Schneider v. Southern Ry. Co., 86-5132

• Decision Date: 30 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-5132,86-5132
• Citation: 822 F.2d 22
• Parties: 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3251, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,440 Dennis SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 22

822 F.2d 22

125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3251, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,440

Dennis SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-5132.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 1986.

Decided June 30, 1987.

Charles W.B. Fels, Ritchie and Fels, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellant.

Earl Layman, Knoxville, Tenn., Jeffrey S. Berlin, argued, Richardson, Berlin & Morvillo, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.

Before KRUPANSKY, NELSON and RYAN, Circuit Judges.

RYAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from the plaintiff's discharge from employment with Southern Railway for falsifying an injury report. Following a Public Law Board No. 964 arbitration hearing, the discharge was upheld. Schneider challenged the Board's decision in federal district court contending that:

(1) Although he was notified of Southern's investigation, the notice was inadequate and the investigation itself was unfair, in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement;

(2) the Board's decision was baseless, without foundation in reason or fact; and

(3) due to unreasonable delay in rendering a decision, the Board lost jurisdiction to decide Schneider's case.

The district court rejected these contentions and granted Southern's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I.

Schneider was employed for eleven years as a brakeman at Southern's Tennessee Division in Knoxville. On August 10, 1983, while working as a brakeman at Yalu Junction, Tennessee, he claimed to have slipped on some oil and fallen on the steps of a locomotive, bruising his knee. The crew's conductor prepared an accident report "Form 22" in accordance with Schneider's oral description of the accident. Schneider did not sign the report.

Upon arrival in North Carolina, Schneider was taken to a doctor. He was told that his knee was bruised, and that he should rest it for a couple of days. Although Schneider protested, the trainmaster insisted that Schneider leave the crew and return to Knoxville by automobile. In response to the trainmaster's questioning, Schneider said he would return to his ordinary work on the next trip.

Before the next trip, however, Schneider received written notice from the railroad that the accident was being investigated. The notice suggested that Schneider obtain representation and prepare to call witnesses in his behalf. A hearing was scheduled for August 15, 1983.

At the hearing Southern presented witnesses who testified that Schneider appeared to be limping the night before the accident; that there was no oil on the locomotive's step when Schneider's shift began; that the oil on the step was "new" oil, free from contaminants; that because the step was not located near any lubricated parts on the engine, the oil could not have leaked onto the step as a natural occurrence; that a container of new oil was missing from a locomotive coupled behind the engine in question; and that it was simply not normal for an experienced brakeman to mount an engine where Schneider claimed to have.

Schneider testified that he was climbing onto the engine in order to cross over to the other side when he slipped on the oil. He offered the testimony of only one witness who stated that Schneider had not been limping the night prior to the accident. At the conclusion of the hearing, Schneider affirmed that the investigation had been conducted in a fair and impartial manner, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. Shortly thereafter, Schneider was discharged for falsifying a personal injury report.

Unsuccessful in his internal appeals, Schneider appealed to Public Law Board No. 964. The Board is a special arbitration panel created by an agreement between Southern and the Union pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153, Second Paragraph. Following a nine-month delay, the Board rendered a decision upholding the discharge.

Thereafter, Schneider filed suit in federal district court. Granting summary judgment for Southern, the district court held that:

(1) Schneider had waived the alleged procedural defects in the investigation and hearing process by failing to raise them before the Public Law Board;

(2) the Board's decision was not wholly baseless and irrational; and

(3) the delay was not unreasonable and therefore the Board had not lost jurisdiction to decide the case.

II.

It is well-established that parties to an arbitration may waive procedural defects by failing to bring such issues to the arbitrator's attention in time to allow the arbitrator an opportunity to cure the defects. National Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Service, 751 F.2d 834, 841 n. 4 (6th Cir.1985); Order of Railway Conductors v. Clinchfield Railway Co., 407 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 841, 90 S.Ct. 104, 24 L.Ed.2d 92 (1969); Brotherhood of Railway Airline & Steamship Clerks v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 676 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.1982). In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed.2d 54 (1952), the Supreme Court stated:

"[O]rderly procedure and good administration require that objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts."

Id. at 37, 73 S.Ct. at 69. Because Schneider failed to raise before the Public Law Board any issues concerning the adequacy of the notice he received from Southern and the fairness of the investigatory process, he waived these alleged procedural defects, and the district court correctly so held.

III.

The standard for judicial review of arbitration decisions is "extremely limited." Brotherhood Railway Carmen v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 745 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir.1984). In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 415 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008, 90 S.Ct. 564, 24 L.Ed.2d 500 (1970), the court stated:

"In the arbitration context, an award 'without foundation in reason or fact' is equated with an award that exceeds the authority or jurisdiction on [sic] the arbitrating body. To merit judicial enforcement, an award must have a basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the collective bargaining agreement.... The requirement that the result of arbitration have 'foundation in reason or fact' means that the award must, in some logical way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the contract."

Id. at 411-12. Because of the policy favoring arbitration, this standard of review is much narrower than the "substantial evidence" standard. Diamond v. Terminal Railway Alabama State Docks, 421 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.1970); Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93-94, 99 S.Ct. 399, 401-402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) (per curiam) reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1135, 99 S.Ct. 1060, 59 L.Ed.2d 98 (1979). In order to set aside the Board's decision, it would be necessary to determine that the decision was "wholly baseless and without foundation and reason." Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway, 382 U.S. 257, 264, 86 S.Ct. 368, 372, 15 L.Ed.2d 308 (1965).

In reaching its...