Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., 15–1660

Citation827 F.3d 314
Decision Date28 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–1660,15–1660
PartiesSutasinee Thana; Michael James Lohman; Thai Seafood & Grill, Inc., trading as Thai Palace & Thai Palace & Lounge, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Board of License Commissioners for Charles County, Maryland; Pamela Smith, Chair; Guy Black, Member; Tomasina Coates, Member; Steven Lowe, Member; William Young, Member, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: Charles Grant Byrd, Jr., Alston & Byrd, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin Bock Karpinski, Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael B. Rynd, Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer

wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Keenan joined.

NIEMEYER

, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we decide whether the district court properly applied the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine to dismiss this federal action challenging the actions of a state administrative agency that were reviewed in state court.

The Board of License Commissioners of Charles County, Maryland (“the Board”), revoked the alcoholic beverage license of a restaurant and lounge known as Thai Palace, as well as two consent orders that imposed conditions on the license, because Thai Palace violated certain conditions imposed by the consent orders. The Circuit Court for Charles County affirmed in part and remanded in part, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court. The Maryland Court of Appeals declined to grant certiorari.

Shortly after the Circuit Court for Charles County had ruled and before Thai Palace filed its notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Thai Palace commenced this federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the First Amendment, challenging the actions of the Board. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the Rooker –Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ; D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The district court concluded that because Thai Palace “seeks to attribute error to the core of the Board's order and the circuit court ruling affirming it,” its federal action “falls neatly within the bounds of the [Rooker –Feldman ] doctrine.”

We reverse and remand, concluding that Thai Palace has, with this action, commenced an independent, concurrent action challenging actions by a state administrative agency. Because Thai Palace did not request the district court to conduct appellate review of the state court judgment itself, the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). To the extent that the district court concluded that Thai Palace is seeking to litigate the same claims or issues decided in the state proceedings, it can, on remand, apply state law principles of preclusion to bar this action if that proves to be appropriate.

I

Thai Palace—formally, Thai Seafood & Grill, Inc., and trading as Thai Palace and Thai Palace & Lounge—is a restaurant and lounge in Waldorf, Maryland. Sutasinee Thana, her husband, and Michael Lohman are the owners of Thai Palace, and Thana and Lohman hold the alcoholic beverage license on behalf of Thai Palace. In 2009, Thai Palace1 filed an application with the Board for an alcoholic beverage license, effectively seeking reinstatement of an earlier license that had been revoked in 2007 for hosting entertainment that featured nudity. Following a hearing, the Board and Thai Palace entered into a consent order dated November 12, 2009, by which the Board issued the alcoholic beverage license on the condition that Thai Palace “be operated as a family restaurant” between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and “that there shall be no entertainment other than dinner music from either a radio and/or t.v. ... without prior written approval of the Board.”

Some two years later, Thai Palace requested that the Board rescind the November 2009 Consent Order to allow it to once again provide live entertainment. At the hearing on this request, the Board declined to rescind the November 2009 Consent Order but did agree to modify it. Accordingly, the Board and Thai Palace entered into a second consent order, dated January 12, 2012, which allowed Thai Palace to extend its hours of operation and also permitted it to offer “instrumental and acoustical music; Karaoke; [and] DJ music and dancing.” But this second consent order also provided that Thai Palace “shall not allow an outside promoter to maintain control of any entertainment and shall not offer any ‘teenager only’ events or ‘go-go’ entertainment.”2 Finally, the January 2012 Consent Order provided that it would remain in effect for a period of three years, after which it would expire and be “ and void and of no further effect.”

Notwithstanding the terms of the January 2012 Consent Order, Thai Palace contracted with various “go-go” bands to perform at Thai Palace. After receiving information about these concerts from the police, the Board issued an order on June 20, 2013, requiring Thai Palace to show cause why the January 2012 Consent Order “should not be revoked.” Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board issued a decision revoking the November 2009 Consent Order, the January 2012 Consent Order, and Thai Palace's alcoholic beverage license.

Pursuant to Maryland statutory provisions for review of administrative orders, Thai Palace filed a petition for review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County. See Md. Code Ann., Art. 2B, § 16–101

. The circuit court affirmed the Board with respect to its revocation of the January 2012 Consent Order; concluded that the Board had made no findings that the November 2009 Consent Order had been violated; and remanded for further findings in connection with whether Thai Palace's alcoholic beverage license should be revoked. Thai Palace appealed the circuit court's decision to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed by decision dated January 29, 2016. Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty. , 226 Md.App. 555, 130 A.3d 1103 (2016)

. Thereafter, Thai Palace filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Maryland Court of Appeals, which denied the petition on May 23, 2016.

Before filing its appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Thai Palace commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

, alleging that, by conditioning its alcoholic beverage license on its agreement not to host “go-go” entertainment and by enforcing that condition, the Board had violated its First Amendment rights. Thai Palace sought declaratory and injunctive relief, $500,000 in compensatory damages, and attorneys fees and costs. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the district court granted by order dated May 14, 2015. The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker –Feldman doctrine, explaining that Thai Palace “plainly seeks to attribute error to the core of the Board's order and the circuit court ruling affirming it (and thereby, to overturn them).”

From the district court's order dismissing the complaint, Thai Palace filed this appeal.

II

Thai Palace contends, contrary to the district court's holding, that it does not, by this action, “seek review ... of the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County and that the district court therefore erred in applying the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine to dismiss the action. It argues that its federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeks compensatory damages, as well as equitable relief, for the Board's conditioning of its alcoholic beverage license on its agreement not to promote or offer “go-go” entertainment and for the Board's enforcement of that condition, in violation of the First Amendment. Thai Palace observes that, because [c]ompensatory damages cannot be awarded in [its administrative appeal,] ... the [Rooker –Feldman ] doctrine is not applicable.” It maintains that rather than dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the district court should have stayed the case pending the outcome of the state court proceedings and then applied principles of preclusion to address the Board's arguments.

The Board, in contrast, contends that the district court correctly dismissed this action under the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine, arguing that [t]here could have been no favorable resolution to [Thai Palace's] claim in the district court without a corresponding determination that the State court's judgment, and the Board's decision affirmed by that State court's judgment, were decided in error.” The Board notes further that [t]here could be no award of compensatory damages without the same federal review and rejection of the State court judgment which is precluded by the Rooker –Feldman doctrine.” In short, the Board argues that Thai Palace “asked the district court to sit in direct review of the State court's judgment and by extension, the underlying decision of the Board, an administrative agency.” Alternatively, the Board argues that “there is no longer a justiciable controversy before the Court, as [the January 2012 Consent Order] became and void by its own terms as of January 12, 2015.”

The principal issue thus presented is whether the district court properly applied the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Rooker

–Feldman doctrine followed from Congress' careful assignment of federal subject matter jurisdiction, allocating original jurisdiction to the district courts in, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)

(actions against foreign states), § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and § 1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction),...

To continue reading

Request your trial
139 cases
  • Johnson v. Byrd
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • November 21, 2016
    ...a decision could be had,' 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) . . ., as was the case in both Rooker and Feldman." Thana v. Board of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). The Fourth Circuit, however, also indicated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine d......
  • Butcher v. Wendt
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • September 22, 2020
    ...Lance v. Dennis , 546 U.S. 459, 466, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006), or a doctrine of comity, see Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs , 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016). Rather, the Rooker - Feldman doctrine proceeds from the statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Co......
  • Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • November 21, 2016
    ...unlike in Verizon Maryland . See id. at *3.Given that the Rooker –Feldman doctrine is "narrow and focused," Thana v. Board of License Comm'rs , 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016), the Court is not inclined to go against the black-letter of Verizon Maryland that "[t]he doctrine has no applica......
  • Moore v. Circosta, 1:20CV911
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • October 14, 2020
    ...district courts from " ‘exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.’ " See Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (per curiam)). The pre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT