Thames Talent, Ltd. v. COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS & OPPORTUNITIES

• Citation: 265 Conn. 127,827 A.2d 659
• Decision Date: 05 August 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16768).
• Parties: THAMES TALENT, LTD. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ET AL.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

265 Conn. 127

827 A.2d 659

THAMES TALENT, LTD. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ET AL.

(SC 16768).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 25, 2002.

Officially released August 5, 2003.

Sullivan, C.J., and Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Eric R. Posmantier, with whom, on the brief, was Andrew P. Nemiroff, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Alix Simonetti, assistant commission counsel, with whom were Philip A. Murphy, Jr., commission counsel, and, on the brief, Charles Krich, for the appellee (named defendant).

Stephen P. Horner, for the appellee (defendant Angela Malizia).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether, upon finding that an employer has unlawfully discriminated against an employee in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) (4) and (8),¹ a hearing officer of the named defendant commission on human rights and opportunities (commission) may award back pay pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-86 (b)² without also ordering reinstatement of that employee. We conclude that a hearing officer has the authority to make such an award.

The following relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. In October, 1993, the defendant, Angela Malizia, was hired as a bookkeeper and secretary by the plaintiff, Thames Talent, Ltd. (Thames Talent), a management company for musical performers. Initially, Malizia worked for Barbara Fucigna, the vice president and secretary of Thames Talent. In December, 1995, however, Malizia began to work exclusively for Bruce Payne, the president of Thames Talent.³

Soon thereafter, Payne began to harass Malizia with overtly sexual comments and conduct that were both offensive and embarrassing to her. Specifically, Payne made explicit comments about Malizia's clothing and her body. Payne also quizzed Malizia about the intimate details of her sex life. In addition, Payne purchased underwear for Malizia and showed her pictures of naked women. The embarrassment that Malizia suffered as a result of Payne's comments and conduct was exacerbated by the fact that Payne sometimes engaged in his offensive behavior toward Malizia in front of others. As a result of Payne's comments and conduct, Malizia's relationship with Payne became strained. As Malizia's relationship with Payne deteriorated, the overall atmosphere in the office, which was small,⁴ became tense.

Malizia became withdrawn as a result of the ongoing harassment that she had experienced. She also began to wear baggy clothes to work in an effort to discourage Payne from continuing to harass her. Payne's offensive comments and conduct did not cease, however, and, on January 22, 1997, after Payne had made a particularly graphic statement about Malizia's body, Malizia asked Payne to refrain from making such remarks because they made her feel uncomfortable.⁵

Approximately one week later, on or about January 29, 1997, Malizia met with Payne to discuss her work performance. Payne informed her that he was happy with her work and that she might receive a raise if she continued to perform her job at the same level of competence. Two days after that meeting, Malizia met with Payne and Fucigna to discuss, among other things, the continuing tension in the office. Malizia stated that she felt uncomfortable in the office as a result of Payne's comments and behavior. Payne apparently was annoyed that Malizia had raised the issue and, several days later, on February 3, 1997, he met with Malizia again. At this meeting, Payne informed Malizia that her employment with Thames Talent was being terminated. According to Payne, Malizia was discharged as a result of their inability to work together. Following her discharge, Malizia was depressed and, therefore, did not immediately seek employment. She eventually secured some temporary jobs, however, and finally accepted a permanent, full-time position at a computer software consulting firm. Malizia received approximately $7916 in unemployment compensation from the state of Connecticut for the period of time that she was unemployed after her discharge from Thames Talent.⁶

On July 23, 1997, Malizia filed a complaint with the commission alleging that she was subjected to sexual harassment while employed by Thames Talent as a result of a hostile work environment, in violation of § 46a-60 (a) (8). Malizia also alleged that she had been discharged by Thames Talent for objecting to that harassment, in violation of § 46a-60 (a) (4).⁷ Thereafter, a hearing was conducted on Malizia's complaint. After the hearing, the hearing officer, in a detailed and comprehensive memorandum of decision, concluded that Malizia had "established . . . that [Thames Talent] sexually harassed her by creating a hostile work environment and subsequently terminated her employment in retaliation for her opposition to the harassment."

In determining the appropriate remedy under § 46a-86 (b), the hearing officer began by explaining that the primary objective "is to make the complainant whole and place her in the position she would have been absent [the] discriminatory discharge [by Thames Talent]." With this overriding principle in mind, the hearing officer awarded Malizia back pay⁸ and prejudgment interest totaling $45,473.⁹ The hearing officer also ordered Thames Talent to pay postjudgment interest on the unpaid balance of the award and to reimburse the state for the $7916 that the state had paid to Malizia in unemployment compensation benefits.¹⁰

Finally, the hearing officer, noting that Malizia had not sought reinstatement to her position at Thames Talent pursuant to § 46a-86 (b), concluded that, in light of the "office environment and [Malizia's] strained (and seemingly irreparable) relationship with Payne . . . reinstatement [was] not a feasible remedy." Thus, the hearing officer did not order that Malizia be reinstated by Thames Talent.

Thames Talent appealed from the decision of the hearing officer to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-94a (a)¹¹ and 4-183.¹² On appeal to the trial court, Thames Talent claimed that, because it had not been ordered to reinstate Malizia, the hearing officer lacked authority under § 46a-86 (b) to: (1) award Malizia back pay and prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and (2) order it to reimburse the state for the unemployment compensation benefits that the state had paid to Malizia subsequent to her discharge from Thames Talent. The trial court rejected these claims and dismissed the appeal. Thames Talent thereafter appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal to this court, Thames Talent does not challenge the hearing officer's findings regarding the existence of a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge. Nor does Thames Talent contest the calculations that form the basis of the hearing officer's award. Rather, Thames Talent claims on appeal that, under § 46a-86 (b), an order of reinstatement is a precondition to (1) any award of back pay, and (2) any requirement of reimbursement to the state for Malizia's unemployment compensation benefits. On the basis of its construction of § 46a-86 (b), Thames Talent maintains that, because the hearing officer did not order Malizia's reinstatement, the hearing officer lacked authority to award Malizia back pay and to order it to reimburse the state for Malizia's unemployment compensation benefits. In addition, Thames Talent claims that the hearing officer improperly awarded Malizia prejudgment and postjudgment interest. We reject Thames Talent's claims, which we address in turn.

I

Thames Talent's primary claim is that § 46a-86 (b) only authorizes an award of back pay when that award is accompanied by an order of reinstatement. Malizia contends, however, that the statute authorizes an award of back pay regardless of whether reinstatement is ordered.¹³ We agree with Malizia.

Thames Talent's claim presents an issue of statutory construction over which our review is plenary.¹⁴ E.g., W & D Acquisition, LLC v. First Union National Bank, 262 Conn. 704, 709, 817 A.2d 91 (2003). "That review is guided by well established principles of statutory interpretation, the fundamental objective of which is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. . . . As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 12, 818 A.2d 1 (2003).

General Statutes § 46a-86 (b) provides in relevant part: "In addition to any other action taken hereunder, upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the presiding officer may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . ." (Emphasis added.) On the basis of this language, Thames Talent contends that the phrase "with or without back pay" relates back to the phrase "hiring or reinstatement of employees," and, therefore, a hiring order or order of reinstatement is a precondition to an award of back pay. We acknowledge that a strict or narrow reading of the pertinent language of § 46a-86 (b) tends to support the statutory interpretation urged by Thames Talent. We do not construe statutes in a linguistic vacuum, however. Thus, when useful to our determination of the meaning of a statute, we also refer to, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment, the policy that the legislature sought to implement in enacting the statute, and the statute's relationship to other legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter. E.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 261 Conn. 86, 99, 801 A.2d 759 (2002). For several compelling reasons, we conclude that an award of back pay under § 46a-86 (b) is not dependent on an order of reinstatement.

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