82 Hawai'i 269, State v. Sturch, 16778
Decision Date | 25 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 16778,16778 |
Citation | 921 P.2d 1170 |
Parties | 82 Hawai'i 269 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy W. STURCH, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
Generally, absent any overriding specific constitutional claim, the State may, under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-112 (1993), properly prohibit persons from using vehicles parked on public property as dwelling places during the hours of 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
The defendant's asserted right to use his privately owned vehicle as he chooses is subject to the State's broad police power to regulate an individual's conduct to preserve public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. Because HRS § 291C-112 directly applies to the defendant and constitutionally protected expressive conduct is not at issue, the defendant lacks standing to assert an overbreadth challenge based on hypothetical applications of the statute.
Read in the context of HRS § 291C-112, the phrase "sleeping place" is obviously modified by the preceding reference to "purposes of human habitation[.]" Thus, the term "sleeping place" is sufficiently definite to be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Under the rational basis test applicable here, the statute's prohibition against inhabiting vehicles on public property furthers the State's legitimate interest in protecting public health because of the dangers caused by the lack of appropriate sanitation facilities in vehicles used as dwellings. Even where a vehicle may be designed for habitation, the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the density of use of public property to maintain the nature and designated purpose of that property for the benefit of the public generally.
Absent explicatory legislative history for the "6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m." classification in HRS § 291C-112, we may consider how the legislature would have intended the legislation to be applied. Because the legislature could have reasonably assumed that more persons would use vehicles as places of habitation during the nighttime hours than during the daytime hours, the legislature could rationally choose to impose a time-specific prohibition against such use from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
Accordingly, because it rationally furthers legitimate state interests, HRS § 291C-112 does not infringe on any claimed "right to work" or deny the defendant equal protection of the laws.
Jimmy W. Sturch, on the briefs, Kaneohe, pro se.
Alexa D.M. Fujise, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BURNS, C.J., and WATANABE and ACOBA, JJ.
Defendant-Appellant Jimmy W. Sturch (Defendant) was found guilty by the district court of four charges of violating Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-112 (1993) which prohibits inhabiting a parked vehicle between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The court imposed a $25 fine for each conviction, but suspended the fines imposed on the last three charges on the condition that Defendant not receive similar citations for a period of one month. We affirm.
HRS § 291C-112 states as follows:
§ 291C-112 Certain uses of parked vehicles prohibited between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.; definition; exceptions. (a) No person shall use any vehicle for purposes of human habitation, whether or not the vehicle is designed or equipped for that purpose, while the vehicle is parked on any roadway, street, or highway or other public property between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. or while the vehicle is parked on private property without authorization of the owner or occupant authorizing both the parking of the vehicle there and its use for purposes of human habitation.
(b) As used in this section, "purposes of human habitation" includes use as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place.
(c) This section does not apply to the parking of vehicles and their use for purposes of human habitation in parks, camps, and other recreational areas in compliance with law and applicable rules and regulations, or under emergency conditions in the interest of vehicular safety.
(d) The department of health shall promulgate rules and regulations, pursuant to chapter 91, necessary for the administration of this section. 1
(Emphases and footnote added.)
The offenses for which Defendant was charged took place in 1992 on September 21 at 1:18 a.m., on October 27 at 11:40 p.m., on October 28 at 3:20 a.m., and on November 28 at 11:05 p.m., all at the Ala Wai Boat Harbor parking area in Honolulu on the island of O'ahu. On each occasion, police officers found Defendant sleeping on a cot in a parked van.
At trial, Defendant testified that he was a writer and a photographer. He maintained that his van was "a mobile photography studio" and that its "primary purpose" was "not for human habitation." He explained that he obtained his "inspiration moving around from one place to another" and that he took "a lot of night photographs."
At trial, the State of Hawai'i (the State) failed to specify which of the three defined types of habitation under HRS § 291C-112(b) was charged. However, when asked for the reason why Defendant was "ticket[ed]" for the offenses on September 21 and October 28, Officer Vincent Domingcil (Officer Domingcil) stated that Defendant "was sleeping in this vehicle ... [a]nd it was between the hours of 6 p.m. to 6 a.m." At the time that the officer observed Defendant sleeping on a "folded cot" on September 21, 1992, Defendant told him, Officer Domingcil also recalled seeing clothing, food, "toiletries and other items" in the van. As to the September 21 and October 28, 1992 offenses, the trial court found that "it was clear from the evidence that [Defendant was] sleeping" and was "for the purposes of this statute occupying the vehicle at least on these two occasions for the purpose of human habitation."
As to the October 27 and November 28, 1992 offenses, Officer Charles Lee (Officer Lee) testified that he noticed Defendant's van parked in the same location every night with the "back doors" and the "passenger door on the front of the van" open, and had observed Defendant asleep on a cot in his van. When Officer Lee asked Defendant whether Defendant knew it was "against the law to sleep in a vehicle, ... on a public facility[,]" Defendant replied that he was aware of the statute. While Defendant did not admit that he was "living" in the vehicle, Officer Lee believed Defendant was doing so because "in [Defendant's] vehicle there [were] boxes which contained food, clothing, and [Defendant] also had some toiletry [sic], and ... a hot plate." Defendant confirmed Officer Lee's observations, stating "the officer was pretty much right about everything that he said, except that I don't have a hot plate." With respect to the offenses on October 27 and November 28, 1992, the court found that "[t]he fact that [Defendant] was sleeping in his vehicle, plus certain other evidence of habitation, indicates that the defendant was certainly within the scope of using the vehicle for human habitation under the requirements of [HRS § ] 291[C]-112."
On appeal, Defendant, who appears pro se, does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence but apparently argues that HRS § 291C-112 improperly (1) deprives him of the "right to use ... [a] privately owned vehicle in a manner that [he] may choose," 2 (2) restricts his business by preventing the use of his vehicle during certain hours, 3 and (3) discriminates against him because it allows "habitation purposes and sleeping" to others "between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m." 4
We construe Defendant's points as raising constitutional challenges to HRS § 291C-112. Thus, we examine the history and the language of HRS § 291C-112 in light of established constitutional doctrines. Because the facts of this case do not involve a vehicle parked on "private property," we limit our discussion to vehicles parked on public property.
Defendant first argues that HRS § 291C-112 improperly deprives him of the right to use his privately owned vehicle in the manner he chooses. Contrary to Defendant's contention, however, a state may, as part of the exercise of its police power, " 'rightfully prescribe uniform regulations [for the use of vehicles] necessary for public safety and order[.]' " State v. French, 77 Hawai'i 222, 231, 883 P.2d 644, 653 (App.1994) (quoting Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 35 S.Ct. 140, 142, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915)). In French, we rejected the defendant's claim that he was exempt from statutes requiring no-fault insurance, use of seat belts, a certificate of inspection, and a driver's license, because he utilized his vehicle for "personal needs" and the statutes applied only to businesses and state vehicles. Id. at 230, 883 P.2d at 653. Consequently, as we held in French, Defendant's right to use his vehicle as he chooses is still "subject to the State's police power to regulate an individual's conduct for the protection of society." Id. at 231, 883 P.2d at 653 (citing State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 610-11, 483 P.2d 997, 1001 (1971)).
The police power of the State is broad and extends to the "preservation of public health, safety, morals or [the] general welfare of the public[.]" State v. Lee, 55 Haw. 505, 513, 523 P.2d 315, 319 (1974). See also State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967). As long as a statute is related to these objectives, it falls within the scope of the State's police power. The legislative findings in support of HRS § 291C-112 indicate that "the use of motor vehicles as a domicile or residence constitutes a hazard to the public health and welfare." 1972 Haw.Sess.L.Act 48, § 1 at 231. The legislature thus sought "to protect the public health and...
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