Stallworth v. Moore, No. SC02-863

• Decision Date: 19 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC02-1049, No. SC02-863, No. SC02-1055., No. SC02-903
• Citation: 827 So.2d 974
• Parties: Fabian STALLWORTH, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Respondent. Thomas L. Kitt, Petitioner, v. Michael W. Moore, Respondent. Kevin Davis, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Thomas Lee Anderton, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

827 So.2d 974

Fabian STALLWORTH, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Respondent.

Thomas L. Kitt, Petitioner, v. Michael W. Moore, Respondent.

Kevin Davis, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.

Thomas Lee Anderton, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.

Nos. SC02-863, SC02-903, SC02-1049, SC02-1055.

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 19, 2002.

Fabian Stallworth, pro se, Arcadia, FL.

Kevin Davis, pro se, South Bay, FL.

Kelly B. Sims, Winter Park, FL, on behalf of Petitioner Anderton.

No Appearance for Respondents.

Thomas L. Kitt, pro se, Panama City, FL.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners Fabian Stallworth and Kevin Davis have filed petitions to invoke our "all writs" jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const., seeking review of decisions from the First and Third District Courts of Appeal denying a petition for writ of certiorari (Stallworth) and a petition for writ of habeas corpus/belated appeal (Davis). Petitioner Thomas Kitt has filed a notice to invoke our discretionary jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, seeking review of a decision of the First District denying a petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner Thomas Lee Anderton has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const., seeking review of a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We consolidate these cases for purposes of this opinion and, for the reasons expressed below, dismiss the petitions filed by petitioners Stallworth, Davis, and Anderton, and dismiss review in petitioner Kitt's case.

The decision from the First District in petitioner Stallworth's case, which he challenges in his petition filed in this Court, reads in its entirety: "PER CURIAM. DENIED." Stallworth v. Moore, 812 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (table case). It is clear from the allegations made by petitioner Stallworth in his petition in this Court that the certiorari proceeding, which culminated in the First District's decision in his case, was initiated in that court in accordance with the dictates of this Court's decision in Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998), in which we agreed with the First District and held that, once an inmate has had full review on the merits in the circuit court of an administrative agency decision, he or she is not entitled to a second plenary appeal of the agency decision in the district court of appeal. See id. at 217-18. Although petitioner Stallworth's petition in this Court primarily focuses on why he believes the Department of Corrections erred in determining that he was guilty of the prison disciplinary infraction of possession of a weapon, the allegations set forth in that portion of his petition entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies," which includes a recitation of the procedural history of the certiorari proceedings in the First District, as well as the attachment to his petition of copies of both the First District's per curiam opinion in his case and the First District's order denying his motion for rehearing directed to the per curiam opinion, indicate that petitioner Stallworth intends for his petition in this Court to be the next step in the review process relative to the disciplinary infraction finding of guilt, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.

The decision from the First District in petitioner Kitt's case, like the decision from that court in petitioner Stallworth's case, reads in its entirety: "PER CURIAM. DENIED." Kitt v. Moore, 812 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (table case). It is clear from petitioner Kitt's notice to invoke that the certiorari proceeding, which culminated in the First District's decision in his case, was also initiated in accordance with the dictates of Sheley to review an order of the circuit court dismissing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which petitioner Kitt had challenged the Florida Parole Commission's decision to place him on conditional release.¹

The decision from the Third District in petitioner Davis's case reads in its entirety:

Following review of the petition for writ of habeas corpus/belated appeal review and the response and reply thereto, it is ordered that said petition is hereby denied.

Petitioner Davis alleges in his petition in this Court that the Third District's decision in his case conflicts with this Court's decision in McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1997). Petitioner Davis asserts in his petition that we appeared to indicate in our decision in McCray that the defense of laches cannot be applied to bar a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), if the petitioner affirmatively alleges under oath that he was misled about the results of the appeal by appellate counsel.² Petitioner Davis asserts in his petition that the Third District's decision in his case was erroneously based on the State's assertion of the defense of laches, even though he had affirmatively alleged under oath in his petition that he had been misled about the results of his appeal by appellate counsel.

The decision from the Fifth District in petitioner Anderton's case reads in its entirety:

ORDERED that the PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, filed April 11, 2002, is denied.

It is clear from petitioner Anderton's petition in this Court that the habeas corpus proceeding, which culminated in the Fifth District's decision in his case, was initiated as a challenge to a lower court's denial of a motion to set bond in an ongoing criminal case. See, e.g., Leichtman v. Singletary, 674 So.2d 889, 892 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("Habeas corpus remains available... to test pretrial detention and the denial of pretrial bond or excessive pretrial bond...."). Petitioner Anderton asserts in his petition in this Court that the Fifth District's decision not only conflicts with other district court decisions made in circumstances similar to those presented by his case but also resulted from a failure of the Fifth District to properly apply certain relevant case law from this Court. He specifically asks this Court to quash the Fifth District's order denying relief in his case.

The decisions from the district courts of appeal in all of these cases are identical in substance, if not in form. They are all per curiam denials of relief issued without opinion or explanation. The fact that the decisions from the First District in both petitioner Stallworth's and petitioner Kitt's cases were issued in opinion form, while the decisions in petitioner Davis's and petitioner Anderton's cases were issued by unpublished order, makes no difference in terms of our jurisdictional analysis.

These cases collectively present this Court with the opportunity to once again clarify the limited scope of its discretionary jurisdiction, this time with regard to unelaborated per curiam denials by the district courts of appeal in cases initiated either by extraordinary writ petitions³ or by petitions filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c). While none of this Court's prior decisions addressing the limited scope of our discretionary jurisdiction following the 1980 amendment to article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution specifically addressed the jurisdictional question presented by the subject cases, the reasoning behind those cases clearly supports the conclusion that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the kind of unelaborated per curiam denials of relief at issue in the subject cases.⁴

In Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 1980), this Court, after discussing at length the history and purpose of the 1980 amendment to article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which restricted the scope of this Court's discretionary review jurisdiction, held that this Court "lacks jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the several district courts of appeal of this state rendered without opinion, regardless of whether they are accompanied by a dissenting or concurring opinion, when the basis for such review is an alleged conflict of that decision with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the Supreme Court." Id. at 1359. The decision of the district court at issue in Jenkins was a majority opinion which read in its entirety "Per Curiam Affirmed," known in common parlance both then and now as a "PCA," which was accompanied by a lengthy and comprehensive dissenting opinion reciting certain facts of the case and disagreeing with the result reached by the majority. See Jenkins, 385 So.2d at 1357; see also Jenkins v. State, 382 So.2d 83, 83-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (Hurley, J., dissenting).

Less than a month after the opinion in Jenkins issued, this Court extended its reasoning to those circumstances where review was sought from an unelaborated per curiam dismissal by a district court of appeal. See Pena v. Tampa Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 385 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1980). In Pena, this Court dismissed review based on the conclusion that an order which merely granted a motion to dismiss and dismissed an appeal, without any explanation of the reason for the dismissal, did not present this Court with a decision in which express and direct conflict could be found as required by article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, such that the Court's discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to that provision had been properly invoked. See id. at 1370.

In St. Paul Title Insurance Corp. v. Davis, 392 So.2d 1304 (Fla.1980), this Court again extended the reasoning of Jenkins to those circumstances where a party sought to evade the decision in Jenkins by seeking review of a PCA by way of a petition to invoke this Court's "all writs necessary" jurisdiction set forth in article V, section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Constitution. This Court explained its reasoning in St. Paul as follows:

We will not allow the "all writs necessary" provision of

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