82 F.Supp. 248 (M.D.Pa. 1949), 2979, Di Sabatino v. Mertz

Docket Number2979.
Citation82 F.Supp. 248
Date28 January 1949
PartiesDI SABATINO et al. v. MERTZ.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Page 248

82 F.Supp. 248 (M.D.Pa. 1949)

DI SABATINO et al.

v.

MERTZ.

No. 2979.

United States District Court M.D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 28, 1949

Louis H. Wilderman and Samuel Polsky, both of Philadelphia, Pa., and James W. McNulty, of Scranton, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Frank M. Walsh, of Scranton, Pa., for defendant.

MURPHY, District Judge.

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint averring that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. 1

Plaintiffs, citizens of Delaware, seek to recover from defendant, a citizen of Pennsylvania, for personal injuries sustained in the State of Virginia. Suit could have been brought in Virginia and service obtained on defendant though he was a nonresident of that State. Section 2154(70), Virginia Code. It was stipulated by counsel

Page 249

that in Virginia an action of this character would have to be brought within one year from the date of the accident, and that failing therein such an action would be by Virginia law forever barred. Section 5818, Virginia Code; Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 4 Cir., 128 F.2d 645, 651.

The present action was instituted in this district after the one year period of limitation had expired. The Conflicts of Law rule of Pennsylvania is that the law of the place where the operative facts occur govern the rights of the parties. See Pennsylvania Annotations to Section 378, Restatement, Conflict of Laws; Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 3 Cir., 155 F.2d 445, 449. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477, ruled that in diversity of citizenship cases a federal court must follow the rule of conflicts of law of the state in which it sits; in this instance, Pennsylvania. ' * * * the proper function of the * * * federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be.' 313 U.S. at page 497, 61 S.Ct. at page 1022.

The Act of June 26, 1895, P.L. 375, 12 P.S. § 39, provides 'When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense to an action thereon brought in any of the courts of this commonwealth. ' See in re Fletcher's Estate, 45 Pa.Dist.& Co.R. 673; Pennsylvania Annotations to Section 604, Restatement, supra, and see Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 91 L.Ed. 1602.

At the argument on the motion plaintiffs' counsel advised the court that within the one year period an action had been commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania but that it was dismissed on defendant's motion for lack of venue, the defendant being a resident of this district. Such action was taken by the district court prior to the adoption of the amended Judicial Code, effective September 1, 1948. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a), which provides that 'The...

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