Graham v. City of Charlotte

Decision Date25 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-2163,86-2163
Citation827 F.2d 945
PartiesDethorn GRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE; M.S. Connor; R.B. Townes; T. Rice; Hilda P. Matos; M.M. Chandler, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Edward G. Connette (Gillespie, Lesesne & Connette, Charlotte, N.C., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank Bayard Aycock, III, Charlotte, N.C., for defendants-appellees.

Before RUSSELL and HALL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Dethorn Graham, the plaintiff in an action alleging the unconstitutional infliction of excessive force by officers of the Charlotte, North Carolina Police Department, appeals an order of the district court, 644 F.Supp. 246, granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. Although we find that the conduct of the police officers was far from commendable, we agree that no constitutional injury occurred. We, therefore, affirm.

I.

On November 12, 1984, Graham was working on an automobile at his home in Charlotte, North Carolina, when he felt the onset of a diabetic insulin reaction. For a diabetic such as Graham a reaction caused by a drop in blood sugar can cause nausea, dizziness, and disorientation. Left untreated the reaction can lead to coma or even death.

When Graham noticed his insulin reaction, he asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a nearby convenience store. Graham intended to purchase orange juice, knowing that the sugar content would counteract the reaction. When he entered the store, however, Graham saw a number of people ahead of him at the counter. In an apparently agitated state, Graham ran or walked rapidly out of the store and asked Berry to drive him to his girlfriend's house.

During this time, officer M.S. Connor of the Charlotte Police Department had been sitting in his patrol car near the convenience store. Observing Graham's erratic behavior, Connor followed the car being driven by Berry and made an investigative stop approximately one-half mile from the store. As Connor approached the automobile, Berry informed him that Graham was having a "sugar reaction." Connor responded that Berry would have to wait until it was determined what, if anything, Graham had done at the convenience store. Connor then returned to his patrol car to summon backup assistance.

At this point, Graham, in the throes of the insulin reaction, exited Berry's automobile and ran around it twice. At Berry's request, Connor approached to assist Berry in catching and restraining Graham. When Connor and Berry approached, he sat down on the curb. Graham testified that he lost consciousness during that time and that when he awoke he was lying face down on the ground with his hands cuffed behind his back.

At different intervals, four other Charlotte police officers, R.B. Townes, Hilda Matos, M.M. Chandler, and T. Rice, arrived on the scene in response to Connor's request for backup. A crowd also began to gather from a nearby apartment complex. After the police officers determined that no crime had been committed at the convenience store, they decided to place Graham in a patrol car and transport him home.

Graham testified that he struggled with the officers because they would not allow him to reach his wallet and display a card identifying him as a diabetic. He also maintained that the officers refused to allow one of his friends to give him orange juice and that one of the officers cursed him when he asked for the juice. Graham further maintained that in the struggle, his face was slammed against the hood of the police car before he was then forcibly shoved into the car and driven home.

It is undisputed that at some point during the unfortunate incident Graham's foot was broken. Graham also contended that he suffered an abrasion over his left eye, that his wrists were cut by the handcuffs, that his right shoulder was injured and that he developed a loud ringing in his right ear as a result of being "slammed" onto the hood of the automobile.

Graham subsequently brought a civil action in district court on July 11, 1985, against the City of Charlotte and the five individual police officers present on November 12, 1984. In addition to alleging the infliction of constitutionally excessive force by the officers, Graham charged that the city had failed to train its police officers to respond appropriately to a medical emergency. He also alleged the officers' conduct amounted to discrimination on the basis of handicap in violation of Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 704. Finally, Graham asserted pendent state claims of assault, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina common law.

The case came on for trial on September 16-17, 1986. In addition to his own account of the incident, Graham presented the testimony of William Berry and Officer Townes. Graham also sought to introduce expert testimony by Dr. Robert Meadows on the subject of proper police training. 1

Following the presentation of plaintiff's case, all defendants moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Upon consideration of the motions, the district court first concluded that a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, could not find that the infliction of force by the police officers was constitutionally excessive. The court also found that Graham's allegation of improper or inadequate police training by the City of Charlotte was refuted by the testimony of his own expert witness. Finally, the court rejected the claim of handicap discrimination based on Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act on the ground that the statute did not reach misconduct of the sort alleged by Graham. Accordingly, the district court granted all motions for a directed verdict as to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint. 2

II.

On appeal, Graham contends that the evidence presented was sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether the officers' use of force and refusal to provide medical care were constitutionally unreasonable. Graham further argues that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it assessed the evidence in support of his excessive force claim. Finally, Graham maintains that the district court committed reversible error in both the disposition of his state tort claims and the limitation imposed on Dr. Meadows' expert testimony. We see no merit in any of Graham's contentions.

As a threshold matter, we reject any suggestion that the district court erred in setting forth the correct standard for constitutionally excessive force. Citing the factors articulated in our decision in King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1980), the district court expressly considered:

(1) The need for the application for the force,

(2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was used,

(3) The extent of the injury inflicted, and

(4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

Graham argues, however, that subsequent decisions of this Court including Carter v. Rogers, 805 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.1986), Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.1986), and Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir.1985), have altered the King factors by abandoning consideration of whether the allegedly excessive force was "applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Graham contends that excessive force is now measured on a totality of the circumstances that examines only the need for force, the amount of force used and the extent of any injury inflicted. Appellant's theory, however, is rooted in a substantial misreading of our previous decisions.

In Kidd, we rejected a lower court's determination that constitutionally excessive force turned solely upon whether the state actor had intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a specific constitutional right. Instead, we concluded that an excessive force claim required the court to "grapple" with both the degree of force applied and the factual context in which the force arose. Kidd, 774 F.2d at 1261. Far from rejecting consideration of the fourth King factor, we held that concepts such as "malicious and sadistic" should be understood as descriptions of the degrees of force that exceed the state's privilege, and, thereby, implicate intrusions into constitutionally protected "personal security." Id. 3

In Carter and more specifically in Justice, we have confronted the question of how best to instruct the jury on the issue of excessive force. Our concern has been that the jury should examine all of the relevant circumstances when determining whether the use of force was constitutionally unreasonable and not focus exclusively on any one factor. While that issue has not at this juncture, been conclusively resolved 4, nothing that we ultimately decide with regard to proper jury instructions is likely to affect the propriety of the district court's balanced application of the four King factors when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.

We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not use an erroneous legal standard when deciding whether Graham's case could withstand a motion for a directed verdict. The only question remaining is whether under that standard, a reasonable jury viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff could have found that Graham's constitutional right to personal security was violated by officers of the Charlotte police department, e.g., Wheatley v. Gladden, 660 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir.1981). We agree with the district court that appellant's evidence could not support a verdict in his favor.

It is undisputed that on November 12, 1984, Officer Connor observed a man in a state of obvious agitation run into a convenience store, exit almost...

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