Hamilton v. Woll, 20120269.

Citation2012 ND 238,823 N.W.2d 754
Decision Date27 November 2012
Docket NumberNo. 20120269.,20120269.
PartiesLawrence A. HAMILTON, Philip B. Hamilton and Judy Casper, Plaintiffs and Appellees v. Larry G. WOLL, Cynthia J. Woll, Tracy J. Holiday, Robert V. Holiday, Philip Knolyn Hatch II, Jacki DeMay, R. Craig Woll, Dorothy Jean Griswold, Russell Rapp, Jeffrey R. Carius, Michael Carius, Mark S. Rapp, Tandals Farm Inc., James H. Bragg, Julie K. McKinley, J. Michael Gleason DBA Gleason Land Co., Strata Minerals, Inc., Frances A. Hannifin, Alan R. Hannifin, Desert Partners II L.P., Value Petroleum Inc., J. Kyle Jones, Margaret J. Hannifin, Fall River Resources, Chatfield Company, Walter E. Opper, Emma Smart, John M. Schattyn, Lloyd S. Schattyn, Noel L. Schattyn Soren, Avalon North LLC, Dakota West Energy LLC, Ronald Rowland, Lee LaBarre, Terry Aronson, Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Company LP; Peyton Woll, Jr., Trust dated June 8, 1993, Peyton H. Woll, Trustee, Dana G. Woll, Successor Trustee; John H. Woll and Dorothea E. Woll, Trustees of the John and Dorothea, Woll Trust Agreement dated 1–31–90; Helen F. Rapp, Trustee of Helen F. Rapp Declaration of Trust dated, 08–17–2004; Alvin C. Schopp, Trustee; and all other persons unknown claiming any estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance upon the property described in the complaint, Defendants. Ronald Rowland, Appellant J. Michael Gleason, d/b/a Gleason Land Co., James H. Bragg, and Julie K. McKinley, Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

823 N.W.2d 754
2012 ND 238

Lawrence A. HAMILTON, Philip B. Hamilton and Judy Casper, Plaintiffs and Appellees
v.
Larry G. WOLL, Cynthia J. Woll, Tracy J. Holiday, Robert V. Holiday, Philip Knolyn Hatch II, Jacki DeMay, R. Craig Woll, Dorothy Jean Griswold, Russell Rapp, Jeffrey R. Carius, Michael Carius, Mark S. Rapp, Tandals Farm Inc., James H. Bragg, Julie K. McKinley, J. Michael Gleason DBA Gleason Land Co., Strata Minerals, Inc., Frances A. Hannifin, Alan R. Hannifin, Desert Partners II L.P., Value Petroleum Inc., J. Kyle Jones, Margaret J. Hannifin, Fall River Resources, Chatfield Company, Walter E. Opper, Emma Smart, John M. Schattyn, Lloyd S. Schattyn, Noel L. Schattyn Soren, Avalon North LLC, Dakota West Energy LLC, Ronald Rowland, Lee LaBarre, Terry Aronson, Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Company LP; Peyton Woll, Jr., Trust dated June 8, 1993, Peyton H. Woll, Trustee, Dana G. Woll, Successor Trustee; John H. Woll and Dorothea E. Woll, Trustees of the John and Dorothea, Woll Trust Agreement dated 1–31–90; Helen F. Rapp, Trustee of Helen F. Rapp Declaration of Trust dated, 08–17–2004; Alvin C. Schopp, Trustee; and all other persons unknown claiming any estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance upon the property described in the complaint, Defendants.

Ronald Rowland, Appellant
J. Michael Gleason, d/b/a Gleason Land Co., James H. Bragg, and Julie K. McKinley, Appellees.

No. 20120269.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 27, 2012.


[823 N.W.2d 755]


Michael J. Maus (argued) and Patrick D. Hope (on brief), Dickinson, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellees Lawrence A. Hamilton, Philip B. Hamilton, and Judy Casper.

Steven A. Lautt (argued) and Scott M. Knudsvig (appeared), Minot, N.D., for defendant and appellant.


David D. Schweigert (on brief) and William B. Wischer (on brief), Bismarck, N.D., for appellees J. Michael Gleason, d/b/a Gleason Land Co., James H. Bragg, and Julie K. McKinley.

[823 N.W.2d 756]



SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] Ronald Rowland appeals from a summary judgment declaring that 15 deeds executed in the 1950s covering certain Bowman County property conveyed royalty interests rather than mineral interests, and from an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Because the deeds are ambiguous and reasonable differences of opinion exist as to the inferences to be drawn about the grantor's intent from the language of the deeds and the extrinsic evidence presented, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I

[¶ 2] On December 19, 1952, Finlay F. Hamilton acquired an undivided one-fourth interest in 80 mineral acres located in Bowman County through a mineral deed. Between March 7, 1953, and February 28, 1956, Finlay Hamilton executed 15 deeds to various persons covering the property. The deeds used were preprinted “Mineral Deed” forms, but stated in the blank spaces in typewritten text that they conveyed undivided fractional “Royalty” interests. Each deed lists Finlay Hamilton's residence as Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the warranty clauses are struck out with typewritten “X”s. Finlay Hamilton died intestate on June 7, 1956, in Duluth, Minnesota, and his estate was probated in Texas.

[¶ 3] In 2010 Lawrence A. Hamilton and the other plaintiffs, who are Finlay Hamilton's grandchildren and successors to his mineral interests, brought this action against Rowland and the other defendants, seeking to quiet title and to have the district court declare that the 15 deeds conveyed royalty interests rather than mineral interests. See Acoma Oil Corp. v. Wilson, 471 N.W.2d 476, 481 (N.D.1991) (explaining that mineral interests are broader than royalty interests). Lawrence Hamilton and the other plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. They presented the 15 deeds, the 1952 mineral deed through which Finlay Hamilton acquired the 80 mineral acres, and an affidavit from Lawrence Hamilton stating in relevant part that “[i]n the 1950s, Finlay F. Hamilton bought and sold minerals throughout western North Dakota.” They also presented two additional deeds executed by Finlay Hamilton on April 24, 1956, in which he conveyed through preprinted “Mineral Deed” forms undivided fractional mineral interests to others without adding the word “Royalty” to the blank spaces.

[¶ 4] In opposition to the motion, Rowland and the other defendants presented mineral deed forms that did not include the “Royalty” language they had received from Finlay Hamilton's grantees as “evidence of the original parties' intents.” They also argued summary judgment was improper under this Court's decision in Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 824 (N.D.1988), in which we concluded that similar deeds executed by Finlay Hamilton were ambiguous and “Finlay's ‘ambiguously expressed intentions, ... are questions of fact to be determined with the aid of extrinsic evidence.’ ” (quoting Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 788 (N.D.1985)).

[¶ 5] The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lawrence Hamilton and the other plaintiffs. The court concluded the 15 deeds were ambiguous, but the deeds conveyed royalty interests rather than mineral interests as a matter of law:

It is inexplicable why Finlay would have typed in “royalty” in the granting clause of the disputed deeds if he did not intend to grant only a royalty interest. It is undisputed that Finlay was in the business of buying and selling oil properties. Individuals purchasing and

[823 N.W.2d 757]

selling interests in this type of property know (or should know) what was being transferred. While there is some merit in the argument that contractual ambiguities should be construed against the originator of the ambiguity, in this case the only extrinsic evidence is Finlay's experience (and the fact that Finlay's grantees in subsequent deeds transferred mineral acres.) But the grantees from Finlay only got royalty interests and could not transfer what they did not receive. The Court is also persuaded by the fact that after issuing the disputed deeds conveying a royalty interest, Finlay, within a month's time, using the same deed form, conveyed out 10 mineral acres without inserting the word “royalty” in the granting clause. It is difficult for the Court to find that an experienced oil broker would have mistakenly, 15 times in a row, conveyed royalty interests and then have discovered he was transferring interests he didn't intend to transfer. Finlay began transferring interests he designated “royalty” in March of 1953 and continued to February 1956, a period of almost three years. If, shortly after he received his mineral acres, he had used royalty language in one or two deeds and then reverted to using mineral acres, the question, factually, of what he intended, may be a closer question.

[¶ 6] Rowland moved to vacate the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). He pointed out for the first time that Finlay Hamilton was from Oklahoma and during the time the 15 deeds were executed it was “a matter of common knowledge” that “the word [royalty] [wa]s frequently used in [Oklahoma] to denote an interest in the mineral rights.” Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509, 513 (1940). He also presented for the first time an affidavit and other evidence in support of his affirmative defense of laches. The district court denied the motion, stating it “will not now consider additional extrinsic evidence” and concluding Rowland “has not raised any issues which would entitle him to the relief sought.”

[¶ 7] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27–05–06. Rowland's appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D....

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