Hull v. Eaton Corp.

Decision Date04 August 1987
Docket NumberNos. 85-6024,85-6039,s. 85-6024
Parties, 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1161, 4 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 764, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,563 Edward William HULL, a/k/a Edward Hull, et al., Appellants, v. EATON CORPORATION, et al. Edward William HULL, et al. Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. EATON CORPORATION, et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Edward L. Genn, Washington, D.C., for appellants, Hull, et al. in No. 85-6024 and for cross-appellees Hull, et al. in No. 85-6039.

William Clague, Bethesda, Md., for appellant, Travelers Ins. Co. in No. 85-6039.

Robert H. Stier, Jr., with whom Philip L. Cohan, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for appellees in Nos. 85-6024 and 85-6039.

Before SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges and JAMESON, * Senior District Judge.

Opinion Per Curiam.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Edward William Hull and Shirley Hull filed this products liability action against Eaton Corporation (Eaton) and Yale Industrial Trucks Baltimore-Washington, Inc. (YIT), 1 seeking damages for injuries sustained by Mr. Hull while operating a forklift manufactured by Eaton and sold by YIT to Hull's employer, Giant Foods, Inc. ("Giant"). 2 The Travelers Insurance Company, the carrier for Hull's worker's compensation claim, intervened. After the Hulls failed to identify their intended expert witness pursuant to Eaton's discovery request and the court's order, the district court imposed a sanction precluding the plaintiffs from introducing expert testimony. Subsequently, the court granted Eaton's motion for summary judgment, holding that (1) the plaintiffs would be unable to make out a case of products liability without expert testimony; (2) the plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Eaton could not be held liable for the wrongful acts of YIT.

I.

On January 14, 1981, Mr. Hull was operating forklift number 501 at Giant's Landover, Maryland warehouse. The forklift is equipped with a counterweight which enables it to lift heavy loads. The counterweight sits on two hooks extending from the frame, and is further attached by three bolts which are threaded into the backside of the counterweight from the frame. The heads of the bolts are countersunk into the frame and covered by the battery. When the counterweight is properly installed, the bolts stabilize it and prevent it from moving horizontally or vertically and disengaging from the mounting hooks. At the time of the accident these three bolts were not in place. Thus, the hooks were all that secured the counterweight to the frame of the forklift. As Hull was driving the forklift through the warehouse area, he hit a bump which caused the left front end of the forklift to dip. When the front end of the forklift dipped, the counterweight slipped off the hooks and fell to the ground, causing an overhead guard which was attached to the counterweight to fall on Hull and injure him.

Eaton manufactured the forklift and delivered it to YIT in December, 1977. The forklift was originally equipped with a counterweight that gave it a 2500 pound carrying capacity. Sometime after delivery to YIT, the original counterweight was replaced with a heavier counterweight that increased the forklift's lifting capacity to 3000 pounds. Giant purchased the forklift from YIT in February, 1978, and YIT informed Eaton of the changed counterweight late that month.

The Hulls' complaint sets forth claims for relief based on strict liability in tort, negligence, failure to warn, and breach of express and implied warranties. The common theory underlying each claim is that if the counterweight had been properly attached to the frame with the three bolts, the accident would not have happened. The strict liability claim asserts that Eaton's design of the forklift was defective because the bolts were removable and the operator could not determine by casual inspection if the counterweight was properly attached. Under the negligence claim, Eaton's manufacture and sale of the forklift with concealed and removable bolts breached a duty of care owed to the Hulls. The failure to warn claim is based on the allegation that Eaton had a duty to warn of the special dangers that resulted from the design of the forklift. Finally, according to the warranty claim, Eaton breached a contractual obligation to deliver the forklift in merchantable condition. Subsequent to filing their complaint, the Hulls raised even an additional claim--that Eaton was vicariously liable for YIT's negligent installation of the replacement counterweight.

On April 21, 1983, Eaton filed interrogatories, including one that requested the identity, qualifications, and expected testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses. Almost eight months passed without an answer to that interrogatory, and Eaton obtained an order from a magistrate compelling the plaintiffs to respond by January 16, 1984. Plaintiffs then filed a "supplemental answer" refusing to name an expert on the grounds that they had not obtained sufficient information from Eaton concerning sales of forklifts of the type involved in the accident. Thereafter, Eaton filed a motion to sanction the plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Subsequent to a June 11, 1984 hearing at which the plaintiffs again refused to answer the interrogatory, the magistrate granted the sanctions motion and entered an order precluding the plaintiffs from presenting expert testimony at trial on the liability issue. The district judge held a hearing on October 5, 1984, and--the plaintiffs still refusing to name their expert witness--entered an order affirming the magistrate's sanction.

The district court granted Eaton's motion for summary judgment on November 21, 1984. The court held that the critical facts in the strict liability, negligence, and failure to warn claims were the risks, costs and benefits of alternative designs of the forklift, and that determination of these facts required expert testimony. Because the plaintiffs could not introduce expert testimony as a result of the discovery sanction, the district court held that they were unable to make out essential elements of these claims. In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim was barred by a four year statute of limitations, and that the relationship between Eaton and YIT was not such that Eaton could be held vicariously liable for YIT's negligent installation of the replacement counterweight.

On appeal the Hulls contend that there are genuine issues of material fact and that the district court's holding on each of the claims was erroneous. They argue that (1) they had no need to produce an expert witness, because the district court erred as to the necessary elements of strict liability, negligence and failure to warn claims, and because they offered evidence showing the existence of a prior alternative design of the forklift; (2) the court should have applied the "discovery rule" to determine when the statute of limitations began to run on the breach of warranty claim; and (3) the record contains sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue as to whether Eaton is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of YIT. In addition, Travelers--but not the Hulls--argues that the discovery sanction was improper.

II.

We first consider the argument that the district court erred in imposing the discovery sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. 3 Travelers contends that where, as here, a sanction precluding plaintiffs from presenting certain evidence at trial is combined with a district court holding on summary judgment that without that evidence the case must be dismissed, the discovery sanction becomes in effect a dismissal of the case. Since appellants were never warned by the district judge that their failure to name an expert witness would lead to de facto dismissal of their case, it is argued, the sanction was so harsh as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

The determination of an appropriate discovery sanction is left to the discretion of the trial court. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). "The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have [imposed the sanction]; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing." Id. Never will the case on appeal look as it does to a district judge faced with the need to impose reasonable bounds and order on discovery. "We may reverse the trial court only if ... its actions were clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful." Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C.Cir.1984).

We reject the argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the practical effect its sanction order would have on appellants' case, even assuming the effect could have been discerned at the time the sanction was imposed. 4 A judge can certainly impose a $10,000 sanction on a party whose discovery violation causes his opponent $10,000 in added expenses without inquiring whether the violator can afford to pay the fine. So too, we believe, can a judge sanction a party's continued and unexcused refusal to name an expert witness by precluding testimony from any such witness without first determining how badly the party needs the witness. Rule 37(b)(2)(B) explicitly authorizes the court to prohibit a party who fails to obey a discovery order from introducing designated matters in evidence. In light of appellants' representations to the magistrate that they did not even intend to use an expert witness, such a sanction seems eminently reasonable. 5 District judges face great difficulties in controlling discovery procedures--which, all too often, are abused by one side or the other. See, e.g., Perkinson v....

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