Duckett v. Fuller
| Citation | 819 F.3d 740 |
| Decision Date | 25 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–6568.,15–6568. |
| Parties | Lewis DUCKETT, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Marcia FULLER, SCDC Dietician in their individual or personal capacities; Mrs. Ball, First Name Unknown Kershaw Cafeteria Supervisor in their individual or personal capacities; Michael L. Fair, Legislative Audit Counsel in their individual or personal capacities; SC District 6, Greenville County State Senate in their individual or personal capacities; Boyd H. Parr, Director of Poultry Products and Inspection in their individual or personal capacities, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
ARGUED:Ricardo Camposanto, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Sheila M. Bias, Richardson Plowden & Robinson, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Stephen L. Braga, Counsel of Record, Kaitlyn Tongalson, Third Year Law Student, Appellate Litigation Clinic, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Caleb M. Riser, Richardson Plowden & Robinson, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and MAX O. COGBURN, JR., United States District Judge for the District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER
wrote the opinion in which Judge MOTZ and Judge COGBURN joined.
, Circuit Judge:
Lewis Duckett commenced this action against employees of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") and others, alleging that the food served to him at the Kershaw Correctional Institution, a prison managed by the SCDC, was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The form of Duckett's complaint and the claims made are virtually the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits.
On the state defendants' motion in this case, the district court dismissed Duckett's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
, concluding that, because Duckett would have benefited if his fellow inmate's 2010 suit had been successful, he is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing the present action. As the court explained:
The claims are at their core identical, and thus qualify as the same cause of action. To allow this claim to go forward would mean relitigating the same issues this court litigated in [the earlier suit]. This goes against the principles behind res judicata.
We reverse. As a nonparty to the earlier suit, Duckett is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant action unless the state defendants are able to demonstrate that at least one of the six exceptions to the general rule against nonparty preclusion applies. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008)
. We conclude that the state defendants have not demonstrated that any of the exceptions applies and accordingly reverse the district court's dismissal of Duckett's complaint and remand for further proceedings.
On April 4, 2013, Duckett and 15 other inmates at Kershaw, all proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against two SCDC employees and other state officials, challenging, under the Eighth Amendment, the quality of the food served at Kershaw. In the complaint, which is labeled "Class Action Complaint," the inmates alleged that the prison authorities failed to serve food satisfying recommended minimum daily amounts of vitamins and nutrients; that they served insufficient portions; and that they misrepresented food as beef when it was actually made from ground poultry offal and organs, thereby violating the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The parties agree that the complaint was drafted by Duckett's fellow inmate, Bernard McFadden, who was also one of the 16 plaintiffs in the action.
On review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
, the district court ruled that the complaint "should not be allowed to proceed under one joint action," explaining, among other things, that the "Plaintiffs have alleged a wide array of illnesses resulting from malnutrition that would require individualized findings." The court accordingly severed the case "into sixteen separate actions, individualized for each Plaintiff," and directed the clerk to file copies of the complaint under new case numbers, a different one for each plaintiff.
Following severance of the action, Duckett paid the required $350 filing fee out of his prison account and supplemented the allegations of his complaint with further allegations of his specific injury, claiming "Bleeding gums, weight loss, High Cholesterol, teeth damage, [and] Heart burn," among other things.
The state defendants filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
to dismiss Duckett's complaint, asserting that "[t]he subject matter of this action ha[d] already been litigated by Plaintiff's privies and a full and final decision on the merits [had been] rendered by this court." They specifically referred to a similar complaint, which the district court had dismissed on the merits, filed by inmate McFadden in 2010 against SCDC employees while McFadden was housed in the Kirkland Correctional Institution, another prison managed by the SCDC.
While the magistrate judge recommended concluding "that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bar[s] the plaintiff's complaint," the district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds by order dated March 19, 2015.1 In its supporting opinion, the court concluded that Duckett "[was] in privity with Plaintiff McFadden in the prior case," providing the following explanation:
Had McFadden I been a successful suit for Plaintiff, Plaintiff in this case would have benefitted. In McFadden I , the Complaint sought "an Order directing the Defendants to serve nutritious and balanced meals according to the daily recommended food charts." Plaintiff here similarly seeks an Order requiring "a gradual change to daily recommended foods that are balanced and nutritious." Further, as far as any damages Plaintiff seeks, had McFadden I been successful, Plaintiff could have argued collateral estoppel barred Defendants from denying the facts that were litigated and thus would benefit from a favorable decision. Thus, Plaintiff has the same legal right as Plaintiff McFadden, and is in privity.
From the final judgment dismissing Duckett's claims with prejudice, Duckett filed this appeal. By order dated October 27, 2015, we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.2
Duckett contends that he is not bound by the judgment in McFadden's 2010 suit because he was not a party to it; he never had his day in court on the issues presented in it; and he had "no meaningful way of participating" in it. In short, he argues that he cannot be bound by the judgment in that action unless his circumstances fit into one of the exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion recognized in Taylor. He asserts that, because none of the exceptions applies to his circumstances, we should reverse the district court's order dismissing his complaint.
The state defendants contend that Duckett is bound by the judgment in McFadden's 2010 suit because Duckett's interests in this action are "aligned with and even identical to" McFadden's interests in McFadden's 2010 suit and, therefore, Duckett is "in privity" with McFadden. They assert that " ‘privity’ between parties exists, as a matter of law, when the interests of one party are so identified with the interests of another that representation by one party is representation of the other's legal right." The state defendants maintain that the applicability of Taylor to this case is, "at best, minimal," because Taylor rejected a preclusion doctrine based on what is known as "virtual representation" and "did not discuss the concept of privity," on which the district court relied in this case. But even if Taylor were to control, they reason, at least one exception identified in Taylor would apply because Duckett "desires to create a substantive legal relationship with Inmate McFadden" and is, in this case, "acting as an agent or proxy for Inmate McFadden to re-litigate his claims."
The district court agreed with the state defendants and dismissed Duckett's suit as precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.
The general rule is well established that once a person has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim, the person is precluded, under the doctrine of res judicata, from relitigating it. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001)
. Sound considerations justify the doctrine. "[P]reclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is applied to bar a suit in light of a prior judgment when three elements are demonstrated: (1) that "the prior judgment was final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of due process"; (2) that "the parties are identical, or in privity, in the two actions"; and (3) that "the claims in the second matter are based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier proceeding"—i.e., the claims "arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or the same core of operative facts." In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315–16 (4th Cir.1996) (citations omitted).
Thus, in this case, it cannot be disputed that inmate McFadden is precluded from relitigating the...
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