Life Insurance Company v. Terry
Citation | 21 L.Ed. 236,15 Wall. 580,82 U.S. 580 |
Parties | LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. TERRY |
Decision Date | 01 December 1872 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas.
Mary Terry brought an action in the court below against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, to recover the sum of $2000, claimed by her as due upon a policy of insurance on the life of her husband George Terry, made and issued to her as his wife.
The policy contained a condition, of which a portion was in these words:
'If the said person, whose life is hereby insured, . . . shall die by his own hand, . . . this policy shall be null and void.'
Within the term of the policy, George Terry died from the effects of poison taken by him.
Evidence was given tending to show that at the time he took the poison he was insane. Evidence was also given tending to show that at that time he was sane, and capable of knowing the consequences of the act he was about to commit.
Thereupon the counsel for the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury thus:
The court refused to give either of these instructions, and charged as follows:
'It being agreed that the deceased destroyed his life by taking poison, it is claimed by defendant that he 'died by his own hand,' within the meaning of the policy, and that they are therefore, not liable.
'This is so far true that it devolves on the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the part of the decedent, existing at the time he took the poison, as will relieve the act of taking his own life from the effect which, by the general terms used in the policy, self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid the policy.
'It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company insuring liable.
'To do this, the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of the insanity, and the mind of the decedent must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing.
The cause came to this court on exceptions to the refusal of the court to give the instructions requested by the insurance company, and to the charge which was actually given.
The case was submitted on briefs; where it was elaborately argued on principle and precedents by Messrs. H. E. and J. T. Davies, for the plaintiff in error: the English case of Borradaile v. Hunter1 being referred to as the leading one, where the rule, it was said, was early settled in England against the pretensions of cases like the present, and settled in accord with what the counsel maintained was a just construction of the words of the contract; a case, it was urged, which had been supported by the weight of authorities both in England and with us; as Clift et al. v. Schwabe,2 Dufaur v. Professional Life Insurance Co.,3 Cooper v. The Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,4 Nimick et al. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,5 and Gay v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.6
Mr. W. W. Nevison, contra, relied on Breasted v. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,7 Barrett v. Buxton,8 State v. Felter,9 and submitted that the charge of the court below was in truth sustained by the Circuit Court for Connecticut, in Gay v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co., relied on by the other side.
The request for instructions made by the counsel of the insurance company, proceeds upon the theory that if the deceased had sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his act, that is, that he was about to take poison, and that his death would be the result, he was responsible for his conduct, and the defendant is not liable; and the fact that his sense of moral responsibility was impaired by insanity, does not affect the case.
The charge proceeds upon the theory that a higher degree of mental and moral power must exist; that although the deceased had the capacity to know that he was about to take poison, and that his death would be the result, yet, if his reasoning powers were so far gone that he could not exercise them on the act he was about to commit, its nature and effect, or if he was impelled by an insane impulse which his impaired capacity did not enable him to resist, he was not responsible for his conduct, and the defendant is liable.
It may not be amiss to notice that the case does not present the point of what is called emotional insanity, or mania transitoria, that is, the case of one in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, who allows his passions to convert him into a temporary maniac, and while in this condition, commits the act in question. This case is expressly excluded by the last clause of the charge, in which it is said that anger, distress, or excitement, does not bring the case within the rule, if the insured possesses his ordinary reasoning faculties.
The case of Borradaile v. Hunter, reported in 5th Manning & Granger,10 is cited by the insurance company. The case is found also in 2 Bigelow, Life and Accident Insurance Cases,11 and in a note appended are found the most of the cases upon the subject before us. The jury found in that case that the deceased voluntarily took his own life, and intended so to do, but that at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong. Judgment went for the defendant, which was sustained upon appeal to the full bench. The counsel for the company argued that where the act causing death was intentional on the part of the deceased, the fact that his mind was so far impaired that he was incapable of judging between right and wrong did not prevent the proviso from attaching; that moral or legal responsibility was irrelevant to the issue. The court adds: In delivering the opinion of the court Erskine, J., says: 'All that the contract requires is, that the act of self-destruction should be the voluntary and wilful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having at the time a purpose and intention to cause his own death by that act, and the question whether at the time he was capable of understanding the moral nature and quality of his purpose, is not relevant to the inquiry further than as it might help to illustrate the extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the act itself.' Chief Justice Tindal dissented from the judgment. In speaking of the verdict he says: 'It is not, perhaps, to be taken strictly as a verdict that the deceased was non compos mentis at the time the act was committed, for if this latter is the meaning of the jury, the case would then fall within that description mentioned in the argument to be without the reach of the proviso, namely, the case of death inflicted on himself by the party whilst under the influence of frenzy, delusion, or insanity.'
This authority was followed in Clift v. Schwabe,12 where it was substantially held that the terms of the condition included all acts of voluntary self-destruction, and that, whether the party is a voluntary moral agent, is not in issue.
These decisions expressly exclude the question of mental soundness. They are in hostility to the tests of liability or responsibility adopted by the English courts in other cases from Coke and Hale onwards. Coke said, 'A little madness deprives the lunatic of civil rights or dominion over property, and annuls wills.' But, to exempt from responsibility for crime, he says 'complete ignorance of the knowledge of right and wrong must exist.' Lord Mansfield holds the legal test of a sound mind to be the knowledge of right and wrong, of good and evil; of which the...
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