Kitchens v. Bowen, 86-3994

Decision Date20 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-3994,86-3994
Citation825 F.2d 1337
PartiesRonnie O. KITCHENS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Otis R. BOWEN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Philip F. Schuster, II, Roger F. Dierking, Portland, Or., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert M. Atkinson, Salem, Or., for defendants-appellees.

Felicia L. Chambers, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for federal-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before KILKENNY, GOODWIN and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.

KILKENNY, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises out of a challenge to the constitutionality of a social welfare program that does not mandate immediate notice to the putative fathers of children whose mothers apply for benefits under that program. The questions presented for review are whether the district court erred by dismissing the complaint as against the federal defendant for lack of any federal action, and against the state defendants by virtue of the doctrine of abstention. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellants are a group of seven men who, in applications submitted for benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program, 1 were identified by the mothers of children born out of wedlock as the children's fathers. At the time of their filing the underlying action, appellants were all defendants in Oregon state court proceedings brought by the state to establish paternity and, pursuant to the AFDC applicants' assignment of support rights to the state, to collect support obligations. In suing the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("Secretary" or "federal defendant"), the Administrator of the Adult and Family Services Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources, and the Administrator of the Support Enforcement Division of the Oregon Department of Justice ("state defendants"), appellants have alleged that the federal regulations governing the administration of the AFDC program are unconstitutional because they do not provide for notice to putative fathers at the time when mothers of children born out of wedlock apply for AFDC assistance.

The district court dismissed appellants' claim against the federal defendant, both because the complaint failed to allege federal action on the part of that defendant sufficient to warrant the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and because the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The claim against the state defendants was also dismissed under the provisions of the so-called Younger abstention doctrine. 2 It is from the dismissal of their complaint that appellants have timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Abrams v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1356, 1357 (CA9 1987). Similarly, we review de novo a district court's decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519, 1521 (CA9 1987). Finally, we review de novo a dismissal based on the doctrine of abstention. Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 (CA9 1986).

DISCUSSION
1. Background

At the heart of this appeal lies the scheme of cooperative federalism existing between the state and federal governments under the AFDC program. The avowed purpose of this program is to promote the benefits of family life by encouraging the care of, inter alia, fatherless, 3 needy children, either in their own homes or in those of relatives, by providing financial assistance to the children's mothers or other relatives. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601.

In a nutshell, the AFDC program works as follows. Financial assistance to needy children is provided by state agencies, which are in turn eligible for federal matching funds if their assistance plans comply with both the Social Security Act's relevant statutory requirements and the regulations implementing the program. For example, a state's plan must provide for prompt notice to the state's child support collection agency upon the furnishing of AFDC assistance to a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent, including a child born out of wedlock, without regard to whether the paternity of that child has been established. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(11). In addition, and as a condition of eligibility, the AFDC applicant must assign to the state any rights to support she may have from any other person and which have accrued at the time the assignment is executed. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(26)(A). Also, the applicant is generally required to cooperate with the state, both in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock and in obtaining support therefor. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(26)(B).

The state must have in effect a plan to establish paternity, locate absent parents, and obtain child and spousal support. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(27). Similarly, the state must provide child support enforcement services with respect to all AFDC recipients. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 654(4). Finally, support rights assigned to the state under the AFDC program constitute obligations owed to the state and are collectable by the state under relevant state and local processes. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 656(a)(1).

2. Federal Jurisdiction

The gravamen of appellants' complaint against the Secretary is that, in promulgating the regulations governing the administration of the AFDC program, the Secretary failed to require that, at the time mothers of children born out of wedlock apply for AFDC benefits, putative fathers be given notice of the filings of such applications and an opportunity for a hearing. As a result, appellants argue, they had no The Secretary contends that dismissal was proper because appellants failed to allege and show any federal action. The AFDC statute and regulations leave the responsibility for formulating specific procedures for determining paternity and support obligations to the individual states; therefore, the Secretary asserts, if appellants were deprived of any constitutional rights, the responsibility for that deprivation must fall on the shoulders of the state defendants.

opportunity to contest the level of AFDC assistance provided and, by virtue of the mothers' assignment of support rights to the state, appellants now face substantial support obligations to the state which accrued during the prenotice period.

In addressing this issue, we note at the outset that "[t]he standards utilized to find federal action for purposes of the Fifth Amendment are identical to those employed to detect state action subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment." Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 487 (CA9 1974); see also Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (CA9 1986) (applying principles of state action cases to federal action issue), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987). Accordingly, this court turns now to an examination of the leading state action cases.

The relevant standards are set forth in the brace of cases, Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). Those decisions make clear that, even though the state defendants here were subject to federal regulations in administering the AFDC program, that fact alone does not establish federal action. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2785; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841, 102 S.Ct. at 2771. Appellants must show that

" 'there is a sufficiently close nexus between the [federal government] and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [federal government] itself.' [Citation omitted] The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the [federal government] is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains."

Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2785 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (emphasis in original)); accord, Fidelity Fin., 792 F.2d at 1435. Appellants may establish this required nexus only

"by showing that the [federal] government exercised such coercive power or such significant encouragement that it is responsible for the specific ... conduct challenged, or by showing that the [state defendants] ha[ve] exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the [federal] government."

Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005, 102 S.Ct. at 2785-86).

As already indicated, the specific conduct challenged by appellants here is the failure to provide for notice and an opportunity for a hearing at the so-called Title IV-A, or AFDC application, stage. While the federal regulations make no provision for such notice and hearing, they do not prohibit the states from granting such rights, either. Indeed, the entire AFDC scheme is designed to leave the states responsible for the specific procedures to be employed, subject only to the broad parameters outlined in the federal statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. Secs. 302.31, 302.50, 303.4, and 303.5 (requiring states to establish paternity and secure support obligations in accordance with state law).

The State of Oregon was and is free to adopt procedures to give timely notice to putative fathers, and there is no evidence that its failure to do so was compelled or encouraged in any way by the Secretary. Nor is it significant that the Secretary did not take action in the face of the state's failure to provide for such notice: "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of [...

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