Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn, &C.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1884
• Citation: 82 Ky. 1
• Parties: Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn, &c.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 1

82 Ky. 1

Trustees of Belleview v. Hohn, &c.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 8, 1884.

APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT.

T. P. McKIBBEN AND NELSON & WASHINGTON FOR APPELLANTS.

CRAWFORD & DUCKER FOR APPELLEES.

JUDGE PRYOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action is based on a written contract, alleged to have been made with the trustees of the town of Belleview and the appellees, for the improvement of certain streets within that town.

By the terms of the contract, the appellees agreed and bound themselves not to look to the town, in any event, for the payment of the money for the work to be performed, and recovered, as we infer in the court below, by reason of the averment in their petition or reply that the contract was entered into with the express understanding that the appellants, the trustees of the town, would take such steps as would make the property holders liable. By the original contract, they were to look alone to the abutting property holders for their pay, and not to the defendants. It is also alleged that the town received the work and must therefore pay for it, as the owners of the abutting property were not responsible.

In a proceeding heretofore in this court in the case of Doyle and others, against the trustees of the town, this court held that the trustees had no power to cause the improvements to be made at the cost of the owners of the adjacent property, and that the proceedings by the trustees to subject such property under special averments made for that purpose, were null and void.

The appellees, who performed the work, are now insisting upon their right to recover of the city, because the trustees had no authority to make such a contract. The doctrine recognized in the case of Murphy v. the City of Louisville, 9 Bush, which follows all the modern authorities in regard to contracts entered into by municipal corporations, must be regarded as decisive of this case. "It is a fundamental principle," says Judge Dillon, "that all persons contracting with a municipal corporation must, at their peril, inquire into the power of the corporation, or its officers, to make contracts. Those dealing with an agent of the corporation must know the nature and extent of his authority." (1 Dillon on Mun. Cor., sec. 372.)

In Murphy against the City of Louisville, the same rule is laid down, and in that case it is further held "when one has made a valid and binding contract with a corporation, through its agents, and has...