U.S. v. D'Angelo

Decision Date22 June 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-8852,86-8852
Citation819 F.2d 1062
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Campanella D'ANGELO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Judy Lancaster, Savannah, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Hinton R. Pierce, U.S. Atty., Kathryn M. Aldridge, Asst. U.S. Atty., Savannah, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the arrest of the appellant and the seizure of the crucial evidence was lawful. Because we find the arrest supported by probable cause and the seizure incident to the lawful arrest, we affirm the district court judgment.

FACTS

On May 29, 1986, deputies from the Screven County, Georgia, Sheriff's Department executed an arrest warrant issued by Jasper County, South Carolina, and mailed to the Screven County Sheriff's Department. After receipt of the arrest warrant, Deputy Sheriff Charles W. Freeman and other deputies arrested the appellant, Campanella D'Angelo. The warrant was based on a charge of assault and battery of an aggravated nature.

When D'Angelo came to the door in response to the deputies' knock, Freeman noticed a bulge in D'Angelo's clothing which appeared to conceal a weapon. Freeman grabbed D'Angelo, pulled him out of the house, and searched him. The bulge concealed a six-inch barrelled Ruger .357 caliber pistol loaded with teflon-coated bullets.

As D'Angelo was led to a sheriff's car, Freeman went into D'Angelo's house pursuant to the Screven County Sheriff's Department's policy of securing an arrestee's home when no other persons were on the premises. As Freeman walked through the house, he noticed a Colt AR-15 .233 caliber rifle leaning against a door jam. Because he knew D'Angelo was a convicted felon, Freeman seized the rifle.

A grand jury indicted D'Angelo in the Southern District of Georgia on three counts: (1) possession of a firearm, in commerce and affecting commerce, after having been convicted of felony offenses, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1); (2) making a false statement in the acquisition of the Colt AR-15 .233 caliber rifle, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(a)(6) and 924(a); and (3) unlawful receipt of the Colt rifle, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)(1) and Sec. 924(a).

After indictment, D'Angelo dismissed his lawyer and personally filed a motion to suppress the Ruger pistol and the Colt AR-15 rifle. The district court granted D'Angelo's motion to suppress with regard to the rifle and all evidence and documents concerning the rifle, but denied the motion to suppress with regard to the Ruger pistol.

A jury found D'Angelo guilty of violating 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1), possession of a firearm (pistol) which traveled in interstate commerce following a felony conviction. The district court sentenced D'Angelo to two years imprisonment and a fine of $50.

ISSUES

D'Angelo raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the Ruger pistol; (2) whether the district court erred in admitting the South Carolina warrant into evidence; (3) whether the government's evidence was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1); and (4) whether the conviction violates the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws.

DISCUSSION
A. The Motion to Suppress the Pistol

D'Angelo contends that the pistol should have been suppressed as the "fruit" of an unlawful search. He argues that the pistol was not seized incident to a lawful arrest because the arrest warrant, issued in South Carolina, could not be lawfully executed in Georgia. D'Angelo also contends that because his arrest was unlawful, seizure of the pistol was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement.

The government contends that D'Angelo's motion to suppress was properly denied, and the pistol was properly admitted into evidence at D'Angelo's trial. It argues that the seizure of the pistol was lawful because the seizure was incident to D'Angelo's lawful arrest. The government further argues that the arrest was lawful because the existence of the South Carolina warrant constituted sufficient probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest under Georgia law.

We agree with the parties that the seizure and admissibility of the pistol depends on the lawfulness of D'Angelo's arrest. Under Georgia law, if probable cause to arrest exists, a warrantless arrest is lawful. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983); Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). In Ledesma, Fulton County, Georgia authorities received a teletype message from Missouri authorities stating that Miriam Ledesma was wanted for violation of the Missouri Controlled Substances Act. The message said, "Pick up Miriam Ledesma." The Georgia officers interpreted this message to mean that an arrest warrant had been issued in Missouri. At the time of the message and at the time of Ledesma's arrest, no warrant had been issued in Missouri. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the arresting officers believed a warrant had been issued and that the officers' beliefs were based upon reliable information from Missouri officials. The court held that such information from a reliable source constituted sufficient probable cause to support the arrest. Ledesma, 306 S.E.2d at 632.

In this case, it is undisputed that the Screven County sheriff's deputies had a South Carolina warrant with them when they arrested D'Angelo. If the warrant was valid and validly executed, then the arrest based on the warrant is lawful. Even if the warrant is invalid or not properly executed, D'Angelo's arrest may still be upheld as a warrantless arrest under Georgia law.

Official Code of Georgia, Sections 17-5-1(a)(1) and (4) provide Georgia's exception to the warrant requirement for searches made incident to a lawful arrest. 1 D'Angelo's arrest was lawful under Georgia law because under Ledesma, the South Carolina warrant furnished probable cause for the arrest. If a teletype message is sufficient to supply probable cause, as the Georgia Supreme Court held in Ledesma, then a warrant in the possession of Georgia officers from another state is sufficient to supply probable cause. Therefore, the seizure of the Ruger pistol constituted a valid search incident to a lawful arrest. D'Angelo's motion to suppress the Ruger pistol was properly denied, and the pistol was properly admitted into evidence.

B. Whether the South Carolina Warrant was Properly Admitted at Trial

D'Angelo contends that, although the document marked at trial as the government's Exhibit 1 was a certified copy of a South Carolina warrant, the government presented no evidence that it was a copy of the warrant which the deputies had at the time of his arrest.

A review of the transcripts from the suppression hearing and the trial reveals that Freeman had a South Carolina warrant at the time of D'Angelo's arrest, and that Freeman was not certain at the time of trial whether the warrant executed was the original, a certified copy, or an uncertified copy. D'Angelo's argument regarding the warrant's certification is without merit for the same reason earlier stated. It does not matter whether the warrant was a certified copy. Whatever its status, under Ledesma, it is sufficient to supply probable cause. 2

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

D'Angelo contends that the government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1). 3 He argues that the evidence failed to establish that the pistol had been transported in interstate commerce prior to his acquiring possession of it. He cites Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), arguing that, in order to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement, the government must produce evidence of specific dates on which the pistol was transported.

Reliance on Scarborough is misguided. In Scarborough, the government produced evidence of specific dates; however, the Supreme Court did...

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