Klugh v. U.S., s. 86-3536
| Decision Date | 06 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 86-3536,s. 86-3536 |
| Citation | 818 F.2d 294 |
| Parties | Margaret KLUGH; Katherine Klugh Maultsby; Mary Klugh Garner; John Bradley Klugh; William W. Bradley, III; Frederick H. Bradley; Patrick H. Bradley; Edna Bradley Troxell; Hugh W. Bradley; Mabel Bradley Payne; Mary Bradley Pressly; Thomas R. Bradley; William T. Bradley; Margaret Bradley Poole; David W. Bradley; John T. Bradley, Jr.; Frances K. Bradley; Mark E. Bradley, Jr., Elizabeth Bradley McGarity; Robert F. Bradley, III; Thomas J. Bradley; Frances Wright Bradley, III; William R. Bradley, II; Rufus A. Johnson, III; Mary Bradley Brown; Margaret Bradley Shuford; Arthur L. Bradley; James B. Bradley; Curtis L. Bradley; David J. Wardlaw; Martha Wardlaw Buie; Foster Bradley Wardlaw, Jr.; Ivey Jean Wardlaw Pressly; Robert S. Wardlaw; William W. Wardlaw; Mildred E. Wardlaw; John U. Wardlaw; Mary Wardlaw Deason; Annie Wardlaw Wright; Frances M. Wardlaw; John K. Bradley; Mary Bradley Miller, Martha Bradley Moody; Frances Trenholm Bradley; Jane H. Bradley; Martha B. Mayo; Robert F. Bradley, Jr.; Eustace U. Bradley; Mary Bradley Cox and Frances Thompson Sheppard, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Certain Lands Located in Abbeville, Greenwood and McCormick Counties, South Carolina, Being a Portion of the Estate of W.K. Bradley, Deceased and the United States Department of Agriculture, Appellees. Margaret KLUGH; Katherine Klugh Maultsby; Mary Klugh Garner; John Bradley Klugh; William W. Bradley, III; Frederick H. Bradley; Patrick H. Bradley; Edna Bradley Troxell; Hugh W. Bradley; Mabel Bradley Payne; Mary Bradley Pressly; Thomas R. Bradley; William T. Bradley; Margaret Bradley Poole; David W. Bradley; John T. Bradley, Jr.; Frances K. Bradley; Mark E. Bradley, Jr.; Elizabeth Bradley McGarity; Robert F. Bradley, III; Thomas J. Bradley; Frances Wright Bradley, III; William R. Bradley, II; Rufus A. Johnson, III; Mary Bradley Brown; Margaret Bradley Shuford; Arthur L. Bradley; James B. Bradley; Curtis L. Bradley; David J. Wardlaw; Martha Wardlaw Buie; Foster Bradley Wardlaw, J |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Frank H. Clabaugh (Dowling, Sanders, Dukes & Svalina, P.A., Beaufort, S.C., Joseph O. Rogers, Thomas E. Shealy, Rogers & Riggs, P.A., Manning, S.C., on brief), for appellants.
J. Carol Williams, Dept. of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Div. (F. Henry Habicht, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Vinton Devane Lide, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., J.D. McCoy, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Sylvia Sepulveda-Hambor, Dirk D. Snel, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellees.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, HALL, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
In a previous appeal, we construed the will of W.K. Bradley of South Carolina who died in December 30, 1881 to determine the persons in whom the fee of his real property would ultimately vest. Klugh v. United States, 588 F.2d 45 (4 Cir.1978). We considered the question because certain of Bradley's lineal descendants were claiming that their property interests in land previously owned by him were not validly acquired by the United States in several condemnation proceedings undertaken in 1936-39 pursuant to the Weeks Act, 16 U.S.C Secs. 16 et seq. We held that under the terms of the will, title would irrevocably vest twenty-one years (possibly twenty-one years and nine months) after the death of the survivor of the testator's children and grandchildren living on the date of Bradley's death. Since the last survivor died January 21, 1967, we concluded that the fee would not have irrevocably vested until January 21, 1988, and possibly as much as nine months later. In the course of making this ruling, we noted an ambiguity as to the jurisdictional base on which the suit proceeded. We therefore directed the district court to require plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege why the district court had jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 52, n. 4.
With the interests of the testator's lineal descendants so defined, the district court on remand undertook to adjudicate the rights of the parties. The plaintiffs sought return of title of the various properties and an accounting for their interim use. They alleged that they proceeded under F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to reopen the judgments in the earlier condemnation cases on the grounds that the judgments were void, or, alternatively, that they should be set aside for good cause. On cross motions for summary judgment as to liability, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs who were adults at the time of the condemnation proceedings and had consented to the condemnations could not recover notwithstanding their contention that they were foreclosed from giving valid consent to the condemnation by the Bradley will because the will prohibited transfer of the properties. The district court therefore gave judgment for the United States as to them. But the district court gave summary judgment as to liability against the United States by setting aside the condemnation judgments in favor of (a) heirs who were unknown at the time of and who were not represented in the condemnation cases, (b) heirs who were unborn at the time of the condemnation cases, and (c) known minor and incompetent heirs at the time of the condemnation proceedings who were represented by a guardian ad litem because the guardian failed adequately to perform his duty. Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C.1985). The district court certified an interlocutory appeal, and the non-prevailing plaintiffs and the United States both appealed. We allowed the appeal. We affirm to the extent that the district court ruled the United States was not liable to consenting adult condemnees, and we vacate the remainder of the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
The facts were stated extensively in our prior opinion, and we will not repeat them. Where necessary, we will refer to them and state additional facts in the text which follows.
Even without consideration of the jurisdictional base on which the suit was brought, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs who were adults and who consented to the condemnations may not maintain suit on the ground that under the Bradley will they were prohibited from giving valid consent to convey their property. Under principles of estoppel, we hold that they are foreclosed from making this argument. 1 In their appeal (No. 86-3536), we affirm.
As we have stated, in the previous appeal we required plaintiffs to allege the basis on which the jurisdiction of the district court was invoked. Plaintiffs, consistent with their claim that they were entitled to at least a partial return of the property, alleged that they were proceeding under F.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and the district court exercised jurisdiction under that rule to reopen the judgments in the several condemnation cases. In the light of two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court since we decided the previous appeal, we think that the district court proceeded in error. We think that those cases hold, as the government contends, that plaintiffs' rights, if any, can be asserted only under the provisions of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a (QTA).
Section 2409a(a), with certain exceptions not pertinent here, permits the United States to be named "as a party defendant in a civil action ... to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights." Certainly this suit falls within those terms. It is an effort by plaintiffs to obtain an adjudication that they have an existing property right in real property which the United States purportedly condemned to establish a national park and which is being used as a national park.
In Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983), the state of North Dakota, claiming ownership of certain portions of a riverbed, sued several federal officials to resolve the dispute arising from its claim and the claim of the United States to the riverbed. Initially North Dakota sought a mandamus and injunctive relief. Later it included a claim under the QTA. After North Dakota prevailed in the district court and the court of appeals, the United States sought and obtained certiorari on the issue of whether the statute of limitations in the QTA applied to a state; and North Dakota's cross-petition for certiorari was also granted to consider if North Dakota had a remedy supplemental to the QTA. Thus two issues were presented for decision: (1) "whether Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real property," and (2) whether the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations applies when the plaintiff is a sovereign state. Id., 461 U.S. at 276-77, 103 S.Ct. at 1814. Both questions were decided in the affirmative, and it is the answer to the first which concerns us here.
The Court extensively considered the legislative history of the QTA, a statute which undertook to waive the sovereign immunity of the United States to suit with respect to suits involving title to land. Based upon that history, the Court concluded that the remedy embodied in the QTA was exclusive, and it rejected the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Taylor v. Sturgell
......Adopted by a number of courts, including the courts below in the case now before us, the exception so styled is broader than any we have so far approved. [553 U.S. ... (quoting Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (C.A.4 1987)). Rejecting both of these ......
-
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.
...... at 455–56 (describing a seven-factor test for finding virtual representation), with Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that a party is “a virtual ...Having only the briefs and the cold record, and with counsel appearing before us for only a short period of time, we are not in the position to second-guess the trial court's ......
-
Haskins v. Hawk
...original action," a narrow concept that the Fourth Circuit has also termed "virtual representation." Id. (citing Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987)). Of import here, the Fourth Circuit has squarely concluded that, in a § 1983 suit, a "government employee in his official ca......
-
Waddekk & Reed Financial, Inc. V. Torchmark Corp.
......992, 108 S.Ct. 511, 98 L.Ed.2d 511 (1987); Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1987) (doctrine of virtual representation not ......
-
Bouchat v. Bon-ton Department Stores, Inc.: claim preclusion, copyright law, and massive infringements.
...407 F.3d 643, 651 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1180 (4th Cir. 1997)). (115.) Id. (quoting Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. (116.) Johnson, supra note 109, at 1311 n.44. (117.) See Bouchat v. Champion Prods., Inc. (Champion), 327 F. Supp. 2d 537, 54......