Smith v. Ryan
Citation | 823 F.3d 1270 |
Decision Date | 26 May 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 14–99008,14–99008 |
Parties | Joe Clarence Smith, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Charles L. Ryan; Ron Credio, Respondents–Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Michael L. Burke (argued) and Kelly L. Culshaw, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Office of the Arizona Federal Public
Defender, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner–Appellant.
Jon G. Anderson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Thomas C. Home, Attorney General, and Jeffrey A. Zick, Chief Counsel, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for Respondent–Appellee.
Before: Richard A. Paez, Richard R. Clifton, and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.
PAEZ
, Circuit Judge:
In 1977, Joseph Clarence Smith, Jr. was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. This is the second time we have reviewed Smith's habeas challenge to his death sentence. In Smith v. Stewart , 189 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999)
, we reversed in part and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue directing the State of Arizona to resentence Smith for the murders of Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee. Smith was resentenced to death in 2004 for each murder. After exhausting his remedies in state court, Smith filed a new petition in federal court. Applying the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, the district court again denied relief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
In 1973, Smith was convicted of raping Alice Archibeque. While on probation for the Archibeque rape, Smith raped Dorothy Fortner and killed Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee. Smith was convicted of the Fortner rape and in subsequent proceedings he was convicted of murdering Spencer and Lee and sentenced to death.
In our 1999 opinion, we summarized the facts of the underlying murders and trial court proceedings. For context, we repeat that summary here:
. After the sentencing hearing for both convictions, the trial judge found three aggravating circumstances warranting the death penalty and no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1007. The judge sentenced Smith to death for each of the murder convictions.
On direct appeal in 1979, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Smith's convictions but remanded his case for resentencing because Arizona had revised its capital sentencing scheme to permit defendants to present additional mitigating evidence. Id. at 1007 & n. 2
; see also
State v. Watson , 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1978) ( ). Notwithstanding the opportunity to present additional mitigating evidence at Smith's resentencing, Smith's counsel simply resubmitted the same evidence he had presented in the prior proceeding. Smith , 189 F.3d at 1007. The trial judge again found no mitigating circumstances and sentenced Smith to death for each of the murders of Lee and Spencer. Id. at 1008. On direct appeal for the second time, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Smith's death sentences. Id.
After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Smith filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging both his convictions and death sentences. Id. at 1008. In 1999, we concluded that Smith's counsel performed deficiently at the resentencing proceeding. Id. at 1014. We reversed in part and ordered the district court to issue the writ and direct that Smith be resentenced. Id.
In 2002 the Arizona legislature responded to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)
, by shifting from judge to jury the role of finding facts necessary to impose the death penalty. See 2002 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 5th Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 § 3 (West); see also
State v. Glassel , 211 Ariz. 33, 116 P.3d 1193, 1202 (2005). This change, coupled with the time necessary for counsel to gather evidence and prepare, delayed resentencing until 2004, when the Arizona Superior Court held separate proceedings to sentence Smith. State v. Smith , 215 Ariz. 221, 159 P.3d 531, 536 (2007).
Like the current framework, Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in 2004 began with an “aggravation phase” in which the jury determined whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt any alleged statutory aggravating circumstances. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–703.01(C), (E)
(2003).1 If the jury found at least one of the aggravating circumstances, the proceeding moved to a “penalty phase” in which the jury heard mitigating evidence and determined whether to impose death. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.01(D), (F)-(G) (2003); see also
State v. McGill , 213 Ariz. 147, 140 P.3d 930, 946 n. 9 (2006) (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ( ). Although the Superior Court applied the then-current capital sentencing framework—including broad mitigation evidence and jury factfinding—the state sought to prove the statutory aggravators codified in the 1977 scheme. Smith , 159 P.3d at 536. In two separate proceedings, first for Spencer and second for Lee, the juries unanimously found three aggravating factors.
First, the juries found that Smith had been convicted of another offense exposing him to a life sentence or the death penalty, Arizona Revised Statutes section 13–454(E)(1)
(1977).2 To establish the (E)(1) aggravator, the prosecution introduced Smith's prior 1973 and 1976 convictions for raping Archibeque and Fortner.
Second, both juries found that Smith had been previously convicted of a felony involving “the use or threat of violence,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–454(E)(2)
(1977). To establish the (E)(2) aggravator, the prosecution first offered the Lee murder at the Spencer sentencing and then offered the Spencer murder at the Lee sentencing.
Third, the juries found that the Spencer and Lee murders were especially cruel, heinous, or depraved within the meaning of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13–454(E)(6)
(1977). To establish the (E)(6) aggravator, the prosecution elicited testimony regarding the women's injuries and the cause of death for each. The prosecution offered evidence that both women had been asphyxiated by dirt forced into their airways, that before death both had been bound at the wrists and ankles with ligatures, and that each suffered puncture and stab wounds
. As the Arizona Supreme Court recounted, Spencer Lee “also had puncture and stab wounds to her chest, abdomen, and breasts and damage to her vulva.”
As mitigation evidence, Smith offered expert testimony demonstrating mental impairment
and psychological problems, including signs of dissociative identity disorder.3 Smith's expert also concurred with the prosecution expert's diagnosis that Smith suffered from sexual sadism. Smith's mother and sister testified to Smith's personal history and several prison employees and a prison expert testified to his good behavior in prison.
Both...
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