Jensen v. General Elec. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1993 |
| Citation | 82 N.Y.2d 77,623 N.E.2d 547,603 N.Y.S.2d 420 |
| Parties | , 623 N.E.2d 547 Eric C. JENSEN et al., Respondents, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et al., Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
The phrase "injury to property" in the date of discovery Statute of Limitations, CPLR 214-c(2), embraces actions for damages ensuing from exposure to any substance, including those characterized as continuing trespass and nuisance. Thus, in this action for compensatory and injunctive relief due to hazardous waste contamination of the plaintiffs' property, we conclude that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reversing so much as reinstated the plaintiffs' causes of action for damages based on continuing trespass and nuisance.
From 1958 to 1969, defendant General Electric disposed of hazardous waste from its Fort Edward-Hudson Falls plant at the Moreau Site. Defendant Albert J. Smaldone, Sr. and Sons, Inc. purchased the Moreau Site in 1970. In 1980, G.E. entered into a consent order with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation to investigate environmental impacts and to undertake remediation at seven inactive hazardous waste sites, including the Moreau Site. G.E. entered into a similar consent order with the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1983.
In 1984, G.E. contacted plaintiff Perkett and obtained her permission to place a cluster of monitoring wells on her nearby property. In November of 1984, G.E. published the "Moreau Site Status Report to the Public" (Moreau Report), which graphically illustrated that the plume of heaviest contamination extended under Perkett's property. On December 5, 1984, G.E. sent a copy of the Moreau Report to Perkett, with her property outlined in black ink. She was specifically advised in that transmittal that "the western half [of your property] is located within the plume showing concentrations of trichloroethylene (TCE)."
Between 1984 and 1985, G.E. installed a groundwater cutoff or slurry wall to vertically enclose the original disposal pit at the Moreau Site. In 1986, plaintiff Perkett and plaintiff Jensen took title to the affected property as joint tenants. On September 9, 1986, G.E. sent plaintiff Jensen extensive technical data on the affected property and enclosed a map on which plaintiffs' property was outlined in black ink, and a copy of the December 5, 1984 letter which had been sent to plaintiff Perkett. G.E. also notified plaintiff Jensen that well sites 10 and 22 on his property showed contamination.
Four years later, in June of 1990, plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging that the hazardous wastes deposited by G.E. had contaminated, and continued to contaminate, the plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an injunction "prohibiting the continued release of chemicals into the environment."
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the injury was discovered more than three years before the commencement of the suit and that the action was time-barred by CPLR 214-c(2). Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division modified and reinstated the causes of action seeking damages and injunctive relief based on the continuing trespass and continuing nuisance theory. The Appellate Division held that these causes of action were not time-barred because "being recurring wrongs they are not subject to any Statute of Limitations because they constantly accrue, thus giving rise to successive causes of action" (Jensen v. General Elec. Co., 182 A.D.2d 903, 904, 581 N.Y.S.2d 917 [emphasis added]. The Appellate Division then granted leave to appeal to our Court on a certified question. We modify the order of the Appellate Division by dismissing the causes of action characterized as continuing trespass and nuisance, insofar as they seek compensatory and punitive damages, on the ground that CPLR 214-c(2) specifically bars that relief.
This case turns on the application and interpretation of New York's toxic tort remedial Statute of Limitations, CPLR 214-c, enacted in 1986. The pertinent portion provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier" (CPLR 214-c[2] [emphasis added].
Clarity and certainty of expression control when courts construe statutes. As to the very statute at issue, this Court has stated in another context:
"CPLR 214-c is a remedial statute and such statutes should be 'liberally construed to effectuate their aims' * * * [and] must be given a meaning consistent with the words chosen by the Legislature--those words define the scope of the remedy that the Legislature deemed appropriate" (Enright v. Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 385, n. 1, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, 570 N.E.2d 198 cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 197, 116 L.Ed.2d 157 [emphasis added].
By its terms, CPLR 214-c(2) applies to actions for "damages for * * * injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance." The all-encompassing sweep of the "words chosen by the Legislature" leaves no room for judicial insertion of qualification or exceptions by interpretation, especially when the context and evolution of this historic legislation is examined (see, e.g., Enright v. Lilly & Co., supra, at 385, n. 1, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, 570 N.E.2d 198; see also, Di Marco v. Hudson Val. Blood Servs., 147 A.D.2d 156, 159, 542 N.Y.S.2d 521; accord, Prego v. City of New York, 141 Misc.2d 709, 712, 534 N.Y.S.2d 95, aff'd 147 A.D.2d 165, 541 N.Y.S.2d 995).
Furthermore, we discern no evidence in explicit words, legislative history or manifest intent that the Legislature chose to exempt continuing nuisance and continuing trespass actions from the comprehensive scope and language of this intensely negotiated legislation. To be sure, this breakthrough legislation was enacted to open otherwise closed courthouse doors and to replace the common-law-developed rule, which was criticized as unfair. Notably, the courts repeatedly importuned the Legislature to make the desired policy change, as a matter more appropriately within its province (see, e.g., Snyder v. Town Insulation, 81 N.Y.2d 429, 435-436, 599 N.Y.S.2d 515, 615 N.E.2d 999; Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 432-434, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248 N.E.2d 871). It would be ironic for the courts in these circumstances to reformulate the enacted version of this statute in the substantial fashion urged by plaintiffs.
The statute was enacted to "provide relief to injured New Yorkers whose claims would otherwise be dismissed for untimeliness simply because they were unaware of the latent injuries until after the limitation period had expired" (Mem of Senator R.B. Stafford, reprinted in 1986 NY Legis Ann, at 287). As Governor Cuomo emphasized in his Approval Memorandum, attending the signing of this long-awaited legislation:
(1986 NY Legis Ann, at 288 [emphasis added].
The Bill Jacket provides this additional contemporaneous perspective from the Attorney-General:
"[The statute] makes several significant changes in the law applicable to personal injury, property damage and wrongful death actions [by creating] a discovery rule for New York's statute of limitations in such cases where the injury, damage or death is caused by the latent effects of exposure to substances" (Mem to Governor, in Governor's Bill Jacket to L 1986, ch. 682 [emphasis added].
This perspective helps to buttress the view that the Legislature knew that it was altering the accrual date for all property damage actions caused by all substances, including...
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