Spanier v. Morrison's Management Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-7562,85-7562
• Citation: 822 F.2d 975
• Parties: 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 628, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,319 Linda Lorie SPANIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. MORRISON'S MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a corporation; Morrison, Inc., a corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 975

822 F.2d 975

44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 628,

44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,319

Linda Lorie SPANIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. MORRISON'S MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a corporation Morrison, Inc., a corporation Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

No. 85-7562.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

July 24, 1987.

Holly L. Wiseman, Markstein, Morris & Liles, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.

Cornelius R. Heusel, Kullman, Inman, Bee & Downing, New Orleans, La., Eldridge D. Lacy, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

Before GODBOLD, and HILL, Circuit Judges, and LYNNE ^*, Senior District Judge.

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:

This is an age discrimination suit. ¹ A jury found that Morrison's had willfully violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., and awarded damages. Morrison's moved for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. The district court granted Morrison's motion for judgment n.o.v. as to the finding of willfulness, thus rendering Spanier ineligible for statutory double damages, and in the alternative found that Morrison's had acted in good faith and on that ground reduced the statutorily doubled damage award by half. Morrison's motion was denied in all other respects. Spanier appeals and questions the granting of this motion. Morrison's cross-appeal challenges the ruling to the extent that its motion was denied. We reverse on the appeal and affirm on the cross-appeal.

I. Facts

In 1974 Lorie Spanier was hired as an assistant manager by Morrison's Management Services, Inc., which provides management services for cafeterias maintained by institutions such as hospitals and factories. At that time Spanier was 48 years old and had over 15 years experience in the food-services industry. Previously she had held a similar position with another company. Spanier was soon promoted to a position as manager and worked in that capacity at a number of facilities over the next several years.

In 1976 Spanier was assigned to manage a cafeteria and box lunch program at the U.S. Steel plant in Fairfield, Alabama. Although initially she was successful in making the operation profitable, an economic downturn in the area caused business to diminish steadily in 1979 and 1980. To counteract the loss of business at that site Morrison's established an Alabama Commission on Aging ("ACOA") Meals-on-Wheels central kitchen there in 1981. Spanier was put in charge. Although the position required her to work much longer hours she continued to receive excellent performance evaluations and yearly bonuses and merit pay increases. In August 1982, a year and a half after taking on the ACOA program in addition to her duties at the U.S. Steel cafeteria, she received a performance rating of 100% on the ACOA program and 90% on the cafeteria program.

In 1983 Spanier was persuaded by her supervisor to transfer to the Morrison's operation at Brookwood Lodge, an alcohol and drug rehabilitation center, to work at an increased salary. Her replacement at U.S. Steel was her assistant manager, a 46 year old. Several months later that person was replaced by a 26 year old. Spanier was then 58.

At trial employees of Morrison's testified that Spanier was transferred because of complaints about her performance that were received from the state agency for which Morrison's managed the ACOA facility. Complaints were also received, however, about all of the ACOA kitchens, and none of the complaints about Spanier was noted on her performance evaluations.

After Spanier had spent two months working at Brookwood Lodge the director asked that Spanier be replaced. When Spanier's supervisor told her that she would have to leave Brookwood he explained that the director there preferred male managers and assured her that her removal was not based on her performance. Spanier was replaced at Brookwood by a 23 year old. The assistant manager who had supervised her, Roy Ramsey, was 27 years old. At trial Ramsey testified that he had asked that Spanier be replaced because of her job performance. Ramsey did not inform Spanier, however, of his concerns about her performance or about the complaints he said he had received from patients at Brookwood.

After leaving Brookwood Spanier was placed on "unassigned status." She never again held a managerial position. She was transferred from facility to facility for several months, and her annual pay was cut from $20,000 to $18,500. One manager under whom she worked told Spanier that he had been asked to evaluate her performance because Morrison's wanted to get rid of her, and that he thought that she was being wronged. Tr. at 187.

After 10 months on unassigned status Spanier was asked by her supervisor to resign. Although formerly she had been told that she had not been reassigned because no openings had been available, on this occasion she was told that Morrison's needed "younger people that were more qualified." Tr. at 215. When Spanier refused to resign or retire she was fired.

The evidence at trial showed that during the 10 months that Spanier was unassigned there were 12 managerial openings in her district. Spanier was qualified for five of these, but all five were filled with younger, less experienced employees. Morrison's contends that it filled each of these five positions with someone other than Spanier for legitimate reasons other than Spanier's age.

At the conclusion of trial the jury returned a general verdict for Spanier and answered special interrogatories. The special interrogatories included the following: "Did you find from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's termination resulted from age discrimination by the defendants?" The jury answered in the affirmative. The jury also found by special interrogatory that the age discrimination by Morrison's was a willful violation of the ADEA. The jury set damages for lost wages and benefits at $25,895.

Morrison's then moved for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. The district court granted the motion for judgment n.o.v. only as to the jury's finding of willfulness and made an alternative finding that Morrison's had acted in good faith. The district court thus refused to award the liquidated "double damages" due under section 626(b) of the ADEA. Spanier appealed and Morrison's filed a cross-appeal.

II. Issues on Appeal

Spanier contends that the district court erred in granting Morrison's motion for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of liquidated damages. We agree.

The ADEA provides for liquidated damage awards when an employer "willfully" violates the Act. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b). In TransWorld Air Lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), the Supreme Court approved a definition of willful which states that a violation is willful if "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." Id. at 128, 105 S.Ct. at 625. Despite difficulties in application of this standard, this circuit has forthrightly adopted the standard. See Reynolds v. CLP Corp., 812 F.2d 671, 675 (11th Cir.1987); Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (11th Cir.1987) (rejecting a Third Circuit case requiring "outrageous" conduct). The jury charge in the instant case comported with this definition, ² and the jury found willfulness.

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Spanier, we conclude that judgment n.o.v. was not warranted. As this court did in Reynolds, we "conclude that there was substantial evidence of such quality and weight that fair-minded jurors, exercising impartial judgment, could reasonably have concluded" that Morrison's termination of Spanier resulted from age discrimination and that Morrison's either knew that this action was unlawful or showed reckless disregard for whether its action was prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See 812 F.2d at 675.

The evidence in this case shows the following. Spanier had a splendid job record. She was replaced at Brookwood Lodge by a 23 year old person and was told that the director at Brookwood preferred male managers and that her removal was not based on her performance. One manager under whom she had worked told her that he had been asked to evaluate her performance because Morrison's wanted to get rid of her and that he thought she was being wronged. When she was asked to resign she was told that no openings had been available when in fact there had been 12 openings, five of which she was qualified for, and these five were filled with younger and less experienced employees. When she was asked to resign or retire she was told that Morrison's needed "younger people that were more qualified." This evidence is adequate to support the jury's finding of willfulness. Because there was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue as to willfulness, it was error for the district court to refuse to double Spanier's damages as provided by Sec. 626(b).

In addition to the judgment n.o.v. on the issue of liquidated damages, the district court held in the alternative that the liquidated damages should be reduced by one-half. Prior to the decision in Thurston the law of this circuit gave the district court discretion to reduce a liquidated ADEA damage award if it found that the defendant had acted in good faith. See Hedrick v. Hercules, 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.1976). This discretion counterbalanced the breadth of this court's definition of "willfulness" under the ADEA. See Elliott v. Group Med. & Surg. Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 558 n. 2 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2658, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984). Thurston disapproved this court's definition of willfulness and, by implication, disapproved the...