Young v. Lynaugh

• Decision Date: 20 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-2064,86-2064
• Citation: 821 F.2d 1133
• Parties: James Ray YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Interim Director Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1133

821 F.2d 1133

James Ray YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Interim Director Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 86-2064.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 20, 1987.

Charles A. Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellant.

Maury Hexamer, Sherman, Tex. (court-appointed), for petitioner-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, RUBIN and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

After many years of seeking relief from an allegedly involuntary guilty plea to a 1963 burglary charge, Petitioner James Ray Young obtained from the district court a writ of habeas corpus. Young claimed to receive not merely ineffective assistance of counsel, but no assistance whatever regarding his plea. Below and on appeal, the state has played procedural football, urging the federal judiciary to punt Young's claims entirely, or at least to lateral them back to the state courts. We find that the district court properly entertained Young's petition, but that it must retain possession of his claims for further substantive consideration.

The state contends that Young is not "in custody," and thus that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition. Second, even if jurisdiction exists, the state urges us to decline jurisdiction on equitable and comity-based grounds. Third, the state argues that Young has failed to exhaust state remedies by presenting corroborative testimony at his federal habeas hearing. Fourth, the state claims that factfindings of the state court habeas judge preclude review of Young's substantive claims. Each of these contentions is meritless. However, the district court failed properly to find prejudice under the applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. The Players and the Background

Late in 1962, an eighteen-year-old Young was arrested for a burglary in Cause No. 27530. Lacking counsel and erroneously believing that his probation--resulting from an uncounseled plea arrangement, formed in Grayson County, Texas six weeks prior to this arrest--had been revoked, Young negotiated a plea arrangement for a two-year concurrent sentence.

On February 16, 1963, counsel was appointed to represent Young in the 15th District Court of Grayson County. After conducting no inquiry regarding the facts of Young's case, the status of Young's probation, the strength of the prosecution's case or Young's potential defenses thereto, counsel, also presuming that Young's probation had been revoked, advised Young to plead guilty to the arrangement that Young had negotiated. Counsel did not instruct Young as to the elements of the crime with which Young was charged, nor as to the consequences and nature of Young's plea. Young pled guilty that same day, and did not appeal this conviction.

In 1964, Young was convicted of burglary, Cause No. E-4624-K, in the Criminal District Court No. 4 of Dallas County, Texas. Young did not appeal.

In 1976, Young again was arrested and charged with burglary, Cause No. F76-4846-PI, in the Criminal Court No. 2 of Dallas County. Young pled not guilty, but the jury convicted. The indictment in F76-4846-PI set forth the two prior burglary convictions, which the jury found to have occurred. The trial court assessed the mandatory punishment for a burglary sentence enhanced by the two prior convictions--which is life imprisonment, see Texas Penal Code Ann. Sec. 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp.1974)--and Young unsuccessfully appealed this conviction. Young v. State, 573 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.Crim.App.1978).

Late in 1978, Young filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Grayson County court challenging the 1963 conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary plea. The judge, who had accepted Young's 1963 plea, appointed counsel, who amended the petition. The state court judge held an evidentiary hearing in 1979, and issued an order, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying relief on the merits. Young unsuccessfully appealed this order.

In 1980, Young filed the instant federal writ application pro se, challenging the 1963 conviction on the same grounds. Late in 1980, the district court referred the case to a magistrate, who issued a show cause order to the state in 1981. The state responded with a motion to dismiss, conceding habeas jurisdiction but arguing that Young's failure to object to the 1963 sentence during its use for enhancement at the 1976 trial constituted a procedural default barring further consideration of Young's 1963 claims. Young responded to the motion to dismiss, and requested an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel.

In 1983, the district court referred the case to another magistrate who, in 1984, appointed the same attorney who argued Young's state habeas petition. During a telephone conference, Young's counsel indicated that Young was challenging only the 1963 conviction, not its use for enhancement. At that point, the state objected that Young was not "in custody" for habeas purposes.

The magistrate then held an evidentiary hearing and, in 1985, issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, suggesting that the district court reject the state's procedural challenges and grant relief on Young's substantive claims. The state objected to the magistrate's recommendations. On December 30, 1985, the district court adopted the magistrate's findings and granted relief from the 1963 conviction because Young had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The state appeals. ¹

II. Jurisdiction on the Sec. 2254(a) Playing Field

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." In Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 450 n. 22 (5th Cir.1982) (citation omitted), reh. denied, 691 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056, 103 S.Ct. 1508, 75 L.Ed.2d 937 (1983),

[w]e note[d] that it is still an unsettled question in this circuit to what extent the use of an earlier sentence for enhancement purposes in a present sentence satisfies the custody requirement for the purpose of an attack on the former sentence. See generally Escobedo v. Estelle, [650 F.2d 70, modified on petition for rehearing, 655 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.1981) ] (suggesting that requirement may be satisfied, if, according to the rule of Sinclair v. Blackburn, 599 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1023, 100 S.Ct. 684, 62 L.Ed.2d 656 (1980), petitioner can show a positive demonstrable relationship between the prior conviction and the petitioner's present incarceration).

The district court properly identified this state of the law, and settled the question by finding Young in custody due to the 1976 enhancement.

Although the state conceded below and on appeal that "as a matter of historical fact, Young is 'in custody' due to his 1963 conviction because it was used for enhancement of punishment in 1976.... [the state contends that] Young is not 'in custody' for purposes of the instant federal habeas action because he has made the tactical decision to challenge only the 1963 conviction and not its use for enhancement." First, the state argues, because Young has fully served the 1963 conviction, there is no "positive, demonstrable relationship" under Sinclair between the conviction that Young challenges and Young's current custody so as to convey jurisdiction. Second, because Young allegedly is likely successfully subsequently to challenge his 1976 conviction if this writ were to issue, a finding of custody would sanction piecemeal litigation. Third, were we to entertain the petition, the state would be deprived of an opportunity to argue procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). ²

The state candidly concedes that Young's 1963 conviction is "positively and demonstrably related" to the enhanced 1976 life sentence, but (admittedly "hypertechnically") claims that it is not demonstrably related to his present confinement because he is not currently challenging this confinement. The greensward of Sec. 2254(a), however, reveals no such hypertechnical pitfall. As we stated in Sinclair and reiterated in Escobedo, " ' "in custody" for jurisdiction under Sec. 2254(a) does not necessarily mean "in custody for the offense being attacked." ' " Escobedo, 655 F.2d at 614 (quoting Sinclair, 599 F.2d at 676); see also Carter v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir.1985); Cappetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1238, 1239 (5th Cir.1969) (citing Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968), and other cases), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846, 90 S.Ct. 55, 24 L.Ed.2d 96 (1969). There is clearly (and admittedly) a positive and demonstrable nexus between Young's current custody and the allegedly unconstitutional conviction sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of Sec. 2254(a).

To further assure that Young's claims were located between the habeas hashmarks, the district court adopted the magistrate's finding that Young is "in custody," because Young "will receive 'credit in some degree' on his current sentence" were the 1963 conviction voided. The state claims that, even in this regard, Young's petition did not demonstrate a positive relationship under Sinclair; Young introduced no "evidence" to demonstrate the likelihood of his earlier release, and the magistrate improperly "engaged in a series of perplexing and illogical presumptions and assumptions" to reach...