814 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2002), SC94450, Doe v. Evans

• Citation: 814 So.2d 370, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S 229
• Party Name: JANE DOE, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM DUNBAR EVANS, III; CHURCH OF THE HOLY REDEEMER, INC.; THE DIOCESE OF SOUTHEAST FLORIDA; AND CALVIN O. SCHOFIELD, JR., Respondents.
• Case Date: March 14, 2002
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 370

814 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2002)

27 Fla. L. Weekly S 229

JANE DOE, Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM DUNBAR EVANS, III; CHURCH OF THE HOLY REDEEMER, INC.; THE DIOCESE OF SOUTHEAST FLORIDA; AND CALVIN O. SCHOFIELD, JR., Respondents.

No. SC94450

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 14, 2002

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Constitutional Construction Fourth District - Case No. 4D97-0879 (Palm Beach County)

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Edward Campbell of The Roberts Law Firm, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; and Randy D. Ellison, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner

Thomas E. Ice of Barwick, Dillian, Lambert & Ice, P.A., Miami, Florida; and David S. Rutherford and Christopher Renzulli of Renzulli & Rutherford, L.L.P., New York, New York, for Respondents

James F. Gilbride and Hetal H. Desai of Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A., Miami, Florida; J. Patrick Fitzgerald, General Counsel for Archdiocese of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida; and George Meros of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, Tallahassee, Florida, for Archbishop John C. Favalora, as Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Miami and as President of the Florida Catholic Conference and J. Lloyd Knox, Presiding Bishop of the Florida Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, Amici Curiae

May L. Cain and William J. Snihur, Jr. of Cain & Snihur, North Miami Beach, Florida, for Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II, Amicus Curiae

Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae

Peter A. Miller of Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida, and Robert S. Glazier of the Law Offices of Robert S. Glazier, Miami, Florida, for Miami Shores Presbyterian Church, Amicus Curiae

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review Doe v. Evans, 718 So.2d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that expressly construes the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,

' 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The issue presented in this case is whether the First Amendment bars claims for negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty against a religious institution based upon alleged sexual misconduct by one of its clergy with a parishioner in the course of an established marital counseling relationship. For the reasons expressed in Malicki v. Doe, No. SC01-179 (Fla. Mar. 14, 2002), we hold that the First Amendment does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability for harm caused to a third party arising from the alleged sexual misconduct by one of its clergy members during the course of an established marital counseling relationship. We therefore quash the Fourth District's contrary decision.

BACKGROUND

Jane Doe brought a lawsuit against the Reverend William Dunbar Evans, III

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("Evans"), the Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc. ("Holy Redeemer"), the Diocese of Southeast Florida, Inc. ("the Diocese"), and Calvin O. Schofield, Jr., a bishop of the Diocese. Doe alleged in her second amended complaint that she was a former parishioner at Holy Redeemer, where Evans was employed as the pastor. Doe's complaint asserted that part of Evans' duties as pastor included "providing counseling and spiritual advice to parishioners having marital difficulties." Doe alleged that Evans approached her while she was having marital difficulties and asked if he could assist her in counseling, spawning a counselor-counselee relationship. During the course of this counseling relationship, which lasted several months, Evans instituted a personal relationship and became involved with Doe in a "romantic manner."

Doe alleged that Holy Redeemer, the Diocese, and Schofield ("the Church Defendants") all were aware of prior incidents involving sexual misconduct by Evans during counseling "at another church and also within the Diocese," and also while at Holy Redeemer, all before the counseling relationship between Doe and Evans began. Doe alleged that "[i]n spite of this knowledge, nothing was done by the [Church] Defendants . . . to rectify the situation." Doe alleged that the Church Defendants had the right to exercise control over a "sexually exploitive pastoral counselor" and in fact had exercised such control in the past. Further, Doe claimed that none of the defendants' conduct was "motivated by any sincerely held religious belief."

Count I of the second amended complaint set forth a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty as to all defendants. Doe alleged that Evans and the Church Defendants assumed a fiduciary duty to her by directly soliciting her trust and confidence. Evans then breached that duty by becoming romantically involved with her and by failing to adequately keep Doe's interests paramount, and the Church Defendants allegedly breached their fiduciary duty because they were aware early on in the counseling process that Evans was abusing his position of trust but failed to protect Doe. Count II of the second amended complaint set forth a cause of action against the Church Defendants for negligent hiring and supervision based upon their knowledge of Evans' prior sexual misconduct in similar circumstances. Count III alleged a cause of action against all of the defendants for outrageous conduct.

The Church Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that Doe's tort claims were barred by the First Amendment and involved practices and procedures beyond the purview of secular courts. ¹ 1 As to the third count alleging a cause of action for outrageous conduct, the Church Defendants alternatively claimed that this cause of action was neither recognized by the Florida courts nor, if the allegations were construed as a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, did the allegations rise to the level of "outrageousness" required by case law. See Evans, 718 So.2d at 288. The Fourth District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of this count, see id. at 293-94, and Doe did not raise this issue as error in this Court.

Further, the Church Defendants did not seek dismissal of the first two counts on the basis that those counts failed to state a cause of action under Florida law, nor did they request a more definite statement

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as to any of the allegations in the second amended complaint. The trial court granted the Church Defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis that the First Amendment barred consideration of Doe's claims. Doe appealed the dismissal and the Fourth District affirmed. The Fourth District agreed with the trial court that the First Amendment barred both the breach of fiduciary duty claim and the negligent hiring and supervision claims against the Church Defendants. See id. In holding that the First Amendment barred considerations of the tort claims in this case, it explained that had this case arisen in the context of allegations involving sexual assault on a child, the case would present a more compelling factual scenario. See id. at 290.

DISCUSSION

In Malicki, No. SC01-179, we held that the First Amendment does not preclude a secular court from imposing liability against a church for harm caused to an adult and a child parishioner arising from the alleged sexual assault or battery by one of its clergy. Id., slip op. at 2. In so holding, we disapproved the reasoning of the Fourth District's opinion in this case, which apparently would have allowed a tort claim against a church defendant only if the underlying sexual misconduct involved criminal activity. See id. at 30-31. As we explained in Malicki, "[w]hether the priest's tortious conduct in this case involved improper sexual relations with an adult parishioner he was counseling or sexual assault and battery of a minor, the necessary inquiry in the claim against the Church Defendants is similarly framed: whether the Church Defendants had reason to know of the tortious conduct and did nothing to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm from being inflicted upon the plaintiffs." Id. at 31.

In this case, Doe raises claims for negligent hiring and supervision and breach of fiduciary duty against the Church Defendants, and these claims are based upon her allegations that Evans engaged in a sexual relationship with her in the course of marital counseling. ² In Malicki, we concluded that the First Amendment did not bar claims for negligent hiring and supervision because the claims constituted neutral principles of tort law that did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. Id. at 30-32. Consequently, we conclude that Doe's right to bring negligent hiring and supervision claims is not barred by the First Amendment.

As to the fiduciary duty claim, Doe also asserts that the Church Defendants breached a fiduciary duty when they failed to protect her from the known harm inflicted by Evans. The Fourth District rejected the contention that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was simply a disguise

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for an impermissible clergy malpractice claim. See Evans, 718 So.2d at 291. We agree with the Fourth District that Doe's breach of fiduciary duty claim is not tantamount to a clergy malpractice claim.

This Court has characterized a fiduciary relationship in the following manner:

The relation and duties involved need not be legal; they may be moral, social, domestic or personal. If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties (that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused), that is sufficient as a predicate for relief. The origin of the confidence is immaterial.

Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 421 (Fla. 1927) (emphasis added). A fiduciary relationship may be implied by law, and such relationships are "premised upon the specific factual situation surrounding the transaction and the relationship of the parties." Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So.2d 515,...