Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

Decision Date23 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14–3284.,14–3284.
Citation817 F.3d 1010
Parties Stephen HUMMEL, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. ST. JOSEPH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Kent L. Hull, Indiana Legal Services Incorporated, South Bend, IN, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

James Francis Groves, David Edward Ballard, Lee, Groves & Zalas, Aladean M. Derose, City of South Bend Legal Department, South Bend, IN, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and DARRAH, District Judge* .

HAMILTON

, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from a broad challenge to the accessibility of state court facilities in St. Joseph County, Indiana, for individuals with disabilities. Over the years of this lawsuit, some plaintiffs who were formerly litigating cases in the state court facilities have stopped doing so. Some plaintiffs have died. Others have dropped their claims. The lawsuit also seems to have prompted physical changes to the main courthouse and to the state court's policies.

In 2014, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all then-remaining claims. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm, not for any single, central reason, but for different reasons for the numerous claims. Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for some of their claims. They failed to present evidence sufficient to raise genuine disputes of material fact on other claims. Plaintiffs' strongest claim was that courthouse restrooms were inaccessible. The courthouse has since been remodeled to become more accessible, so that claim is moot.

We do not hold that the St. Joseph County courts are fully compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, we hold only that these plaintiffs have failed to present evidence sufficient to survive defendants' motion for summary judgment on the specific claims before the district court. We express no opinion regarding any possible future claims involving courthouse accessibility. If, in the future, individuals with disabilities experience problems with access to the St. Joseph County courts, their claims will need to be decided on a fresh record.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In January 2010, four plaintiffsVictoria Means, Tonia Matney, Stephen Hummel, and Margaret Hummel—sued the St. Joseph County Board of Commissioners and the City of South Bend. Plaintiffs were all individuals with disabilities, and all alleged that they had cases pending in state courts in St. Joseph County. Plaintiffs Means and Matney, who have both since died, used wheelchairs, and Matney had limited vision. Plaintiff Stephen Hummel has limited physical mobility as a result of a stroke

. His wife, plaintiff Margaret Hummel, who has since died, had limited physical stamina and ability to walk. Plaintiffs have been represented throughout this case by the same attorney, who is also an individual with a disability and uses a wheelchair.

Plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the St. Joseph County Courthouse in South Bend and the Mishawaka County Services Building (the "Mishawaka Courthouse") did not comply with federal rules ensuring accessibility for individuals using wheelchairs, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.1 The county operates both buildings, so the claims regarding the accessibility of the actual courthouse buildings were against St. Joseph County. In particular, plaintiffs explained that the courtrooms in the St. Joseph County Courthouse and the Mishawaka Courthouse failed to meet federal accessibility standards with respect to restrooms, elevators, witness stands, jury boxes, jury deliberation rooms, attorney podiums, spectator seating, entrance ramps, clerk counters, services for the blind, and water fountains.

Plaintiffs also alleged that parking around the St. Joseph County Courthouse in South Bend is not accessible to them, especially in inclement weather. They brought this claim against the city, which operates the parking near the courthouse and the snow removal services. The city was not a defendant on any claims relating to the Mishawaka Courthouse.

On September 16, 2011, the district court granted in part a motion to dismiss, concluding that none of the original plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief against the county because none of them had cases pending in the St. Joseph County courts. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add five plaintiffs with then-pending state court cases: Crystal Wright, Karen Brandy–Comer, Shawna Canarecci, Michael Ramos, and Erica Bishop. Wright, Brandy–Comer, and Ramos were also individuals with disabilities caused by mobility impairments. Canarecci and Bishop, by contrast, sought relief on the basis of their representation by an attorney with a disability (the same who represented the original four plaintiffs).

On March 4, 2013, the district court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to make the desired changes to the St. Joseph County Courthouse. At some point after the preliminary injunction hearing, though, defendants remodeled the St. Joseph County Courthouse restrooms, which plaintiffs agree are now accessible.

In December 2013, the county and city moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims, presenting evidence that their facilities complied with the federal statutes. Plaintiffs offered little evidence to rebut the evidence defendants presented. But plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction requiring the county to keep in place the ADA-compliant restrooms it had installed and to enforce one state court judge's policy that she would accommodate individuals with disabilities by transferring their cases to another courtroom.

By the time of the summary judgment motions, three of the original plaintiffsVictoria Means, Tonia Matney, and Margaret Hummel—had passed away. Still, claims remained against the city and county for both damages and injunctive relief. Two plaintiffs, Wright and Brandy–Comer, had pending litigation in the St. Joseph Superior Court. Two other plaintiffs, Bishop and Canarecci, sued based on their representation by a disabled lawyer. Plaintiff Ramos's case had been pending in the St. Joseph Superior Court but had been dismissed without prejudice in 2014 before the district court's grant of summary judgment. He nevertheless asserted his claims against defendants when the district court took up the motions for summary judgment.

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Many claims failed for lack of standing. The district court dismissed the claims of the two non-disabled plaintiffs represented by a disabled lawyer, saying broadly that Title II of the ADA did not provide for "associational" standing. The court dismissed Ramos's injunctive claims against the county for lack of standing because his case had ended. The court also dismissed Ramos's claims against the city for lack of standing because the Mishawaka Courthouse, where his case had been heard, is not located in the City of South Bend. The court held that Wright and Brandy–Comer, the two disabled plaintiffs with claims then pending at the St. Joseph County Courthouse, lacked standing to proceed with claims against the city for parking accessibility and snow removal practices. The court found no evidence that they had suffered past injuries that would support standing for damages, and that the prospect of future injury was too speculative to support an injunction.

With those rulings, what remained were damages claims relating to the two courthouses—St. Joseph County and Mishawaka—and injunctive claims relating to the St. Joseph County Courthouse. The district court disposed of those primarily through summary judgment on the merits for defendants. Regarding damages, the court held that there was no evidence that any of the remaining plaintiffs had been injured by any past inaccessibility at either courthouse. Regarding injunctive relief, the court found no evidence that the courthouse buildings remained inaccessible. The court also found that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the accessibility of the jury facilities because any injury would be too speculative, and that any challenges to the restrooms were mooted by remodeling that had been done since the beginning of the lawsuit.

The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, noting that plaintiffs had no remaining underlying claims following summary judgment for the defendants, and, regarding the restrooms, the county was unlikely to revert to inaccessible restrooms after remodeling to create accessible ones.

II. Legal Standards

Plaintiffs appeal as to both their standing to sue and the merits of their claims. Since all issues were decided on summary judgment, we review de novo questions of both standing and the merits. See Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir.2008)

. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it can show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)

. The moving party has the burden of either: (1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. E.g., Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir.2013).

If the moving party takes the former approach, the non-moving party must respond by offering evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in that party's favor on the issue. Id. at 1168–69

. The non-moving party "need not depose her own witnesses or produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, but she must ‘go beyond the pleadings' (e.g., produce affidavits,...

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