Griffin v. Dugger, 85-3831

Citation823 F.2d 1476
Decision Date07 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. 85-3831,85-3831
Parties44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 938, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,334, 56 USLW 2122, 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 782 Peners L. GRIFFIN and Henry L. Dejerinett, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard L. DUGGER, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Bruce Alexander Minnick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Mitchell D. Franks, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellants.

Harry L. Witte, Jerry G. Traynham, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and EATON *, Senior District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

I.

In April 1971, Peners L. Griffin became the first black Road Prison Officer at the Tallahassee Road Prison, operated by the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC or Department). Beginning in 1973, Griffin frequently sought promotion to higher-grade correctional officer positions, as well as various other positions. On each occasion, the FDOC turned him down.

In December 1974, Griffin's supervisor fired him for disciplinary reasons. The next day, the Regional Superintendent reinstated Griffin because the supervisor had not followed proper termination procedures. In early 1975, the FDOC again terminated Griffin's employment, without notice, for disciplinary reasons. He appealed the termination to the State of Florida Career Service Commission. The Commission found no just cause for Griffin's discharge and ordered the FDOC to reinstate him with back pay. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision, and the FDOC reinstated Griffin to his position.

Soon after his reinstatement, Griffin filed a complaint with the FDOC's Equal Employment Opportunity Program Office, charging that his two dismissals were racially discriminatory. An investigator in that office wrote Griffin a month later and informed him of his conclusion that racial discrimination had not been a factor in the dismissals. Within a day or two of having received that letter, Griffin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), detailing the events leading up to his allegedly discriminatory discharges. A notation at the beginning of Griffin's complaint, probably made by an EEOC counselor, describes Griffin's allegations of racial discrimination as also encompassing "[s]incerity of recruiting, hiring, and promoting of minority groups within the Florida's Division of Adult Corrections. Specific attention within the Community Service Program."

Griffin asked the EEOC for a right-to-sue letter and received one in July 1979. On October 15, 1979, Griffin brought this action in the district court against Louis L. Wainwright, as Secretary of the FDOC, the FDOC, and the State of Florida. Griffin alleged that the FDOC had denied him several promotions because of his race. He also alleged that the FDOC impermissibly considered race in all of its promotion decisions, as well as in its hiring and job assignment decisions. In hiring correctional officers, according to Griffin, the Department used written entry-level examinations having a detrimental impact upon blacks. 1

Griffin sued "individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated," pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 (1976), 2 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976). 3 The class identified in his complaint was composed "of all past, present and potential black American citizens and residents who have been, are or may be employees of the Defendants or applicants for employment." 4

On June 17, 1980, Griffin obtained leave of court to amend his complaint to add Henry L. Dejerinett as a party-plaintiff and class representative. Dejerinett, who is black, had applied for an FDOC clerical position but was not hired. 5 On March 10, 1981, based on a stipulation between the parties 6 and without a hearing, the district court preliminarily certified the case as a class action with Griffin and Dejerinett representing the class of "all past, present, and potential black employees of the State of Florida Department of Corrections."

On June 25, 1982, the defendants filed a "Notice Regarding the Adequacy of the Preliminary Class Certified," which called to the court's attention a Supreme Court decision rendered eleven days previously. That decision, General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), announced the appropriate standards courts should apply when determining class action certifications in the context of a Title VII suit, reversing a former Fifth Circuit decision permitting "across-the-board" class actions that had been binding precedent in the new Eleventh Circuit. 7 On July 8, 1982, the defendants moved the court, in light of Falcon, to vacate its order certifying the class.

To avoid the risk that the district court might vacate its order certifying the class, Griffin and Dejerinett took steps to obtain an additional named plaintiff to represent those in the class who had applied for the position of correctional officer, failed the written entry-level examination, and not been hired. Accordingly, on July 8, 1982, Alvin Smith, joined by Griffin and Dejerinett, moved the court to intervene as an additional named plaintiff and class representative. In 1980 and 1981, Smith, who is black, applied for the same entry-level position that Griffin held. The FDOC did not hire Smith, because he did not have a high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma (GED), a prerequisite for employment as a correctional officer. Smith later obtained a GED, but when he reapplied with the FDOC in July 1981, he failed the written entry-level correctional officer examination and was again denied the job. 8

On July 28, 1982, the district court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class and permitted Smith to intervene 9 because

Smith, [as] an unsuccessful applicant, certainly has an interest in this suit which seeks to challenge defendants' employment practices, including hiring. Unless he is permitted to intervene, his interest may not be adequately represented by the named parties. Mr. Smith eases this court's concern that the class claim against the [FDOC]'s objective criteria was not fairly and adequately protected by the named plaintiffs. Alvin Smith is a proper representative for potential black employees.

As to the defendants' contention that Smith could not be a class representative because he had not timely filed an EEOC complaint, the district court found that the charges of discrimination Griffin had filed with the EEOC included "the hiring claim in addition to promotion, job classification, discipline, and termination claims." The court thus reasoned that the Fifth Circuit's single-filing rule excused Smith from having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.1968) ("[O]nce an aggrieved person raises a particular issue with the EEOC which he has standing to raise, he may bring an action for himself and the class of persons similarly situated....").

On July 30, 1982, the district court entered partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, including Griffin and Dejerinett, on the liability issue as to the written entry-level examination. 10 The court found that the FDOC examination "has a disparate impact upon class members which has not been justified by business necessity." The plaintiffs had sought summary judgment on two other issues--the class hiring and promotion claims--but the court denied summary judgment on those issues because they presented material issues of fact.

A trial was held over the five-week period beginning August 17 and ending September 17, 1982. The court entered judgment on August 25, 1983, disposing of the following issues in favor of the defendants: whether the FDOC's policies and practices discriminated against past, present, and potential black employees; whether the FDOC's employment practices as to Peners L. Griffin were racially discriminatory; and whether the FDOC's hiring practices as to Henry L. Dejerinett were racially discriminatory. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the liability issue concerning the correctional officer examination, on which it had previously granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 11 The issue of relief for the class of black persons who took and failed the correctional officer written examination is still pending. The parties agreed that notice should be given to the affected members of the class and to seek interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision permitting Griffin, Dejerinett, and Smith to serve as named plaintiffs for a class that included applicants with testing claims. We granted this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Because we conclude that the district court incorrectly applied the dictates of Falcon, we vacate the district court's order certifying the class.

II.

As with any private class action, the legitimacy of a private Title VII suit brought on behalf of a class depends upon the satisfaction of two distinct prerequisites. First, there must be an individual plaintiff with a cognizable claim, that is, an individual who has constitutional standing to raise the claim (or claims) and who has satisfied the procedural requirements of Title VII. 12 Second, the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be fulfilled; in other words, the individual plaintiff must be qualified to represent the members of the class in accordance with the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), 13 and the action must...

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