 (2016) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) ). Determining that plaintiff did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits of the taxing state based solely on the beneficiaries residence in North Carolina, the Business Court concluded that the provision of section 105-160.2 allowing taxation of trust income "that is for the benefit of a resident of this State," N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 (2005), violated both the Due Process Clause and Article I, Section 19 of the state constitution as applied to plaintiff. Applying the four-pronged analysis for determining the constitutionality of a tax pursuant to the Commerce Clause as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), the Business...
To continue readingFREE SIGN UP