Morva v. Zook

Decision Date05 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–1.,15–1.
Citation821 F.3d 517
PartiesWilliam Charles MORVA, Petitioner–Appellant, v. David ZOOK, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Jonathan P. Sheldon, Sheldon, Flood & Haywood, PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Alice Theresa Armstrong, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Teresa L. Norris, Blume Norris & Franklin–Best, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge DIAZ

wrote the opinion, in which Judge WYNN and Senior Judge DAVIS joined.

DIAZ

, Circuit Judge:

William Charles Morva appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and challenges several aspects of his capital convictions and death sentence. First, Morva argues that the Virginia circuit court's refusal to appoint a prison-risk-assessment expert compels relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

. But because Morva has identified no clearly established federal law requiring the appointment of a nonpsychiatric expert, we reject this claim.

Next, Morva asserts three related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims regarding his counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in his capital sentencing hearing. Reviewing these claims through the deferential lens of § 2254(d)

, we find neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Last, we determine whether Morva has shown cause to excuse his procedurally defaulted claim that counsel was ineffective for stipulating at the guilt phase of trial that Morva was a prisoner in lawful custody at the time of the alleged capital murder. Finding the underlying claim insubstantial under Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), we hold that he has not.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.

I.
A.

In the summer of 2006, Morva was in jail awaiting trial in Montgomery County, Virginia, on burglary-, robbery-, and firearm-related charges. He had been in jail for approximately one year when he escaped and committed the crimes we address in this appeal. We set out the relevant facts of Morva's crimes, as recited by the Supreme Court of Virginia:

Morva was scheduled to go to trial on August 23, 2006. In the evening on August 19, 2006, he informed the jail personnel that he required medical attention due to an injury to his leg and forearm. During the early morning hours of August 20, 2006, Sheriff's Deputy Russell Quesenberry, who was in uniform and armed with a Glock .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol, transported Morva to the Montgomery Regional Hospital located in Montgomery County. Morva was wearing waist chains, but Deputy Quesenberry did not secure Morva's allegedly injured arm.
Upon arrival at the hospital, Morva “kept trying” to walk on Deputy Quesenberry's right side even though he was ordered to walk on Deputy Quesenberry's left side. Quesenberry was required to have Morva walk on his left because Quesenberry wore his gun on his right side. Quesenberry observed that Morva's limping

was sporadic and “sort of went away.” Also, Nurse Melissa Epperly observed Morva walking as if he were not injured.

After the hospital treated Morva, Morva requested to use the bathroom. Deputy Quesenberry inspected the bathroom and allowed Morva access. While in the bathroom, Morva removed a metal toilet paper holder that was screwed to the wall. As Deputy Quesenberry entered the bathroom, Morva attacked him with the metal toilet paper holder, breaking Quesenberry's nose, fracturing his face, and knocking him unconscious. Morva then took Quesenberry's gun. Prior to leaving the bathroom, Morva confirmed that Quesenberry's gun was ready to fire, ejecting a live round from the chamber.

After escaping from the bathroom, Morva encountered Derrick McFarland, an unarmed hospital security guard. Morva pointed Quesenberry's gun at McFarland's face. McFarland stood with his hands out by his side and palms facing Morva. Despite McFarland's apparent surrender, Morva shot McFarland in the face from a distance of two feet and ran out of the hospital, firing five gunshots into the electronic emergency room doors when they would not open. McFarland died from the gunshot to his face.

In the morning of August 21, 2006, Morva was seen in Montgomery County near “Huckleberry Trail,” a paved path for walking and bicycling. Corporal Eric Sutphin, who was in uniform and armed, responded to that information by proceeding to “Huckleberry Trail.”

Andrew J. Duncan observed Morva and then later observed Corporal Sutphin on “Huckleberry Trail.” Four minutes later, Duncan heard two gunshots, less than a second apart. David Carter, who lived nearby, heard shouting, followed by two gunshots, and saw Corporal Sutphin fall to the ground.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Brian Roe discovered Corporal Sutphin, who was dead from a gunshot to the back of his head. Corporal Sutphin's gun was still in its holster with the safety strap engaged. Officer Roe confiscated Corporal Sutphin's gun to secure it and continued to search for Morva.

Later that day, Officer Ryan Hite found Morva lying in a ditch in thick grass. Even though Morva claimed to be unarmed, officers discovered Quesenberry's gun on the ground where Morva had been lying. Morva's DNA was found on the trigger and handle of Quesenberry's gun.

Morva v. Commonwealth (Morva I ), 278 Va.329, 683 S.E.2d 553, 557 (2009)

. After a six-day trial, the jury found Morva guilty of assault and battery of a law-enforcement officer, escape of a prisoner by force or violence, three counts of capital murder,1 and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a murder.

B.
1.

We begin with a brief discussion of Virginia's capital sentencing scheme.

Under Virginia law, a capital sentencing hearing proceeds in two stages. See Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 12 n. 1, 116 S.Ct. 283, 133 L.Ed.2d 251 (1995)

(per curiam). First, the jury decides whether the Commonwealth has proved at least one of two statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant's future dangerousness and the vileness of his capital offense conduct. Va.Code Ann. §§ 19.2–264.2, 19.2–264.4(C). In evaluating the aggravating factor of future dangerousness, the jury is limited to considering the defendant's criminal record, his prior history, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the capital offense. §§ 19.2–264.2, 19.2–264.4(C). If the jury fails to find an aggravating factor, it must impose a sentence of life imprisonment; if, however, the jury finds one or both of the statutory aggravating factors, it has full discretion to impose either the death sentence or life imprisonment. See §§ 19.2–264.2, 19.2–264.4(C)(D) ; Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 12 n. 1, 116 S.Ct. 283.

Although Virginia juries are not instructed to give special weight to aggravating factors or to balance aggravating and mitigating evidence, Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 441 S.E.2d 195, 205 (1994)

, juries are constitutionally required to consider relevant mitigating evidence in determining a sentence in a capital case, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).

2.

Prior to trial, Morva moved for the appointment of Dr. Mark D. Cunningham, a prison-risk-assessment expert, to “rebut the Commonwealth's claim that Morva was a future danger to society and to provide the jury with an assessment of the likelihood that Morva would commit violence if he were sentenced to life in prison.” Morva I, 683 S.E.2d at 557

. The circuit court denied the motion, stating that Virginia law barred as irrelevant Dr. Cunningham's testimony regarding the environment and structure of a maximum-security facility as well as testimony regarding rates of violence among individuals similarly situated to the defendant. Morva later moved for reconsideration, supported by a letter from Dr. Cunningham, but the motion was denied.

Morva also sought the appointment of a mental-health expert and a mitigation specialist, which the circuit court granted. The court appointed Dr. Bruce Cohen, a forensic psychiatrist; Dr. Scott Bender, a neuropsychologist; and Dr. Leigh Hagan, a psychologist. All three experts prepared capital-sentencing evaluations. Dr. Cohen and Dr. Bender diagnosed Morva with schizotypal personality disorder

.2 Dr. Cohen and Dr. Hagan, however, noted that there was no evidence indicating that Morva was experiencing “an extreme mental or emotional disturbance” at the time of the capital offenses, or that he was “unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” J.A. 2013; see also J.A. 2025–26 (showing in Dr. Bender's evaluation that he did not find to the contrary; rather, he did not consider the issue).

At the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth tendered evidence of both statutory aggravating factors. Morva called thirteen witnesses, including Dr. Bender and Dr. Cohen. While Dr. Cohen testified to Morva's absence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, the doctor also testified that Morva's schizotypal personality disorder

mitigated against imposing the death sentence. The jury ultimately found both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed the death sentence on each of the three capital murder convictions.

On direct appeal (and as relevant here), Morva challenged the circuit court's denial of his motion to appoint Dr. Cunningham as a prison-risk-assessment expert. The Supreme Court of Virginia found no abuse of...

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