827 So.2d 974 (Fla. 2002), SC02-863, Stallworth v. Moore

Docket NºSC02-863, SC02-903, SC02-1049, SC02-1055
Citation827 So.2d 974, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S 768
Party NameFABIAN STALLWORTH, Petitioner v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent. THOMAS L. KITT, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent. KEVIN DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. THOMAS LEE ANDERTON, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent
Case DateSeptember 19, 2002
CourtSupreme Court of Florida

Page 974

827 So.2d 974 (Fla. 2002)

27 Fla. L. Weekly S 768

FABIAN STALLWORTH, Petitioner

v.

MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent.

THOMAS L. KITT, Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent.

KEVIN DAVIS, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

THOMAS LEE ANDERTON, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent

SC02-863, SC02-903, SC02-1049, SC02-1055

Florida Supreme Court

September 19, 2002

Page 975

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct Conflict First District - Case No. 1D01-2566

Fabian Stallworth, pro se, Arcadia, Florida;

Kevin Davis, pro se, South Bay, Florida;

Kelly B. Sims, Winter Park, Florida, on behalf of Petitioner Anderton, Petitioners

No Appearance, for Respondents

Thomas L. Kitt, pro se, Panama City, Florida for Petitioner

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners Fabian Stallworth and Kevin Davis have filed petitions to invoke our "all writs" jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const., seeking review of decisions from the First and Third District Courts of Appeal denying a petition for writ of certiorari (Stallworth) and a petition for writ of habeas corpus/belated appeal (Davis). Petitioner Thomas Kitt has filed a notice to invoke our discretionary jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, seeking review of a decision of the First District denying a petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner Thomas Lee Anderton has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const., seeking review of a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We consolidate these cases for purposes of this opinion and, for the reasons expressed below, dismiss the petitions filed by petitioners Stallworth, Davis, and Anderton, and dismiss review in petitioner Kitt's case.

The decision from the First District in petitioner Stallworth's case, which he challenges in his petition filed in this Court, reads in its entirety: "PER CURIAM. DENIED." Stallworth v. Moore, 812 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (table case). It is clear from the allegations made by petitioner Stallworth in his petition in this Court that the certiorari proceeding, which culminated in the First District's decision in his case, was initiated in that court in accordance with the dictates of this Court's decision in Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1998), in which we agreed with the First District and held that, once an inmate has had full review on the merits in the circuit court of an administrative agency decision, he or she is not entitled to a second plenary appeal of the agency decision in the district court of appeal. See id. at 217-18. Although petitioner Stallworth's petition in this Court primarily focuses on why he believes the Department of Corrections erred in determining that he was guilty of the prison disciplinary infraction of possession of a weapon, the allegations set forth in that portion of his petition entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies," which includes a recitation of the procedural history of the certiorari proceedings in the First District, as well as the attachment to his petition of copies of both the First District's per curiam opinion in his case and the First District's order denying his motion for rehearing directed to the per curiam opinion, indicate that petitioner Stallworth intends for his petition in this Court to be the next step in the review process relative to the disciplinary infraction finding of guilt, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.

The decision from the First District in petitioner Kitt's case, like the decision from that court in petitioner Stallworth's case, reads in its entirety: "PER CURIAM. DENIED." Kitt v. Moore, 812 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (table case). It is clear from petitioner Kitt's notice to invoke that the certiorari proceeding, which culminated in the First District's decision in his case, was also initiated in accordance with the dictates of Sheley to review an order of the circuit court dismissing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which petitioner Kitt had challenged

Page 976

the Florida Parole Commission's decision to place him on conditional release. 1

The decision from the Third District in petitioner Davis's case reads in its entirety:

Following review of the petition for writ of habeas corpus/belated appeal review and the response and reply thereto, it is ordered that said petition is hereby denied.

Petitioner Davis alleges in his petition in this Court that the Third District's decision in his case conflicts with this Court's decision in McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366 (Fla. 1997). Petitioner Davis asserts in his petition that we appeared to indicate in our decision in McCray that the defense of laches cannot be applied to bar a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), if the petitioner affirmatively alleges under oath that he was misled about the results of the appeal by appellate counsel. 2 Petitioner Davis asserts in his petition that the Third District's decision in his case was erroneously based on the State's assertion of the defense of laches, even though he had affirmatively alleged under oath in his petition that he had been misled about the results of his appeal by appellate counsel.

The decision from the Fifth District in petitioner Anderton's case reads in its entirety:

ORDERED that the PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, filed April 11, 2002, is denied.

It is clear from petitioner Anderton's petition in this Court that the habeas corpus proceeding, which culminated in the Fifth District's decision in his case, was initiated as a challenge to a lower court's denial of a motion to set bond in an ongoing criminal case. See, e.g., Leichtman v. Singletary, 674 So.2d 889, 892 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("Habeas corpus remains available . . . to test pretrial detention and the denial of pretrial bond or excessive pretrial bond . . . ."). Petitioner Anderton asserts in his petition in this Court that the Fifth District's decision not only conflicts with other district court decisions made in circumstances similar to those presented by his case but also resulted from a failure of the Fifth District to properly apply certain relevant case law from this Court. He specifically asks this Court to quash the Fifth...

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