824 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1987), 86-5391, LaRo Corp. v. Big D Oil Co.

Docket Nº:86-5391.
Citation:824 F.2d 689
Party Name:LaRO CORPORATION, Appellant, v. BIG D OIL COMPANY, Appellee.
Case Date:July 31, 1987
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Page 689

824 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1987)




No. 86-5391.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

July 31, 1987

        Submitted June 11, 1987.

        Reed C. Richards, Deadwood, S.D., for appellant.

        Edward C. Carpenter, Rapid City, S.D., for appellee.

        Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and LARSON [*], Senior District Judge.

        PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff-appellant sued defendant-appellee alleging violations of federal and state anti-trust law. The case was submitted to the jury under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (conspiracy), Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (attempted monopolization) and South Dakota Codified Laws Sec. 37-2-1 (discriminatory pricing).

        The jury found for defendant on all of plaintiff's claims. The district court 1 denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial and plaintiff appeals from that decision.

Page 690

        Plaintiff asserts a number of trial errors: 1) failure to permit certain hearsay testimony relating to a claimed price-fixing conspiracy; 2) the giving of Instruction No. 32 as to South Dakota law; 3) refusal to permit plaintiff to call a rebuttal witness; 4) refusal to permit plaintiff to question further its claimed main witness; 5) failure to give and the giving of other instructions; and 6) refusal to permit testimony of a witness as to his knowledge and understanding of South Dakota law.

        Plaintiff's arguments on appeal are thus directed, in general, to the trial court's rulings concerning the admissibility of evidence and to the court's instructions to the jury. We note that the trial court has traditionally been accorded broad discretion in the conduct of the trial and that an appellate court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial judge unless there has been a showing of abuse. See Fed.R.Evid. 611(a); Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985) (citing Dobson v. Bacon Transport, 607 F.2d 805, 807 (8th Cir.1979)).

        We thus may reverse a trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1986); Harris v. Union Electric Co., 787 F.2d 355, 371-72 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ---...

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