Smith v. Pyro Min. Co., 85-6063

• Citation: 827 F.2d 1081
• Decision Date: 18 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-6063,85-6063
• Parties: 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1152, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,350, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,614, 56 USLW 2155 Danny R. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PYRO MINING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 1081

827 F.2d 1081

44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1152,

44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,350,

45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,614, 56 USLW 2155

Danny R. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PYRO MINING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-6063.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 17, 1986.

Decided Sept. 1, 1987.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 18, 1987.

Edward Katze, Terry Price (argued), Constangy, Brooks and Smith, Atlanta, Ga., Sidney Hulette, Ruark and Hulette, Morganfield, Ky., for defendant-appellant.

Theodore H. Amshoff, Jr. (argued), Amshoff, Amshoff, & Searcy, Louisville, Ky., Richard L. Masters, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ENGEL, JONES and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges.

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

The defendant in this employment discrimination case appeals from a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff for discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1)(1982). Because we find no error in the district court's disposition of this case, we affirm.

The plaintiff, Danny R. Smith, was hired by Pyro Mining Company on June 19, 1981, as a mechanic in an underground coal mine. Pyro employs over 1,000 persons who work underground and another 150 surface employees. During the time of his employment at Pyro, Smith was a member of the Independent General Baptist Church located in Ceder Hill, Kentucky. Smith also held the church offices of Treasurer and Trustee at the time. He subsequently became a Sunday School teacher. The official doctrine of the church precluded all officers and teachers in the church from working on Sundays, although individuals could work on Sunday and remain church members. Based on the teachings of his church, Smith believed that it was morally wrong to work on Sundays in the absence of a life threatening situation.

During his initial employment interview, Smith informed Varney Coleman, Mine Superintendent for Pyro, that he had religious convictions against working on Sundays. Despite his convictions, Smith worked for a time on Pyro's third shift, which required him to report for work at 11:00 p.m. on Sundays. Aside from these occasions, Smith was not required to work on Sundays during the first year of his employment.

On July 11, 1982, Pyro altered its work schedule and implemented an eight-day work week for employees stationed at the mine where Smith worked. The eight-day work week was instituted to improve mining efficiency. Under the new schedule, employees were assigned to work four consecutive ten-hour days and then have four consecutive days off. Each employee was required to work approximately twenty-six Sundays per year.

Prior to implementing the new schedule, Pyro publicized through a video presentation its policy of allowing employees who objected to working on Sundays to trade scheduled shifts with another qualified employee who was not scheduled to work the same shift. ¹ Pyro also had a representative on hand to answer questions following the presentations. Under Pyro's policy of attempting to accommodate those unable to work on Sundays due to religious reasons, an employee was first required to attempt to arrange a shift swap with another qualified employee. If the employee was unsuccessful in that effort, he was then required to exhaust the opportunities afforded by Pyro's "Open Door Policy" to resolve the problem. The "Open Door Policy" was designed to allow an employee who had a work-related grievance or other problem to personally present the matter first to his supervisor and then up the chain of command to the president of Pyro, if necessary, to resolve the problem. All employees were given a handbook setting forth this policy prior to the implementation of the eight-day work week.

Smith was scheduled to work on the first Sunday that the new schedule went into effect. All employees were required to report to work on that Sunday, July 11, 1982. The entire company had been on a two-week vacation and prior to the vacation, Smith had informed his immediate supervisor, David Dunbar, that he would not be reporting for work on Sunday, July 11, 1982, due to his religious convictions. Smith called the office on Sunday and left word that he would not be reporting to work since he was going to church. He was subsequently given an unexcused absence for missing work that day.

Smith was again scheduled to work on Sunday, August 15, 1982. Once again he informed his supervisor that he would be absent from work due to his religious convictions. He was given a second unexcused absence. After his second unexcused absence, Smith talked with David Dunbar, who in turn talked to mine superintendent Don Ramsey, who said that the unexcused absences would stand. Dunbar promised Smith that he would ask his son to swap work days with Smith, but this swap never took place. Smith also asked two other mechanics if they would swap with him and both declined. Smith then decided that it was wrong for him personally to ask someone to swap with him since he was, in effect, asking that person to sin. Smith, however, was willing to work in a swap arranged by the company.

After Smith's second unexcused absence, the Mine Manager, Danny Griffin, talked with him about his absences and was told by Smith that he did not believe in working on Sundays. Griffin told Smith to try and arrange a swap and to come back if nothing could be worked out. Griffin was aware that Smith considered it to be morally wrong to ask someone to work for him on a Sunday.

Smith was again scheduled to work on Sunday, August 22, 1982. He again notified his supervisor that he would not be reporting to work. He was given a third unexcused absence for missing work. Pyro had a company policy of automatically terminating any employee who accumulated three unexcused absences within a six-month period. In accordance with this policy, Smith was discharged on Monday, August 23, 1982, when he reported to work after his third unexcused Sunday absence.

On the day of his discharge, Smith appealed his termination to Coleman. At this time Smith proposed that the company allow him to work additional days in excess of the regular shift without overtime pay to make up for the Sunday absences. He also proposed that he be transferred to a surface job that did not require Sunday work. Both requests were refused by Pyro. At the time of the discharge, Coleman told Smith that he would look into the matter to see if anything could be done. Coleman subsequently turned the matter over to the Assistant Manager of Employee Relations, Paul Hill. Hill conducted a cursory examination of the matter and concluded that Smith had been properly terminated.

Following his discharge, Smith filed a complaint against Pyro in federal district court alleging that Pyro had violated the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII by discharging him because of his religious beliefs. Pyro's answer denied Smith's allegations and claimed that Smith had refused to cooperate with Pyro's effort to accommodate his religious needs. Following a one day bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Smith, finding that Pyro had made no effort to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The court further found that Pyro had not shown any undue hardship to justify its failure to accommodate Smith. On appeal Pyro challenges the following findings of the district court: (1) that Smith's religious beliefs were sincerely held; (2) that Pyro failed to reasonably accommodate Smith's religious beliefs; and (3) that Pyro failed to establish that accommodation would pose an undue hardship.

I.

Title VII provides in part that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to ... discharge any individual ... because of such individual's ... religion...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1)(1982). When Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it added the following definition of religion:

The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employees' ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.

42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)(1982). "The intent and effect of this ... was to make it an unlawful employment practice ... for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of its employees and prospective employees." TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). The obligation to accommodate includes efforts to accommodate those employees who refuse to work on particular days of the week because of their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edge Memorial Hospital, 550 F.Supp. 1185 (M.D.Ala.1982). "[A]ny reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation." Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 367, 372, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). "[W]here the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee's alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship." Id.

The analysis of any religious accommodation case begins with the question of whether the employee has established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Such a case is established when an employee shows that: (1) he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he has informed the employer about the conflicts; and (3) he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir.1984). Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it cannot reasonably accommodate the employee without incurring undue...