Arizona v. Tohono O'Odham Nation

Citation818 F.3d 549
Decision Date29 March 2016
Docket NumberNos. 13–16517,13–16519,13–16520.,s. 13–16517
Parties State of ARIZONA; Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiffs, and Gila River Indian Community, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION, Defendant–Appellee. State of Arizona, Plaintiff–Appellant, and Gila River Indian Community; Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiffs, v. Tohono O'odham Nation, Defendant–Appellee. State of Arizona; Gila River Indian Community, Plaintiffs, and Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Tohono O'odham Nation, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

818 F.3d 549

State of ARIZONA; Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiffs,
and
Gila River Indian Community, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION, Defendant–Appellee.


State of Arizona, Plaintiff–Appellant,
and
Gila River Indian Community; Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiffs,
v.
Tohono O'odham Nation, Defendant–Appellee.


State of Arizona; Gila River Indian Community, Plaintiffs,
and
Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Tohono O'odham Nation, Defendant–Appellee.

Nos. 13–16517
13–16519
13–16520.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 7, 2015.
Filed March 29, 2016.


818 F.3d 553

Pratik A. Shah (argued), Merrill C. Godfrey, Z.W. Julius Chen, and John B. Capehart, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff–Appellant Gila River Indian Community.

Mary R. O'Grady, Shane M. Ham, and Grace E. Rebling, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff–Appellant Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian Community.

Robert L. Ellman (argued), Solicitor General, Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General, and Michael Tryon, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff–Appellant State of Arizona.

Seth P. Waxman (argued), Danielle Spinelli, Kelly P. Dunbar, Sonya L. Lebsack, and Adam Klein, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan Jantzen, Attorney General, Laura Berglan, Deputy Attorney General, Tohono O'odham Nation Attorney General's Office, Sells, AZ, for Defendant–Appellee Tohono O'odham Nation.

Before: DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to consider whether sophisticated, represented parties really meant what they wrote in a gaming compact that was duly executed after years of tedious negotiations. Like the district court, we hold the parties to their words, and affirm the district court's orders in favor of the Tohono O'odham Nation.

I.

In 2002, the Tohono O'odham Nation ("the Nation") and the State of Arizona

818 F.3d 554

executed a gaming compact ("the Compact") pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 –2721. The Compact expressly authorizes Class III gaming1 on the "Indian Lands" of the Nation. The Compact defines "Indian Lands" as "lands defined in 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A) and (B),2 subject to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 2719." In turn, § 2719 of IGRA provides that although Class III gaming is generally barred on land taken into trust after IGRA's effective date (October 17, 1988), that bar does not apply to land "taken into trust as part of ... a settlement of a land claim." 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B). Additionally, the Compact contains an integration clause, which provides that the Compact "contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to matters covered by this Compact and no other statement, agreement, or promise made by any party, officer, or agent of any party shall be valid or binding."

After the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and became effective in 2003, the Nation purchased an unincorporated parcel of land within the outer boundaries of Glendale, Arizona, pursuant to federal Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act ("LRA"). Congress enacted the LRA in 1986 after continuous heavy flooding caused by a federally-constructed dam rendered over 9,000 acres of the Nation's reservation lands, which it had used principally for agriculture, economically useless. The LRA gave the Nation $30 million in "settlement funds" to purchase replacement reservation lands, provided the Nation "assign[ed] to the United States all right, title, and interest of the Tribe in nine thousand eight hundred and eighty acres of land within the Gila Bend Indian Reservation" and "execute[d] a waiver and release" "of any and all claims of water rights or injuries to land or water rights ... with respect to the lands of the Gila Bend Indian Reservation from time immemorial to the date of the execution by the Tribe of such a waiver." In 1987, the Nation entered into a written agreement with the United States pursuant to the LRA in which the Nation waived and released its claims against the United States and assigned the United States "all right, title and interest" in 9,880 acres of its destroyed reservation lands in exchange for $30 million.

On July 7, 2014, the United States took a portion of the Glendale-area land, known as "Parcel 2," into trust for the Nation pursuant to the LRA. We recently affirmed the legality of the Secretary's taking of Parcel 2 into trust for the benefit of the Nation under the LRA. See Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir.2015). The Nation desires to build a casino and conduct Class III gaming on Parcel 2.

The State of Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community, and the Salt River Pima–Maricopa Indian community (the "Plaintiffs") brought an action in federal district court in Arizona against the Nation, seeking to enjoin the Nation's plan to conduct Class III gaming on Parcel 2. To bring their action, the Plaintiffs invoked § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of IGRA, which grants the United States district courts jurisdiction over "any cause of action initiated by

818 F.3d 555

a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a [C]lass III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal–State compact." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii). Plaintiffs alleged that Class III gaming on Parcel 2, since it was acquired after IGRA's effective date (October 17, 1988), would violate the Compact because the LRA was not a "settlement of a land claim" under IGRA § 2719, and because the Compact implicitly bars the Nation from gaming in the Phoenix area. Plaintiffs also alleged other non-Compact-based claims, including promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement, and material misrepresentation.

After a year of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Nation because it concluded that land acquired and taken into trust pursuant to the LRA was land "taken into trust as part of ... a settlement of a land claim" under IGRA § 2719(b)(1)(B)(1), and thus IGRA did not bar the Nation from gaming on Parcel 2. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Nation on Plaintiffs' breach of Compact claims, because the Compact specifically authorizes Class III gaming on Indian lands that qualify for gaming under IGRA § 2719. The court also ruled that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity barred the Plaintiffs' non-Compact-based claims for promissory estoppel, fraud in the inducement, and material misrepresentation, and thus dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appeal the district court's rulings in favor of the Nation.

II

A district court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 975–76 (9th Cir.2015). "The district court may grant summary judgment on ‘each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Id.; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)." Nation v. City of Glendale, 804 F.3d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir.2015).

This court reviews "de novo a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir.2013). "Whether Congress has abrogated the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes by statute is a question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed de novo. " Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), as amended on denial of reh'g en banc (Apr. 6, 2004).

A district court's construction or interpretation of IGRA is question of law, and is reviewed de novo on appeal. See United States v. 103 Elec. Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.2000).

III

A. Interpretation of IGRA § 2719

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously concluded that land acquired and taken into trust pursuant to the LRA qualifies as land "taken into trust as part of ... a settlement of a land claim" under § 2719(b)(1)(B)(i) of IGRA. If land acquired and taken into trust pursuant to the LRA qualifies as land "taken into trust as part of ... a settlement of a land claim," then it is exempt from IGRA's prohibition of Class III gaming on Indian lands acquired and taken into trust after

818 F.3d 556

October 17, 1988. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(i).

To determine if land taken into trust pursuant to the LRA qualifies as land "taken into trust as part of ... a settlement of a land claim" under § 2719(b)(1)(B)(i) of IGRA, we must first...

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