United States v. Williams

Decision Date17 November 2011
Docket NumberCriminal No. 09–0026(PLF).
Citation825 F.Supp.2d 117
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Rico Rodrigus WILLIAMS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

April E. Fearnley, Debra L. Long–Doyle, John Leslie Hill, U.S. Attorney's Office, Christine L. Duey, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

Defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams, a former member of the United States Air Force, killed Army Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a Gangster Disciples gang initiation that took place on July 3, 2005, near the Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. In Count One of the Indictment in this case, the government charged Mr. Williams with second degree murder in connection with Sergeant Johnson's death, asserting jurisdiction under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”). 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq.

As the Court instructed the jury, in order for Mr. Williams to be found guilty of second degree murder under MEJA, the government was required to prove at trial five elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant unlawfully killed Juwan Johnson; second, that the defendant killed Juwan Johnson with malice aforethought ...; third, at the time he killed Juwan Johnson, the defendant was the dependent of a member of the United States Armed Forces outside the United States, in the Federal Republic of Germany; fourth, at the time he killed Juwan Johnson, the defendant was residing with such member of the United States Armed Forces outside the United States, in the Federal Republic of Germany; [and] fifth, that the defendant is not a national of or ordinarily a resident in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 38. On November 15, 2010, the jury concluded that the government satisfied its burden on Count One, finding Mr. Williams guilty of second degree murder.1

This matter is before the Court on Mr. Williams' motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One. The motion raises two grounds for acquittal: as Mr. Williams describes it, the government failed to prove at trial (1) that Mr. Williams killed Sergeant Johnson with malice aforethought; and (2) that Mr. Williams “resided with a member of the Armed Forces outside the United States on the date of [Sergeant] Johnson's death[.] Mot. at 2.

The Court heard oral argument on Mr. Williams' motion on June 1, 2011. The Court then resolved the first part of the motion by oral opinion on June 3, 2011, concluding that “with respect to the mens rea element, the motion ... should be denied.” June 3, 2011 Tr. at 47; see id. at 28–46. In that oral opinion, however, the Court stated that it was not ruling on Mr. Williams' motion regarding the “residing with” element under MEJA, 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(B), because the Court would be directing the parties to file supplemental briefing. See June 3, 2011 Tr. at 55–56. That briefing since has been completed, and this matter now is ripe for decision. Upon consideration of the parties' papers, the oral argument presented by counsel, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court will deny the remaining part of Mr. Williams' motion.2

I. BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2009, a grand jury returned an Indictment charging defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams with one count of second degree murder and three counts of witness tampering. Before trial, the government dismissed one of the witness tampering counts.

As charged in Count One of the Indictment, on or about July 3, 2005, Mr. Williams unlawfully killed Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a Gangster Disciples gang initiation in Germany by striking Sergeant Johnson with his fists and kicking him with his feet. See Indictment ¶ 5. As charged in Counts Two and Three, Mr. Williams then intimidated and threatened, or attempted to intimidate and threaten, other members of his gang with the intent to prevent them from communicating information about the events surrounding Sergeant Johnson's death to United States law enforcement authorities. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9.

As for Count One, the Indictment specifically charged the following:

3. On or about July 3, 2005, the defendant, RICO RODRIGUS WILLIAMS, a citizen of the United States, was accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2), that is:

a. The defendant was the dependent of a member of the United States Armed Forces;

b. The defendant was residing with such member of the United States Armed Forces outside the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany;

c. The defendant is not a national of or ordinarily a resident in the Federal Republic of Germany; and

d. The conduct described in Count One of this Indictment occurred at or near Hohenecken, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

4. The conduct described herein constitutes an offense which would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

5. On or about July 3, 2005, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the defendant, RICO RODRIGUS WILLIAMS, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, with malice aforethought, did unlawfully kill Juwan Johnson by striking him with their fists and kicking him with their feet.

Indictment ¶¶ 3–5 (emphasis in original).

Trial in this case began on October 25, 2010. After the government completed its case-in-chief, Mr. Williams orally moved for judgment of acquittal on all three counts in the Indictment. See Nov. 2, 2010 Trial Tr. at 5–11, 23, 25–29. 3 The Court denied Mr. Williams' motion on Count Two, see id. at 43, but reserved its decision on Counts One and Three. See id. at 52. Mr. Williams then renewed his oral motion after he rested, and the Court again reserved its decision. See Nov. 4, 2010 Trial Tr. at 39.

On November 15, 2010, Mr. Williams was found guilty on Count One, second degree murder; and Count Two, witness tampering. See Verdict Form at 1–2. Mr. Williams was acquitted on Count Three, the other witness tampering count. See id. at 2. After the jury rendered its verdict, Mr. Williams requested the opportunity for post-trial briefing, see Minute Entry, Nov. 15, 2010, and he then filed three post-trial motions, see Dkt. Nos. 139, 140, 141, including his pending motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One.

The Court heard argument on those motions on June 1, 2011 and issued an oral opinion on June 3, 2011. See generally June 3, 2011 Tr. That oral opinion resolved all of the issues presented in Mr. Williams' three post-trial motions, see generally id., except one: Mr. Williams' claim that “the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that [he] resided with a member of the Armed Forces outside the United States on the date of [Sergeant] Johnson's death[.] Mot. at 2; see also June 3, 2011 Tr. at 55–56.4

The Court ordered supplemental briefing on the “residing with” element. As the Court explained:

Mr. Williams was convicted of second degree murder pursuant to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act[.] Under MEJA, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams was “residing with” a member of the United States Armed Forces outside of the United States at the time of the events in question. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(B); see also Nov. 9, 2010 Tr. at 38–39. Despite extensive briefing and oral argument with respect to the evidence in the record that relates to the “residing with” prong of MEJA, the Court finds that there has been little discussion of the applicable law.

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, June 6, 2011 [Dkt. No. 149]. The Court therefore directed the parties to file supplemental briefs discussing any authority that may assist the Court in its consideration of the meaning of the term “residing with” under MEJA. Id. at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court must enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Safavian, 644 F.Supp.2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C.2009). In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must ‘consider[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determin[e] whether, so read, it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ United States v. Kayode, 254 F.3d 204, 212 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C.Cir.1997)). The Court must “accord[ ] the government the benefit of all legitimate inferences,” United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437 (D.C.Cir.1983), and accept the jury's verdict of guilt if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C.Cir.2002) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). Put another way, the Court may grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only where “a reasonable juror must necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant['s] guilt.” United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d at 437 (emphasis in original).

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Williams was convicted of second degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), under MEJA. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. See Indictment ¶¶ 2–5; Verdict Form at 1–2. Congress enacted MEJA in response to a jurisdictional gap created by host nations' reluctance to prosecute crimes against Americans committed by civilians accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.” United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir.2007). “To close this gap, MEJA creates federal jurisdiction over those who commit felonies while ‘accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.’ Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1)). Under MEJA,

[a] person is “accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States,” if [that person] satisfies three requirements: [he ...

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