Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dep't

Decision Date07 April 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14–10402.,14–10402.
Parties Chaz Z. RODGERS, Individually, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. LANCASTER POLICE & FIRE DEPARTMENT; Methodist Dallas Medical Center ; James Skach, Officer; Brian Dorsey, Supervisor; M. Adams; Jeremy Stuckey, EMT–P # 3082; Daniel Bufe, EMT–P # 3165; David P. Bryant, D.O. Physician; Abi M. Finberg–Province, Registered Nurse; Michael Adams; James Grimes; Bryan Dorsey ; Devon O. Candler, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Chaz Z. Rodgers, Lancaster, TX, pro se.

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH

, Circuit Judge:

Chaz Rodgers's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound

. Rodgers sought to hold the Lancaster police and fire departments, law-enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel liable. Without benefit of the res nova determination that we now make, the district court dismissed without prejudice. We reverse and remand.

I.

Hudson was leaving a party when Devon Candler drove by and began shooting. Lancaster Police Department ("LPD") dispatched officers, who discovered Hudson lying unresponsive in the street with an apparent gunshot wound

. Lancaster Fire Department ("LFD") dispatched emergency medical technicians ("EMTs"), who assisted Hudson and transported him to Methodist Dallas Hospital ("MDH"), where medical personnel pronounced him dead.

Rodgers, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Candler, LPD, LFD, MDH, the responding officers and EMTs, and the nurses and doctors at MDH. She claimed the officers failed properly to respond to the scene and investigate the crime; the EMTs failed to treat Hudson appropriately and to transport him timely to a hospital capable of rendering adequate services; MDH and its medical personnel provided him with negligent medical treatment; and, finally, Candler negligently operated the firearm that killed him. Rodgers also alleged defendants' intentional misconduct and an agreement between them to deprive Hudson of his constitutional rights. By construing her allegations liberally,1 we glean that Rodgers asserted claims under federal civil-rights laws and Texas's survival and wrongful-death statutes.2

Because she proceeded in forma pauperis, Rodgers's complaint was subject to judicial screening and possible sua sponte dismissal before service of process.3 During screening, the district court sua sponte dismissed the survival action without prejudice: Rodgers had failed to plead facts upon which relief could be granted because, as a non-lawyer, she could not sue pro se on behalf of the estate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

. The court then dismissed the wrongful-death claims for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that they arose under state law, and there was no diversity. The court did not consider whether Rodgers also stated a claim for relief under any federal civil-rights laws, such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 19834 and 1985.5 Rodgers appeals pro se.

II.

We first address the dismissal of the wrongful-death claims because it implicates subject-matter jurisdiction.6 That dismissal is reviewed de novo. Wagner v. United States, 545 F.3d 298, 300 (5th Cir.2008)

(citation omitted). We reverse, because, although she appeared to assert only a wrongful-death claim, Rodgers pleaded a claim under the federal civil-rights laws, so there is federal-question jurisdiction.7

Texas's wrongful-death statute provides, "A person is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death if the injury was caused by the person's or his agent's or servant's wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.002(b)

. "An action to recover damages as provided by this subchapter is for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased." Id. § 71.004(b). For Rodgers, "Texas wrongful death law provides ... the right to recover for her son's wrongful death and she can recover for injury to herself caused by her son's death." Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1992).

A plaintiff suing under the state statute in federal court generally would need to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)

for supplemental jurisdiction or the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) for diversity. Federal civil-rights laws extend federal-question jurisdiction, however, by incorporating state wrongful-death statutes. See Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391 ; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Thus, an individual may bring a claim under federal civil-rights laws through Texas's wrongful-death statute.8

In Brazier, for example, we held that § 1988

incorporated Georgia's wrongful-death statute, thereby conferring federal-question jurisdiction over a widow's claims that officers had killed her husband. See Brazier, 293 F.2d at 402, 407–09. Similarly, in Grandstaff, the Texas wrongful-death statute allowed a father to assert § 1983 claims based on his son's wrongful death. See Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 167, 172.9 Then, in Rhyne, we allowed a prisoner's mother to sue the county and its sheriff for failing to provide reasonable medical care in violation of § 1983. See Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 388. Specifically, after noting her capacity to sue under Texas's wrongful-death statute, we concluded that "our decisions allow recovery by Rhyne for her injury caused by the state's deprivation of her son's constitutionally secured liberty interests." Id. at 391.

Under Brazier and Grandstaff, Rhyne has standing to recover for her own injuries arising out of the wrongful death of her son.... Both Brazier and Grandstaff hold that § 1988

incorporates [the Texas] wrongful death remedy into § 1983, allowing Rhyne to recover under § 1983 for her own injuries resulting from the deprivation of her son's constitutional rights.

Id.

It follows that a litigant such as Rodgers may sue under §§ 1983

and 1985 for injuries to another, because § 1988 incorporates wrongful-death statutes. Rodgers alleged in her complaint, "I intend to prove Civil Rights Violations ... and action of bias racial profiling [sic], discrimination, gross negligence's [sic ], ... [and] intentional misconduct." Construing her pleadings liberally, we understand Rodgers to allege that she suffered injuries from violations of Hudson's rights under §§ 1983 and 1985. Rodgers may sue for her personal injuries resulting from those alleged violations, because § 1988 incorporates the wrongful-death statute, under which Rodgers has capacity to sue as Hudson's surviving parent. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 71.002(b), 71.004(b). Rodgers's claims did not arise solely under state law; at least some stem from the federal civil-rights laws. Accordingly, there was federal-question jurisdiction, and the claims should not have been dismissed.

III.

Texas provides for survival actions: "A personal injury action survives to and in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the injured person. The action survives against the liable person and the person's legal representatives." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.021(b)

.10

That is, "The Survival Statute provides that only a personal representative, administrator, or heir may sue on behalf of an estate." Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex.1998)

. "[A] decedent's estate is not a legal entity and may not properly sue or be sued as such.... [T]he law therefore grants another party the capacity to sue on their behalf." Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex.2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Rodgers's survival action raises two interrelated issues. We must determine whether a pro se litigant may ever represent an estate in a survival action—an issue of first impression in this circuit. If so, there is the question whether Rodgers established her capacity to sue under Texas's survival statute.

A.

It is axiomatic that an individual may proceed pro se in civil actions in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654

, but it is equally certain that those not licensed to practice law may not represent the legal interests of others, see Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1978).11 Relying on Weber, the district court dismissed Rodgers's pro se survival action because she was not authorized to practice law. We review that dismissal de novo.12

We have not addressed whether a person who has capacity to represent an estate under a survival statute may do so pro se.13 The circuits that have addressed that issue tend to refuse to hear pro se survival claims where there are multiple beneficiaries or creditors.14 Two circuits, going further, affirmatively hold that an individual with capacity under state law to represent the estate may do so pro se if he is the estate's sole beneficiary and there are no creditors. See Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228, 230–31 (6th Cir.2015)

; Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 19–21 (2d Cir.2010).15 Those decisions are persuasive.

In Guest, the administrator of an estate brought a survival action. The administrator retained counsel in the district court but appealed an adverse summary judgment pro se. Id. The Second Circuit allowed the administrator to proceed pro se after other beneficiaries had disclaimed any interest in the estate and the administrator had filed a supplemental brief that the estate had no creditors. Id. at 19–20. The court addressed the perils of lay representation:

The law contains so many esoteric pitfalls for an untrained advocate ... that the risk of inadvertent waiver or abandonment of an issue is too high for us to allow a pro se litigant to represent another person. This rule exists to serve not only the interests of the represented party but also the interests of the adversaries and the court, because the entire judicial system benefits from the professional knowledge of practicing attorneys....

Guest, 603 F.3d at 20

(quotation marks and citations omitted). The court allowed the pro se appeal because the administrator, as the sole beneficiary of an estate without...

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