Reshard v. Britt

• Decision Date: 26 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3641,86-3641
• Citation: 819 F.2d 1573
• Parties: Connie C. RESHARD and Leroy Reshard, Co-personal Representatives of the Estate of Minnie Lee Reshard on Behalf of the Estate and certain Survivors, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Earl BRITT, Dr. George Bonk, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1573

819 F.2d 1573

56 USLW 2030

Connie C. RESHARD and Leroy Reshard, Co-personal

Representatives of the Estate of Minnie Lee

Reshard on Behalf of the Estate and certain Survivors, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Earl BRITT, Dr. George Bonk, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-3641.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 26, 1987.

Connie Reshard, pro se.

Richard B. Collins, Collins, Dennis & Williams, Tallahassee, Fla., for Dr. Earl Britt.

Richard Smoak, Sale, Brown & Smoak, Panama City, Fla., for Dr. George Bonk.

P. Scott Mitchell, Fuller & Johnson, Tallahassee, Fla., for Dr. David Moore.

William H. Davis, Wadsworth & Davis, Tallahassee, Fla., for Tallahassee Community Hosp.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case presents two rather novel issues for review by this court. It involves an action brought in a pro se capacity, in Federal Court, under Sec. 1654 of 28 U.S.C. First, we are called upon to determine whether a district court's order is immediately appealable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and the collateral order doctrine; and second, whether plaintiffs, designated as co-representative parties of the decedent's estate and the real parties in interest, may bring a wrongful death action in Federal Court, under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, on a pro se basis. The district court ruled that Connie Reshard and Leroy Reshard, as co-personal representatives of the estate of Minnie Reshard, could not proceed on a pro se basis in their representative capacity on behalf of the estate and were therefore ordered to obtain counsel; the court then stayed all further proceedings until they did so. From this order, the Reshards filed an appeal.

BACKGROUND

Connie C. Reshard and Leroy C. Reshard, duly appointed, co-personal representatives of the estate of the decedent, Minnie Reshard, ¹ brought a wrongful death action in Federal Court under diversity of citizenship In the same order, the court denied other pending motions, by Dr. Britt and other defendants. Thereafter, the parties proceeded with discovery in the case. The court ordered all discovery to be completed by September 4, 1986. A discovery conference was held on June 26, 1986 and all parties were ordered to file discovery plans by July 25, 1986. The pre-trial conference was set for November 13, 1986 and the trial was scheduled to begin on December 8, 1986.

                jurisdiction, on behalf of the decedent's estate and certain survivors, 2 against Dr. Earl Britt, Dr. George Bonk, Dr. Chuck Chokhawala Pankha, Dr. David Moore, the Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Community Hospital and the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center.  The plaintiffs brought this action on a pro se basis, as the representative parties of the decedent's estate. 3   In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that various acts of the defendants caused the death of the decedent;  however, the specific acts surrounding the care and treatment of the decedent are not pertinent issues to this appeal, and therefore, will not be discussed herein. 4   After the commencement of the lawsuit, defendant Britt moved to dismiss the complaint, on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not real parties in interest.  The court, however, issued an order on January 30, 1986, finding that the case was grounded on diversity of citizenship and that the plaintiffs were the real parties in interest. 5
                

At all times therein, the plaintiffs continued to proceed "personally," in their capacity as pro se plaintiffs, acting for the benefit of the estate of the decedent and certain survivors. Various discovery disputes arose during the course of pre-trial discovery The co-personal representatives sought an expedited appeal to this Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, as a final order under the collateral order doctrine. In their emergency motion to expedite, the plaintiffs argued that a delay, or failure to grant their requested relief, would cause them irreparable injury. They alleged that the relief sought involved the denial of the fundamental right of any party in the courts of the United States, to proceed "personally in their own behalf," and to defer the appeal until the case was fully adjudicated, "would destroy any effective redress the Petitioners would have on future appeal."

                and the court had before it various motions pertaining to discovery abuses, the ethical conduct of lawyers and a motion requesting that the plaintiffs be required to obtain counsel.  The district court, then issued a notice of hearing, to entertain all motions pending before it, to be held on September 2, 1986.  Thereafter, on September 2, 1986, the court entertained defendant Britt's motion, that the plaintiffs be required to obtain counsel.  After hearing argument from counsel for Dr. Britt, and Ms. Connie Reshard, on representing herself, as co-plaintiff, and the estate and its survivors, the court made an oral ruling from the bench, ordering the pro se plaintiffs to obtain counsel.  Thereafter, by written order of September 8, 1986, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiffs to obtain counsel by October 6, 1986 and stayed all further proceedings until that time.  In its September 8th order, the court disqualified the plaintiffs from proceeding pro se in the wrongful death action on the basis that the right to proceed pro se under Sec. 1654 of 28 U.S.C., applied only to one's own case, and that under Florida's wrongful death statute, a wrongful death action is an an action on behalf of the decedent's estate and is not personal to the representative party.  The court concluded that the action was not the "plaintiffs' own claim and they must obtain counsel."    The court also said that its decision was supported by Rule 5.030 of the Florida Rule of Probate and Guardianship Procedure.  The court stated "that rule provides that every personal representative shall be represented by an attorney unless the personal representative remains the sole interested person." 6   Since there were a number of potential beneficiaries, in addition to the named plaintiffs, who "must be considered interested parties," the court concluded "it would be inappropriate for plaintiffs to proceed pro se."
                

This Court granted the appellants' motion to expedite the appeal, and stayed the district court's order disqualifying the parties from appearing pro se. At the outset, both parties anticipated a jurisdictional hurdle, and we instructed the parties to address the issue: whether the "district court's order is appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 or is otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction."

Both parties have briefed and orally argued this issue, and thus we now turn to the "appealability" of the district court's order to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction.

THE APPEALABILITY

The appellants argue that the right of a party to proceed without counsel, under 28 This right, they contend, is not entirely about choice of counsel, but rather, involves the exercise of a clear, unqualified right. They note that this right of self representation has roots deep in the nation's history. ⁷ Moreover, this statutory right to proceed pro se, they assert, is in no way involved in the merits of this particular case; whether the plaintiffs may proceed "personally" in their capacity as the representative parties and the real parties in interest, they contend, is entirely separate from the merits of the wrongful death action. Thus, the appellants argue, the right to proceed pro se in this action is collateral to the main action, and the question of the appealability of the district court's order, disqualifying them from appearing pro se, is determined by the application of the collateral order doctrine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, the final judgment rule.

U.S.C. Sec. 1654, is an unqualified right, which is fundamental to our system of democracy and too important to be deferred until the entire case is concluded, citing O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2nd Cir.1982).

THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE

A final decision within the meaning of Section 1291, does not mean the last order to be made in a case, but orders which are collateral to the main action and are separate from the merits of the case, are appealable under what is known as the "collateral order doctrine," first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court held that an order, which involves a final disposition of a claimed right, which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require separate consideration with it, is an appealable order within the meaning of Sec. 1291. ⁸ The Court noted that such orders

fall in that small class which finally determined claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.

337 U.S. 546, 69 S.Ct. 1225. Subsequently, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), the Court applied the test enunciated in Cohen. Under Coopers, an order comes within the Cohen doctrine, if it "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the case, and [is] Although the Supreme Court has held that orders disqualifying attorneys in civil and criminal cases are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the question whether the granting of a motion disqualifying a party from proceeding pro se in a civil action is immediately appealable has not been decided by the Court.

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