United States v. Woods, 15–2498

• Citation: 827 F.3d 712
• Decision Date: 01 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–2498,15–2498
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Leslie J. Woods, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

827 F.3d 712

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Leslie J. Woods, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15–2498

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 7, 2016

Decided July 1, 2016

Ali M. Summers, Office of the United States Attorney, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Preston Humphrey, Law Office of Preston Humphrey, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before Easterbrook, Manion, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Manion

, Circuit Judge.

The government filed a juvenile information against Leslie Woods III,¹ on May 18, 2015, charging him with multiple offenses related to two armed robberies. At the time the government charged Woods he was 20, but at the time of the crime he was 15 and thus, under the Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act (“Juvenile Act”), Woods was considered a juvenile. The United States moved under the Juvenile Act to transfer Woods's case for adult prosecution. After a hearing, the district court granted that motion and transferred the case against Woods for adult prosecution. Woods filed this interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

I.

According to the information filed by the government, when he was 15 years old, Woods and several other gang members robbed two convenience stores. The first robbery occurred on June 17, 2010, when Woods drove three masked and armed gang members to the Best Stop convenience store in Cahokia, Illinois. Woods waited in the car while the other three entered and robbed the store of over $11,000. During this robbery one customer was shot and another customer was grazed by a bullet. Three weeks later, on July 8, 2010, Woods, the same three gang members, and another accomplice robbed the Mini–Mart gas station in Cahokia, Illinois. Woods shot the clerk several times. The clerk survived, but was in critical condition and permanently injured.

Nearly five years later, on May 18, 2015, the United States filed a juvenile information against Woods, charging him with two counts of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, two counts of interference with commerce by robbery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. The government charged Woods under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act (“Juvenile Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et. seq.

The Juvenile Act provides that the government cannot try a juvenile for federal crimes until he is transferred to adult status pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Accordingly, at the same time that the government filed the information against Woods, it moved to transfer the case for adult prosecution.

Although Woods was 20 years old at the time the information was filed, he was 15 at the time he allegedly committed the charged offenses. Under the Juvenile Act, a juvenile is defined as “a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday.” 18 U.S.C. § 5031

. In turn, under the Juvenile Act, “juvenile delinquency” is defined as a violation of federal law “committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult.” Id.

To charge Woods under the Juvenile Act, the Attorney General was required to certify that the case should be transferred for adult prosecution because it meets certain factors, which are not at issue here. United States v. Jarrett , 133 F.3d 519, 535 (7th Cir. 1998)

. The Attorney General must also certify that “there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 5031 ; see id. Additionally, the government must submit the juvenile's court records as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a transfer proceeding. Id. at 535–36. Finally, if those three conditions are met, as they undisputedly are in this case, “the district court must decide whether the juvenile's transfer to adult status is ‘in the interest of justice.’ ” Id. at 536 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5031 ).

Section 5032 of the Juvenile Act sets forth specific factors the district court must consider in assessing whether the transfer is in the interest of justice. This section requires the court to make factual findings on:

(1) the age and social background of the juvenile;

(2) the nature of the offense;

(3) any prior delinquency record;

(4) the present intellectual development and psychological maturity;

(5) past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts;

(6) the availability of programs to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C. § 5032

.

In this case, the district court held a hearing to receive evidence concerning these factors. At this hearing, the government presented as evidence a DVD containing video surveillance of the robberies, as well as an affidavit from an FBI agent elaborating on the details of the charged robberies. The video surveillance of the first robbery did not depict Woods because he was alleged to be the getaway driver, but it showed the other individuals involved in the offense and showed one of the gang members shooting a customer. The agent's affidavit also noted that a woman who had pulled up in the parking lot as the gang was fleeing was shot, but luckily only grazed. The second video showed the robbery of the Mini–Mart and, according to the government, depicted Woods entering the store with a long rifle and shooting the cashier in the chest, arm and hand.

The government also presented evidence from an officer familiar with Woods and his gang involvement, as well as testimony from Woods's juvenile probation officer. Specifically, St. Louis County Police Detective Joseph Percich described, in detail, the Dead End Gang involvement in the area and Woods's extensive involvement with the gang. Additionally, Woods's state juvenile-probation officer testified in detail about Woods's extensive involvement in the juvenile justice system and her role in providing court-ordered supervision for two drug-related charges. She explained that Woods's first juvenile case was for a drug-related charge and that, while it was closed, only a few months later a second juvenile petition was filed against him for drug-related offenses. She also explained that Woods was involved with the Dead End Gang and would not end that affiliation. She further elaborated on the various services offered to Woods and that “[h]e never took accountability at any point.” She added that she recommended Woods for a residential program to remove him from the negative influences in his life, but he was rejected because of his “gang affiliation and his willingness to fight and cause harm.” The juvenile-probation officer further testified that she had concluded “there were no additional resources that I could afford him,” and at that point she recommended that he be placed in the custody of the Division of Youth Services, where minors are detained in a locked, secure, residential facility because they are a risk to society and are not benefitting from juvenile services. She ended her direct testimony by saying, “in the 15 years that I've done this work it is unfortunate but Leslie was the first child that I truly feared and was concerned about what harm he could do to the community.”

Following the hearing, the district court found that Woods's social background was marked by criminal activity and gang involvement and that at his current age (one week shy of 21), the juvenile-rehabilitation programs would not be of much benefit. The court found the second factor likewise supported transfer, given that Woods was alleged to have been involved in two violent armed robberies and had shot and seriously injured an individual in the second robbery. The third factor also supported transfer, the district court concluded, because Woods had an extensive juvenile record starting at the age of 12 and involving more than 30 separate incidents that resulted in referrals to juvenile court. The fourth factor (intellectual development and psychological maturity) the district court weighed neutrally. But the court found the fifth factor also weighed in favor of transfer because Woods had responded poorly to past treatment programs. Finally, the court found the sixth factor weighed in favor of transfer because he was unlikely to benefit from juvenile programs given his age. The court then concluded that the totality of the factors supported transfer, and entered an order transferring Woods for adult prosecution.

Woods appeals.²

II.

On appeal, Woods argues the district court erred in transferring him for adult prosecution under the Juvenile Act. At oral argument, we asked the parties whether Woods was still considered a juvenile under the Juvenile Act given that he is now over 21 and his trial had not yet begun. We directed the parties to address that question in supplemental briefing. In their supplemental briefs, the government and Woods both maintain that such defendants are still considered juveniles under the Juvenile Act.³

Every circuit which has considered this issue has held that the Juvenile Act “permits the district court to continue to exercise its juvenile jurisdiction where a defendant is [charged] while under twenty-one but attains the age of twenty-one during the criminal proceedings.” United States v. Ramirez , 297 F.3d 185, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2002)

; United States v. Smith , 851 F.2d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Martin , 788 F.2d 696, 697–98 (11th Cir. 1986) ; United States v. Doe , 631 F.2d 110, 112–13 (9th Cir. 1980). These courts reasoned that jurisdiction under the Juvenile Act is determined at the time the case is initiated, and thus, the fact the defendant later turns twenty-one is irrelevant. Ramirez, 297 F.3d at 191 ; Smith , 851 F.2d at 709 ; Martin , 788 F.2d at 697 ; Doe , 631 F.2d at 112–13. Further, Ramirez and Doe explained that retaining jurisdiction under the Juvenile Act is contemplated by the statute even after a...