Pratt v. Harris Cnty.

Decision Date03 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–20080.,15–20080.
Citation822 F.3d 174
PartiesErony PRATT, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Wayne Pratt, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; Adrian Garcia, Harris County Sheriff ; Michael Medina, Deputy; Vincent Lopez, Deputy; Tarzis Lobos, Deputy; Brian Goldstein, Deputy; Tommy Wilks, Jr., Deputy; Francisco Salazar, Deputy; B.J. Auzene, Deputy; R. DeAlejandro, Jr., Deputy; R.M. Goerlitz, Deputy; E.M. Jones, Sergeant; M. Coker, Sergeant, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Susan E. Hutchison (argued), Hutchison & Stoy, P.L.L.C., Fort Worth, TX, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Lisa Rice Hulsey, Assistant County Attorney, Mary E. Baker (argued), County Attorney's Office for the County of Harris, Houston, TX, for DefendantsAppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY

, Circuit Judge:

Erony Pratt, the mother of the deceased, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

lawsuit alleging that officers of the Harris County Sheriff's Department (HCSD), in Harris County, Texas, caused her son's death by using excessive force in restraining him during his arrest. Furthermore, she asserted, under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), that Harris County was also liable for his death. The district court granted qualified immunity to HCSD officers in their individual capacity and denied Pratt's claims under Monell. Pratt appealed. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

I.
A.

In reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, we “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir.2009)

. The majority of the facts in this opinion, therefore, are adopted from the appellant's briefing before this Court.

Wayne Pratt (Pratt) was involved in a minor traffic accident. In response to a disturbance call, HCSD Deputy Vincent Lopez, upon arrival at the scene, observed a vehicle with front-end damage resting in a ditch and Pratt “running in circles ... imitating a boxer.”1 HCSD Deputies Brian Goldstein and Michael Medina arrived shortly. All three officers attempted to interact with Pratt. Pratt did not respond, but began to walk away. All three officers requested that he stop walking away. Pratt still did not respond, and remained in an uncooperative state.

After several warnings, Pratt began approaching Lopez and came within 5–7 feet of Lopez. Lopez then unholstered his taser and commanded Pratt to stop. At this point, Goldstein and Medina unholstered their tasers as well and Pratt began to run away. Lopez deployed his taser, but was ineffective in stopping Pratt.2 Lopez cycled his taser two more times in the next forty seconds, which also failed to stop Pratt. Around this time, deputies Tommy Wilks, Tarzis Lobos, Francisco Salazar, B.J. Auzene, R. DeAlejandro, and R.M. Goerlitz arrived at the scene.

Because Lopez's efforts to subdue Pratt were ineffective, Medina deployed his taser. Pratt fell to the ground. Goldstein attempted to handcuff Pratt but, because of Pratt's continued resistance, he was able to secure only one of Pratt's arms in a handcuff. Medina cycled his taser two more times in the next thirty seconds. Pratt continued to struggle. When Lobos began aiding Goldstein in handcuffing Pratt, however, he stopped resisting and said “okay, okay, I'll quit.... I'll stop fighting.” Goldstein then secured both of Pratt's arms in handcuffs. Pratt was patted down for weapons. None were found.

After Pratt was in handcuffs, Salazar aided Goldstein in lifting Pratt and walking him toward the patrol car. After a few steps, however, Pratt again began to resist and broke free from Goldstein's grip. Salazar returned Pratt to the ground. While on the ground, Pratt began kicking at Goldstein and Salazar. Pratt kicked Goldstein in the groin twice during the exchange. Witnessing this exchange, Wilks retrieved a hobble restraint (i.e., handcuffs that attach to an arrestee's ankles) from his patrol car.

As Pratt continued to struggle, Salazar, Lobos, and Medina attempted to aid Goldstein in controlling him. During this struggle Medina tasered Pratt once again, this time in “drive stun mode” (in which the taser leads make direct contact with the arrestee's body), and Goldstein was able to gain control of Pratt's legs. Goldstein then rolled Pratt onto his stomach, crossed Pratt's legs, and bent them towards his buttocks. Salazar also placed his knee on Pratt's back in order to maintain compliance. When Wilks returned with the hobble restraint, Goldstein aided him in attaching it to Pratt's legs. Pratt ceased resisting and said “Ok I quit. I'm done.” Goldstein and Salazar also ceased physically restraining him. At this point, Pratt's handcuffs were connected to the hobble restraint behind his back. Pratt was “hog-tied”.

Shortly, EMS arrived at the scene.3 EMS paramedics requested that the hobble restraint and handcuffs be removed so CPR could be administered. Pratt did not have a pulse and had ceased breathing. Upon treatment, Pratt regained a pulse, but did not resume independent breathing until after arriving at the hospital. Pratt died the following morning.

Following his death Dr. Darshan Phantak conducted Pratt's autopsy and concluded that [t]he cause and manner of the death ... [wa]s best classified as ‘UNDETERMINED’. Dr. Phantak based this conclusion on the fact that he could not “definitively separate[ ] the effect of Pratt's ingestion of cocaine and ethanol, from the other possible contributing factors—which, at least, included Pratt's car accident, various altercations, tasing, and hog-tying—that culminated in his asphyxiation

.

Dr. Lee Ann Grossberg, Pratt's expert witness, also submitted an affidavit to the district court, which differed from the findings of Dr. Phantak. Specifically, rather than leaving the cause of death undetermined, Dr. Grossberg described the cause of death as “multi-factorial” and “list[ed] the factors that contributed to the death.” In Dr. Grossberg's opinion, “the cause of death ... [wa]s due to the combined effects of prone restraint and cocaine and ethanol toxicity” and “[c]ontributing factors also include[d] TASER use, dilated/hypertrophic cardiomyopathy

, obesity and chronic drug use.” Dr. Grossberg further concluded that Pratt's death was “complex and multi-factorial” and that “no single factor is 100% responsible”; rather, it was “the combination of events and factors in a susceptible individual that cause [d] the ‘perfect storm’ ... [that] result[ed] in the death.”

At the time of Pratt's arrest, the HCSD had a policy that prohibited officers from using hog-tie restraints, prompting the HCSD to conduct an “In Custody Death Review” of Pratt's death. The results were presented to a grand jury, and Goldstein, Medina, and Lopez were no-billed by the grand jury. A second internal investigation was conducted, reviewing specifically the use of the “hog-tying” restraint by Goldstein and Wilks. The Administrative Disciplinary committee found Goldstein and Wilks's alleged misconduct “not sustained.”

B.

As earlier indicated, Erony Pratt, individually and as representative of Pratt's estate, brought this § 1983

cause of action alleging various violations of Pratt's Fourth Amendment rights against individual officers and Harris County. The HCSD officers moved for summary judgment, asserting defenses of qualified immunity. Harris County also moved for summary judgment contending that Pratt failed to sufficiently plead Monell liability as a matter of law. On summary judgment, the district court granted qualified immunity to the HCSD officers, denied Pratt's Monell claims against Harris County, and dismissed the complaint. Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., No. H–12–1770, 2015 WL 224945 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 15, 2015)

.

On appeal, Pratt challenges the district court's grant of qualified immunity, contending unconstitutional conduct by HCSD officers as follows: 1) Deputies Lopez and Medina's excessive use of force by tasing Pratt; 2) Deputies Wilks, Goldstein, and Salazar's excessive use of force by hog-tying Pratt; 3) Deputies Auzene, DeAlejandro, Goerlitz, and Lobos's failure to assist Pratt during either allegedly excessive use of force; and 4) Sergeants M. Coker and E.M. Jones, and Sheriff Adrian Garcia's failure to train and/or supervise the nine deputies present at the scene of Pratt's arrest. Furthermore, Pratt maintains that Harris County is liable under Monell for: 1) tasing and hog-tying customs that fairly represented municipal policy; 2) failure to train and/or supervise; and 3) ratification of the unconstitutional conduct of the HCSD officers.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, also applying the same standards as the district court. See Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir.2012)

. Summary judgment is only appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “On a motion for summary judgment, [we] must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir.2009).

To establish a claim under § 1983

, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1935, 188 L.Ed.2d 960 (2014). Additionally, [c]laims under § 1983 may be brought against persons in their individual or official capacity, or against a governmental entity.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty., ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
144 cases
  • Delacruz v. City of Port Arthur
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • 14 Marzo 2019
    ...officer's actions must be examined individually to determine whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Pratt v. Harris Cty., 822 F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007)). At the time of the incident in question, Manuel had a......
  • Jamison v. McClendon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • 4 Agosto 2020
    ...Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights? , 114 Mich. L. Rev. 893, 909 (2016).162 See, e.g., Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex. , 822 F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2016).163 Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge’ , N.Y. Times (Nov. 21,......
  • Velazquez v. City of Westwego
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • 31 Marzo 2021
    ...State Defendants are correct; a failure to follow policy is not in and of itself a constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cnty. , 822 F.3d 174, 183–84 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that the constitutionality of an official's actions is "neither guided nor governed ... by [her] adherence to......
  • Carpenter v. Itawamba Co. Jail
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • 11 Abril 2022
    ...verbal commands prior to deploying his taser, but also a K-9 while attempting to subdue Carpenter. See Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex. (In re Estate of Pratt) , 822 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting "it is important that neither officer used their taser as the first method to gain Pratt's compli......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT