Maudsley v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 2003
• Citation: 357 N.J. Super. 560,816 A.2d 189
• Parties: Charles MAUDSLEY and Barbara Maudsley, Plaintiff-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. STATE of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police Department, Trooper Gary D. Rhile, Trooper Joseph Brown, Trooper Mark Weeks, Trooper Brian Crain, Trooper John Hunt, Trooper Steven J. Cozzi, Trooper Dennis Mcnulty, Trooper Joseph Farro, Sergeant James Kanz, and R. Militano, in their Official Capacity and Individually, Cape May County Prosecutor's Office, Cape May County Narcotics Task Force, Robert Cramer, Cape May County Narcotics Task Force Investigator, in his Official Capacity and Individually, Lieutenant A. Barnett, Supervisor of the Cape May County Narcotics Task Force, in his Official Capacity and Individually, Lower Township Police Department, Detective William Hinkle of the Lower Township Police Department, in his Official Capacity and Individually, and Cape May County Sheriff's Department, Defendant-Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

816 A.2d 189

357 N.J. Super. 560

Charles MAUDSLEY and Barbara Maudsley, Plaintiff-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. STATE of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police Department, Trooper Gary D. Rhile, Trooper Joseph Brown, Trooper Mark Weeks, Trooper Brian Crain, Trooper John Hunt, Trooper Steven J. Cozzi, Trooper Dennis Mcnulty, Trooper Joseph Farro, Sergeant James Kanz, and R. Militano, in their Official Capacity and Individually, Cape May County Prosecutor's Office, Cape May County Narcotics Task Force, Robert Cramer, Cape May County Narcotics Task Force Investigator, in his Official Capacity and Individually, Lieutenant A. Barnett, Supervisor of the Cape May County Narcotics Task Force, in his Official Capacity and Individually, Lower Township Police Department, Detective William Hinkle of the Lower Township Police Department, in his Official Capacity and Individually, and Cape May County Sheriff's Department, Defendant-Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued October 7, 2002.

Decided February 27, 2003.

Susanna J. Morris, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for appellants (Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg and Sade, attorneys; Ms. Morris, on the brief).

Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for respondents (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Lustberg, Kevin G. Walsh, Newark, and Richard A. Grossman, Brick on the brief).

Before Judges HAVEY, WELLS and PAYNE. The opinion of the court was delivered by WELLS, J.A.D

Cape May County, Cape May County Prosecutor's Office, Cape May County Narcotics Task Force, Robert Cramer and Steven McShaffry, (the County defendants) appeal from the entry of a final judgment against them and in favor of plaintiffs, Charles Maudsley, in the sum of $100,000, and the Estate of his late wife, Barbara Maudsley, in the sum of $25,000. While the judgment did not award any prejudgment interest, it ordered defendants to pay $143,745.74 in counsel fees and costs to plaintiffs.

The Maudsleys cross appeal from the judge's decision denying punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and award of only one-half of the counsel fees sought.

The factual background out of which the judgment under appeal arises is described in our prior opinion, Maudsley v. State, 323 N.J.Super. 579, 733 A.2d 1220 (App. Div.1999). Briefly, Cramer, an agent of the Cape May County Narcotics Task Force (Task Force), applied for and obtained a search warrant for a vessel, the "Imperial," moored at the Lobster House dock in Lower Township. Cramer prepared the application based on information he received from McShaffry, another agent with the Task Force. McShaffry had received a tip from an unnamed informant that a large shipment of narcotics was aboard the Imperial, which had just arrived from Florida, and that its crew was heavily armed. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a tax court judge, a large contingent of police officers, including State troopers, raided and searched the Imperial on October 2, 1991. After a forty-minute search, during which the owner and captain, Charles Maudsley, was detained and frisked, nothing was found.

The Maudsleys filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for compensatory damages to themselves and to the Imperial, punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and counsel fees. The County defendants asserted that probable cause for the search warrant existed, but even if it did not, they were afforded a qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 protecting the officers. The Maudsleys sought the name of the confidential informant who supplied the tip and other discovery concerning the investigation leading to the issuance of the warrant. The judge denied the request for the name of the informant and eventually ruled that the search was based upon probable cause. The plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 collapsed, and the trial proceeded only on their claims of excessive force accompanying the search itself. The jury found no cause for action as to those claims. The Maudsleys appealed.

We reversed, directing that the name of the informant be produced. We stated:

In Point I, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claims against the County defendants based on defendants' qualified immunity. We decline to address this point. In our view, after the disclosure of the identity of the informant and the plaintiffs have had an opportunity to conduct discovery, the issue of the County defendants' qualified immunity should be revisited by the trial court. At that point, the trial court should reconsider whether summary judgment in favor of the County defendants is appropriate. If not, the matter must be retried as to the County defendants.

[Maudsley, supra, 323 N.J.Super. at 594, 733 A.2d 1220.]

Following our decision, the name of the informant, George McClain, was produced. Further discovery ensued revealing the details of the Task Force investigation leading to the issuance of the search warrant. The County defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. Because the most current precedent involving claims for damages under § 1983 holds that the issue of qualified immunity should be presented "`at the earliest possible stage in the litigation,'" Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 356, 749 A.2d 336 (2000) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 595 (1991), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146, 121 S.Ct. 1083, 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001)), and because the issue is one for the court not the jury, id. at 357, 749 A.2d 336, the motion and its result are a significant threshold to later rulings in the case.

The present record does not give us precisely what the judge considered on the motion. We, however, are assured from his ruling that he considered the depositions of both McShaffry and Cramer; an affidavit from Dennis Jones, an officer from Ocean City who vouched for McClain; an affidavit from an assistant prosecutor who reviewed by telephone the affidavit in support of the warrant before it was submitted to the judge; the affidavit presented to the tax court judge in support of the search warrant; McShaffry's investigative reports for the four days immediately prior to the search itself, September, 27, 28, 30 and October 1, 1991; and an affidavit from Maudsley.

Based on these submissions, the judge denied the County defendants' motion. He specifically concluded that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search the Imperial. He concluded that evidence of reliability of the informant was lacking. He also found a fact issue existed surrounding the "state of the officer's knowledge regarding the arrest and convictions as the result of information provided from ... this particular informant." The judge stated:

The depositions disclose that McShaffry and/or Cramer did some investigation into the reliability of this informant. In this regard, McShaffry relied on Cramer to check the informant's criminal record. Cramer thought he checked the record. Both officers thought that the informant had minor violations, but not criminal convictions. It turns out that in 1986 there was a conviction for burglary. There was also a—an arrest then pending, an arrest which had recently been made in June of 1991 for an assault, which was apparently never mentioned to McShaffry or Cramer. This assault charge was ultimately downgraded, and according to the depositions of McShaffry and Cramer, neither had knowledge of that particular action. These officers also relied on telephone calls, as I have said, to officers in Lower Township and Ocean City about the reliability of this informant. Detective Dennis Jones, in particular, of Ocean City, has submitted an affidavit in conjunction with this motion that he had knowledge of the informant and that based upon his own use of this informant, Detective Jones believed him to be reliable. This affidavit in this Court's view, however, is totally lacking in specificity and of little use on the issues before this court. I understand and do realize that it is true that this affidavit came some nine years after the events in this particular case. But it's generality, nonetheless is inexcusable. If the content of that affidavit is all that was given to McShaffry, then our standard of probable cause has been substantially eroded. No information has been provided by Detective Martin from Lower Township regarding his use of this informant. Although, McShaffry claims to have relied upon that information as well.

....

In addition, in regard to that particular affidavit, while the affidavit alleges numerous arrests and convictions, it does not mention any investigation into the informer's reliability or the contact with other officers at the time—or at this particular time, or at any prior time; that is, namely the Ocean City or Lower Township officers. But the affidavit certainly, as I've indicated—indicated in 5A that there had been numerous arrests and convictions. There's no information in the affidavit stating that McShaffry had reason to believe that the informer was reliable, other than as based upon an inference which may be drawn, of course, from the statement contained in 5A, that numerous—numerous arrests and convictions had been made based upon information provided by this particular informant.

The judge also found the facts surrounding the officers' independent investigation of McClain's tip either inconclusive or disputed in material respects. First, a fact issue remained "as to whether Officer McShaffry actually saw the informant enter the vessel in question." The judge reviewed the evidence on that point:

McShaffry, in response to the request, transported the agent (sic) and watched him walk to the rear of the docks to meet an allegedly Hispanic individual and board a boat with a black hull. And I know that there's some controversy factually about...