Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana

• Decision Date: 28 February 1996
• Docket Number: M,PAGES-CAHU,No. 95-2055,95-2055
• Citation: 82 F.3d 533
• Parties: 70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1030, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,053, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 501 Maria De Los A.aria Pilar Lopez, and Gilberto Izquierdo-Santiago, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA, Defendant-Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 533

82 F.3d 533

70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1030,

68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,053,

3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 501

Maria De Los A. PAGES-CAHUE, Maria Pilar Lopez, and Gilberto Izquierdo-Santiago, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-2055.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 28, 1996.

Decided April 25, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico; Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Enrique J. Mendoza-Mendez, Santurce, with whom Mendoza & Baco, Francisco M. Troncoso and Troncoso & Becker, Old San Juan, were on brief for appellants.

James D. Noel III, with whom Ledesma, Palou & Miranda, Hato Rey, was on brief for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Maria de los A. Pages-Cahue ("Pages"), Maria Pilar Lopez ("Lopez"), and Gilberto Izquierdo-Santiago ("Izquierdo") (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana ("Iberia") on claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("the ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. Pages also seeks appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberia on her claim under Puerto Rico Law No. 80, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a et seq. ¹ Lopez appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberia on her claim for an unpaid balance of sick leave and overtime compensation due under Puerto Rico Law No. 379 of May 15, 1948, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A. 271 et seq., ("Law 379" or "Puerto Rico Overtime Compensation Act"), and Puerto Rico Law No. 96 of June 26, 1959, as amended, 29 Laws of P.R.Anno. 246 et seq. ("Law 96"). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute. In 1992, Iberia's net loss for its San Juan operations was $14,305,504. For the seven prior years, plus the year 1992, Iberia's net loss in San Juan was $136,795,292. Beginning in the year 1991, Iberia implemented a worldwide reorganization of its operations, including substantial cutbacks in Puerto Rico. During the time period from May 1991 to November 1992, 14 of Iberia's 32 employees in Puerto Rico were laid off or otherwise ceased to work for Iberia. On September 30, 1992, the three appellants in this case were discharged.

This appeal also contains several disputed facts. Because we must determine whether the disputes of fact are both genuine and material, we discuss these disputed facts in the course of our discussion of the law.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We examine a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment. Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir.1995); see LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841; Goldman v. First National Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ADEA Claims

1. The Legal Framework

In ADEA discrimination lawsuits, plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proving that their ages were the determinative factor in their discharge, "that is, that [they] would not have been fired but for [their] age." LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841; see Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). "At least where there is little overt evidence of age discrimination, the case usually follows the ritualized burden-shifting paradigm" presented in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. See, e.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1993); Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 68 (1st Cir.1992); Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823-24.

Under the McDonnell Douglas test, plaintiffs must open with a prima facie showing of certain standardized elements suggestive of possible discrimination. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. It is undisputed that the employment actions that gave rise to the instant case took place as part of a reduction in Iberia's work force. As a result, each of the Appellants was required to make a prima facie showing (1) that he or she fell within the ADEA's protected age group--that is, more than forty years of age; (2) that he or she met Iberia's legitimate performance expectations; (3) that he or she experienced adverse employment action; and (4) that Iberia did not treat age neutrally or retained younger persons in the same position. See Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091; Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st Cir.1993).

Establishment of the prescribed prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer engaged in impermissible age discrimination. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117. However, to rebut this presumption, the employer need only "articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination." LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117. Once the employer meets this burden in an age discrimination case, however, "the McDonnell Douglas presumption 'drops out of the picture.' " LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). The trier of fact then must simply determine, based on the evidence, whether the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff was motivated by intentional age discrimination. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843.

In the context of a summary judgment proceeding, once the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its adverse employment decision, the plaintiff, "before becoming entitled to bring the case before the trier of fact, must show evidence sufficient for the factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer's decision to discharge him or her was wrongfully based on age." LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843; see Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117; Lawrence, 980 F.2d at 69-70. Direct or indirect evidence of

                discriminatory intent may suffice, but "the evidence as a whole ... must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's decision was motivated by age animus."  Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n. 3 (1st Cir.1991);  see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 836;  Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117.   Thus, a district court's grant of summary judgment to an employer will be upheld if the record is devoid of adequate direct or circumstantial evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent
                

2. Lopez and Izquierdo

We treat Lopez' and Izquierdo's respective appeals together because the same case law governs both.

The district court found that Lopez failed to present a prima facie case. It found that while she satisfied the first three required elements of the prima facie case--she belongs to the protected class, her job performance was adequate, and she was discharged--she failed to satisfy the fourth element. That is, she failed to show either that Iberia did not treat age neutrally or that younger persons were retained in the same position. Here we assume, without concluding, that Lopez has demonstrated a prima facie case, since doing so does not alter the outcome of our analysis. In contrast, the district court concluded that Izquierdo demonstrated a prima facie case, but that he failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that Iberia's decision to terminate him was motivated by age animus.

On appeal, Lopez argues that the district court erred because, in fact, she did produce evidence both that Iberia did not treat age neutrally and that younger persons were retained to do her functions. With respect to age neutrality, Lopez asserts that Iberia never considered her seniority in its decision to terminate her, as she argues is required by Puerto Rico Law No. 80. ² However, she cites no authority for the proposition, which we reject, that Puerto Rico Law modifies the ADEA to take into account discrimination against more senior employees, not just older employees. She also points to the fact that, during the reduction in force, she was not offered employment alternatives made available to Galo Beltran ("Beltran") (age 35) and Ernesto Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") (age 48). Furthermore, Lopez also maintains that her functions were taken over by a younger employee, Alga Rivera ("Rivera") (age 33), hired soon after Lopez' termination.

Similarly, Izquierdo (age 45) contends on appeal that the fact that he was not considered for retention or immediate re-hiring as a Sales Agent, as Beltran and Rodriguez ³ were, shows that Iberia did not treat age neutrally in the course of its reduction in force. Izquierdo also alludes to a younger individual in a different department than Sales, who was allegedly offered the opportunity to continue work at a lower salary. However, since Izquierdo failed to proffer any evidence that this other department experienced a reduction in force at a similar time period, or that Izquierdo was qualified for this position, it would plainly be unreasonable to infer a lack of age neutrality from this evidence. As a result, we consider only Izquierdo's arguments regarding Beltran and Rodriguez. We note that Izquierdo does not point to evidence contravening Iberia's position that Beltran and Rodriguez were simply re-hired at lower pay to do the same job they had done previously. Neither Lopez or Izquierdo has argued or adduced evidence In Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797...