Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue

Decision Date08 June 2018
Docket NumberNo. 307PA15-2,307PA15-2
Parties The KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

371 N.C. 133
814 S.E.2d 43

The KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

No. 307PA15-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed June 8, 2018


Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Thomas D. Myrick, Neil T. Bloomfield, Jonathan M. Watkins, and Kara N. Bitar, for plaintiff-appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, Tenisha S. Jacobs, Special Deputy Attorney General, and James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General; and Law Office of Robert F. Orr, by Robert F. Orr, for defendant-appellant.

JACKSON, Justice.

371 N.C. 133

In this case we consider whether defendant North Carolina Department of Revenue could tax the income of plaintiff The Kimberly

371 N.C. 134

Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 solely based on the North Carolina residence of the beneficiaries during tax years 2005 through 2008. Because we determine that plaintiff did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina to satisfy due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina, we conclude that the taxes at issue were collected unconstitutionally and, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the North Carolina Business Court's 23 April 2015 Opinion and Order

814 S.E.2d 45

on Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff.

As the Business Court noted, the underlying, material facts of this case as established by the evidence in the record are not in dispute. The Joseph Lee Rice, III Family 1992 Trust was created in New York in 1992 for the benefit of the children of the settlor Joseph Lee Rice, III pursuant to a trust agreement between Rice and the initial trustee, William B. Matteson. In 2005 Matteson was replaced as trustee by David Bernstein, who was a resident of Connecticut. Bernstein remained in the position of trustee and remained a Connecticut resident during the entire period of time relevant to this case. The trust was and is governed by the laws of the State of New York, of which Rice was a resident. No party to the trust resided in North Carolina until Rice's daughter and a primary beneficiary of the trust, Kimberly Rice Kaestner, moved to North Carolina in 1997.

On 30 December 2002, the trust was divided into three share sub-trusts one each for the benefit of Rice's three children, including Kaestner. The sub-trusts were divided into three separate trusts in 2006 by Bernstein for administrative convenience. Plaintiff is the separate share trust formed for the benefit of Kaestner and her three children, all of whom resided in North Carolina during the tax years at issue.

During the tax years at issue, the assets held by plaintiff consisted of various financial investments, and the custodians of those assets were located in Boston, Massachusetts. Documents related to plaintiff such as ownership documents, financial books and records, and legal records were all kept in New York. All of plaintiff's tax returns and accountings were prepared in New York.

None of the beneficiaries of plaintiff had an absolute right to any of plaintiff's assets or income because distributions could only be made at the discretion of Bernstein, who had broad authority to manage the property held by plaintiff. No distributions were made to beneficiaries in

371 N.C. 135

North Carolina, including Kaestner, during the tax years at issue; however, in January 2009, plaintiff loaned $250,000 to Kaestner at Bernstein's discretion to enable her to pursue an investment opportunity. This loan was repaid.

The terms of the original trust provided that the trustee was to distribute the trust assets to Kaestner when she reached the age of forty. Before her fortieth birthday on 2 June 2009, Kaestner had conversations with her father and Bernstein about whether she wished to receive the trust assets on that date. Ultimately, she requested to extend the trust, and accordingly, Bernstein transferred the assets of plaintiff into a new trust, the KER Family Trust, in 2009. That transfer occurred after the tax years at issue, and KER Family Trust is not a party to this case.

In managing plaintiff, Bernstein provided Kaestner with accountings of trust assets, and she received legal advice regarding plaintiff from Bernstein and his firm. Kaestner and her husband also met with Bernstein in New York to discuss investment opportunities for the trust and whether Kaestner desired to receive income distribution as set forth in the original trust agreement.

During tax years 2005 through 2008, defendant taxed plaintiff on income accumulated each year, regardless of whether any of that income was distributed to any of the North Carolina beneficiaries. Plaintiff sought a refund of those taxes totaling more than $1.3 million, including $79,634.00 paid for 2005, $106,637.00 paid for 2006, $1,099,660.00 paid for 2007, and $17,241.00 paid for 2008. Defendant denied the refund request on 11 February 2011.

On 21 June 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court, Wake County, alleging that defendant wrongfully denied plaintiff's request for a refund because N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 is both unconstitutional on its face and as applied to collect income taxes from plaintiff during those tax years. Plaintiff claimed that the taxes collected pursuant to section 105-160.2 violate the Due Process Clause because plaintiff did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina. Plaintiff also claimed that the taxes violate the Commerce Clause on several grounds, including that the tax was not applied to an activity with a substantial nexus

814 S.E.2d 46

to the taxing state. Plaintiff claimed that consequently, the tax also violated Article I, Section 19 of the state constitution. Based on these claims, plaintiff requested a declaration that section 105-160.2 is unconstitutional and an order from the court requiring defendant to refund any taxes, penalties, and interest paid by plaintiff for tax years 2005 through 2008, and enjoining defendant from enforcing any future

371 N.C. 136

assessments against plaintiff pursuant to section 105-160.2. Subsequent evidence indicated that penalties were assessed against plaintiff for tax years 2005 and 2006. These penalties were not paid by plaintiff and were ultimately waived at plaintiff's request, rendering moot that specific portion of plaintiff's claim for relief.

In accord with N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(b), this case was designated as a mandatory complex business case by the Chief Justice on 19 July 2012. On 11 February 2013, the Business Court issued an Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in which it granted the motion as to plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief, but denied the motion as to plaintiff's constitutional claims.

Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on its constitutional claims on 8 July 2014, and defendant filed its own motion for summary judgment on 4 September 2014. In its Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, the Business Court observed that when a taxed entity such as plaintiff is not physically present in the taxing state, the taxed entity must "purposefully avail[ ] itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum state" for the tax to satisfy due process requirements. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue , No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County (Bus. Ct.) Apr. 23, 2015), aff'd , ––– N.C. App. ––––, 789 S.E.2d 645 (2016) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298, 307, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) ). Determining that plaintiff did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits of the taxing state based solely on the beneficiaries' residence in North Carolina, the Business Court concluded that the provision of section 105-160.2 allowing taxation of trust income "that is for the benefit of a resident of this State," N.C.G.S. § 105-160.2 (2005), violated both the Due Process Clause and Article I, Section 19 of the state constitution as applied to plaintiff. Applying the four-pronged analysis for determining the constitutionality of a tax pursuant to the Commerce Clause as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), the Business Court also determined that the same provision of section 105-160.2 violated the Commerce Clause as applied to plaintiff. Therefore, the Business Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and ordered that any taxes and penalties paid by plaintiff pursuant to section 105-160.2 be refunded with interest.

Defendant noticed its appeal to the Court of Appeals on 22 May 2015. Before that court, defendant challenged the substantive conclusions of the Business Court that taxation of the trust based solely on

371 N.C. 137
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5 cases
  • N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 21, 2019
    ...that the Trust accumulated to Kaestner or her children, and the trustee’s contacts with Kaestner were "infrequent."3 371 N.C. 133, 143, 814 S.E.2d 43, 50 (2018). The Trust was subject to New York law, Art. X, App. 69, the grantor was a New York resident, App. 44, and no trustee lived in Nor......
  • State v. Killette, COA18-26-2
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
    • November 5, 2019
    ...writs of certiorari or have any bearing upon the decision as to whether a writ of certiorari should be issued ." ––– N.C. at ––––, 814 S.E.2d at 43 (emphasis added). Nor do I agree with the majority's conclusion that Pimental and State v. Harris , 243 N.C. App. 137, 776 S.E.2d 554 (2015), a......
  • State v. Ledbetter, 402PA15-2
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • June 8, 2018
    ...than automatically denying the petition for writ of certiorari or requiring that the heightened standard set out in Rule 2 be satisfied.3 814 S.E.2d 43371 N.C. 197 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had both the jurisdiction and the discretionary authority to issue defendant's writ of certio......
  • State v. Ledbetter, COA15-414-3
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
    • August 21, 2018
    ..."exercise [our] discretion to determine whether [we] should grant or deny [D]efendant's petition for writ of certiorari." Id. at ––––, 814 S.E.2d at 43 (2018).II. Writ of Certiorari "A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedial writ[.]" State v. Roux , 263 N.C. 149, 153, 139 S.E.2d 189......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Practical advice on current issues.
    • United States
    • The Tax Adviser Vol. 52 No. 5, May 2021
    • May 1, 2021
    ...the beneficiaries had not received any trust income nor exercised control over trust income or assets (139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019), aff'g 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff'g 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff'g 2015 NCBC 36 (N.C. Sup. Ct. (Bus.) 2015)). Along with court challenges that scruti......

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