Armenakes v. State

Citation821 A.2d 239
Decision Date30 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 2002-56-C.A.,2002-56-C.A.
PartiesJames G. ARMENAKES v. STATE of Rhode Island.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

David A. Schechter, for plaintiff.

Aaron L. Weisman, Asst. Attorney General, for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the court on February 4, 2003, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time.

The applicant, James G. Armenakes (Armenakes or applicant), is before the Supreme Court on appeal from a judgment denying his application for post-conviction relief. Armenakes alleged that his plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of cocaine, in accordance with the provisions of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), was invalid as not knowingly and voluntarily given and further, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.1

After the execution of a search warrant in his business office that resulted in the discovery of cocaine in his jacket pocket, Armenakes was charged with possession of cocaine. In a collateral attack on post-conviction relief, Armenakes asserted that he was erroneously led to believe that his Alford plea was not equivalent to a guilty plea and that his attorney failed to appropriately advise him of the nature and consequences of the plea. Additionally, Armenakes argued that the required plea formalities, including the right of allocution and the execution of a plea request form, should have been afforded to him a second time, when the trial justice, at Armenakes's request, amended the sentence because of an oversight in sentencing requirements.2 Finally, Armenakes argued that the state failed to demonstrate a strong factual basis for the plea with sufficient evidence for the case to proceed to trial, a mandatory prerequisite to an Alford plea. Notwithstanding, after a three-day hearing, the trial justice concluded that applicant had entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and denied the application for post-conviction relief.

Armenakes asks this Court to declare that the trial justice committed clear error in finding that he fully understood the nature and consequences of his plea and the sentence that was imposed. He argues that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence that clearly showed his belief that the plea was not equivalent to a criminal conviction. Armenakes maintains that his only interest in entering the plea was to protect his several liquor licenses from revocation, and therefore, had he known that the plea was the effective equivalent to a guilty plea, he would have opted for trial.

The state asserts that there is ample record evidence establishing that Armenakes understood the consequences of entering an Alford plea, and that he admittedly was pleased with the agreed-upon disposition of the case. Although conceding that sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing to support applicant's contention that he believed that an Alford plea meant he would not be deemed to have pled guilty or nolo contendere, the state argues that this showing does not defeat the weight of the evidence supporting the findings of the trial justice. The state highlights applicant's admission that he previously had entered pleas of nolo contendere to other unrelated charges, and thus, had ample familiarity with the nature and consequence of a plea of nolo contendere. Furthermore, the state argues that applicant has failed to satisfy the burden of proving that his counsel's advice concerning the plea was deficient to such a degree to warrant vacating the conviction.

"The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offense may plead guilty even though he maintains his innocence as long as the state presents a factual basis for such plea through evidence other then the defendant's own admission." State v.Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I.1989). However, although a criminal defendant may be relieved of the embarrassment of admitting participation in the crime or comforted by the fact that he or she has maintained his innocence and the victim sometimes is left in a quandary about what occurred during the plea proceeding, the result is abundantly clear: the defendant stands convicted of the crime. "When a defendant enters an Alford plea, which is accepted by the [C]ourt, then such a plea in a later judicial proceeding constitutes a conviction, irrespective of the fact that the defendant maintains his [or her] innocence and does not stand up and confess guilt." State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 (R.I.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S.Ct. 117, 121 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992). Such a conviction may be used later for any legitimate purpose, including sentencing factors and enhancement, impeachment, and in collateral proceedings, such as deportation.

Since its inception in 1970, the Alford plea has given rise to inconsistent results, confused victims, and a divided judiciary.

"Most jurisdictions offer defendants the option of seeking permission from the judge to enter either a nolo [contendere plea] or an Alford plea. Typically, however, judges and prosecutors do not favor either choice. Both alternatives have the potential of detracting from the moral legitimacy of the conviction that ensues because it is based neither on a trial where there was a full exposition of the evidence nor on the defendant's admission that he or she committed the crime. Because the defendant may assert his or her innocence in either event without contradiction, the public may question the integrity of the process." 2 David Rossman, Criminal Law Advocacy, ¶ 9.03[2] at 9-15 (2001).

In Alford, based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Henry Alford was facing the death penalty for first-degree murder. Although steadfastly maintaining his innocence, Alford agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder, and accepted a sentence of thirty years in prison. The United States Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional bar to a defendant's voluntarily consenting to the imposition of a prisonsentence after intelligently concluding that a plea is in his best interest, as long as the record contains strong evidence of actual guilt. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167, 27 L.Ed.2d at 171. The Court declared that the Constitution was concerned with the practical consequences of a plea and not the formal categorizations of state law. Thus, while most pleas of guilty "consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of a criminal penalty." Id. However, the Court also declared that its holding did not prevent the individual states from prohibiting their courts from accepting guilty pleas by the defendants who insist on asserting their innocence. Id. at 38 n.11, 91 S.Ct. at 168 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d at 172 n. 11. Further, the accused does not enjoy a constitutional right to have a guilty plea accepted. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). Thus, based on the wide latitude accorded the states and their trial justices, Alford has received uneven acceptance and application.

Some states have rejected the right of a defendant to enter an Alford plea or have criticized the concept. See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994)

(refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945, 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91, 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is not assured that the court has convicted a guilty defendant; thus an Alford plea may be withdrawn with great liberality); Harris v. State, 671 N.E.2d 864, 868, 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (holding that aplea of guilty followed by a protestation of innocence is not a plea, except in capital cases, when an accused may enter a plea to avoid death, yet professes innocence); Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 358, 485 A.2d 511, 514 (1984) (holding that Alford pleas are not accepted in Pennsylvania, and although admissible in an administrative hearing as evidence of guilt of a crime, are not conclusive). Moreover, the discretionary nature of an Alford plea sometimes results in judge shopping and the inability of the accused, the victim, and the public to understand and accept the concept that an accused, who has denied his guilt, is nonetheless permitted to plead guilty and is sentenced to prison. See Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 Iowa L.Rev. 1063, 1064 (1987). Accordingly, the states remain free to decline to accept an Alford plea as an exercise of discretion. The refusal of a trial justice to permit a defendant to plead guilty or nolo contendere and maintain his or her innocence is usually upheld on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677, 774 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Doe v. Liebsch, A14–0275.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • December 30, 2015
    ...(allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about a previous Alford plea for impeachment purposes); Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 242 (R.I.2003) (noting that a conviction obtained via an Alford plea "may be used later for any legitimate purpose, including sentencing factors......
  • Page v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • May 26, 2010
    ...80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)." Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I.2001); see also Washington v. State, 989 A.2d at 99; Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 245 (R.I.2003). In applying those principles, we have further stated that "the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be wh......
  • McKinney v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • February 4, 2004
    ...justice. We have held that a sentencing justice must have wide latitude to accept negotiated plea agreements. See Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 244 (R.I.2003). Unless the sentence of sixty years, forth to serve, was illegal or unconstitutional, and we hold here it is not, then the sente......
  • Mattatall v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • May 29, 2008
    ...S.Ct. 160; State v. Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I. 1989); see also Azevedo v. State, 945 A.2d 335, 338-39 (R.I.2008); Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 242 (R.I.2003); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 n. 6 (R.I.1992). As this Court has made clear on numerous "[A]lthough a criminal......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT