Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga

• Citation: 82 F.3d 563
• Decision Date: 21 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 903,D,903
• Parties: Elizabeth M. LOWTH and William W. Lowth, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, Scott Grant, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Daniel Smith, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Kenneth Rusin, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Anthony Filipski, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Michael Hockwater, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Michael Isbrandt, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-7691.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 563

82 F.3d 563

Elizabeth M. LOWTH and William W. Lowth, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, Scott Grant, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of

the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Daniel

Smith, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee,

Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the

Town of Cheektowaga, Kenneth Rusin, Individually and in his

capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the

Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Anthony

Filipski, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee,

Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the

Town of Cheektowaga, Michael Hockwater, Individually and in

his capacity as an Employee, Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of

the Police Department of the Town of Cheektowaga, Michael

Isbrandt, Individually and in his capacity as an Employee,

Agent, Officer and/or Deputy of the Police Department of the

Town of Cheektowaga, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 903, Docket 95-7691.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 4, 1996.

Decided May 3, 1996.

As Amended May 21, 1996.

Appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Elfvin, J.) granting summary judgment to the defendants in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held that the municipal defendant could not be held liable because no town policy or custom was implicated by the complained-of police activity. The court further found that qualified immunity protected the individual police officers on all counts.

K. Michael Sawicki, Buffalo, N.Y. (Mark J. Schlant, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Joseph J. Schoellkopf, Jr., Buffalo, N.Y. (Alan P. Schaefer, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before: McLAUGHLIN, CALABRESI, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge:

This case involves private citizens who claim that police officers violated their constitutional rights by arresting and prosecuting them on charges of which a jury subsequently absolved them. The district court, on summary judgment, dismissed the citizens' suit against the officers, and the citizens have appealed.

In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we are required to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). But, for the purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, we consider only those facts that were actually available to the police officers, or could reasonably have been perceived by them, at the moment they engaged in the challenged conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Fulfilling both of these responsibilities is always difficult where many of the disputed facts involve states of mind. It becomes especially complicated where, as here, the parties had radically differing perceptions of what was happening at the time they acted. We find that what the appellants believed was happening on the night they were arrested is relevant to the reasonableness of the police officers' behavior only to the extent either that the appellants in some way expressed their beliefs to the officers or that their beliefs should otherwise have been apparent to reasonable police officers.

Background

On the evening of July 1, 1993, several police officers of the Town of Cheektowaga were investigating the actions of two suspicious individuals who had been seen in and around the backyard of a house at 195 Santin Drive. One of the officers involved in the investigation was defendant Scott Grant. He had been off duty, and had responded to a radio call from his colleagues. He was driving an unmarked car and was wearing jeans and a "muscle" shirt. Obviously hurrying to join the investigation, Officer Grant pulled up in front of the driveway at 195 Santin Drive and left his car (partially blocking the driveway) with its engine running, its lights on, and the driver's door open.

Soon after, at about 10 p.m., William and Elizabeth Lowth, who lived at 195 Santin Drive, returned home after a peaceful dinner in town. Seeing an automobile blocking the entrance, and presumably wanting to put her own car in the driveway, Mrs. Lowth left her car and got into the unmarked police vehicle in order to move it away. At just that point, Officer Grant, who had been questioning the suspects behind the house, came out of the yard and saw Mrs. Lowth in his car. Grant claims to have yelled to Mrs. Lowth, as he was running toward the car, that he was a police officer, and that the car she was driving was a police vehicle. Two of the other officers on the scene testified that they heard him identify himself as a police officer. No one disputes this testimony, although Mr. Lowth and the remaining officers said that they only heard Grant shout "something" as he headed toward the car. In any event, Mrs. Lowth has affirmed that she did not hear him identify himself, and we accept her statement as true.

When he reached the car, Officer Grant reached through the driver's window and, while trying to stop the car, struck Mrs. Lowth. Attacked by an unknown man, dressed as casually as Officer Grant was, Mrs. Lowth panicked and accelerated. The car swerved onto a neighbor's lawn next to the driveway and moved forward with Officer Grant hanging half in and half out of the window. About two feet in front of a tree on the neighbor's lawn, Mrs. Lowth slammed on the brakes, and the car lurched to a halt.

When the car had stopped moving, Officer Grant pulled Mrs. Lowth out, placed her on the ground with his knee on her back, and handcuffed her. Throughout the scuffle, Mrs. Lowth both yelled at Grant to get off her and shouted to her husband to get the police. At the moment when he handcuffed her, Officer Grant, apparently realizing what she had been screaming, flashed his badge and said "Lady, I am the police, and you are under arrest." Mrs. Lowth immediately stopped resisting.

While Officer Grant and Mrs. Lowth were struggling over control of the unmarked vehicle, Mr. Lowth got out of his car and-- shouting and cursing--went toward his wife and Officer Grant, as fast as his bad back would allow. Defendant Michael Hockwater, who was standing nearby with several other uniformed officers, pointed his gun at Mr. Lowth and ordered him to stop. He put Mr. Lowth up against the police car and held him there for about 30 seconds until Mr. Lowth informed the officer that 195 Santin Drive was his home.

Mrs. Lowth was immediately taken to the police station and was charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of New York Penal Law § 165.05; with reckless endangerment, in violation of New York Penal Law § 205.30; and with resisting arrest, in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.20. She was subsequently prosecuted on each of these three charges, and in March 1994 a jury acquitted her on all counts.

The Lowths then brought this suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law. Mrs. Lowth claimed that Officer Grant's decision to arrest her for reckless endangerment and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle amounted to a false arrest under New York law, and hence infringed her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. She also claimed that Officer Grant's decision to charge her with these crimes and with the additional crime of resisting arrest constituted malicious prosecution, and therefore violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Both Mr. and Mrs. Lowth asserted claims for assault and battery amounting to an unconstitutional use of excessive force against Officers Grant and Hockwater. They included the Town of Cheektowaga and the other officers involved in the investigation that night in their suit.

The district court (Elfvin, J.) granted summary judgment to the defendants on all grounds. The court found that the Town of Cheektowaga could not be subject to suit on these claims because the police actions did not involve town custom or policy. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). It further held that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Since the court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' federal claims, it also declined to retain jurisdiction over the related state law ones. ¹

On appeal, the Lowths argue that summary judgment was inappropriate as to Officers Grant and Hockwater on the § 1983 claims because their actions were not those of reasonable police officers. We affirm the district court's decision insofar as it concerns the Lowths' claims of assault and battery, and Mrs. Lowth's claims of false arrest. We further find that Officer Grant is entitled to qualified immunity as to Mrs. Lowth's claims that she was maliciously prosecuted for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and for reckless endangerment. But we conclude that summary judgment was not appropriate with respect to Mrs. Lowth's claim that charging her with resisting arrest constituted a malicious prosecution. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the district court's decision and remand the case for further proceedings.

Discussion

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government employees acting in their official capacity from suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless their conduct violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The Supreme Court has stated that the immunity accorded officials by this doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,"...