Lawson v. Gault

Decision Date07 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14-2360,14-2360
PartiesMelanie Lawson, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Union County Clerk of Court, William F. “Freddie” Gault; William F. Gault, a/k/a Freddie Gault, Individually, Defendants–Appellees. Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law ; Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment; Common Cause, Amici Supporting Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Samantha Clark Booth, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant. Vance J. Bettis, Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Eugene Volokh, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae. ON BRIEF: Mark Epstein, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; John G. Reckenbeil, Law Office of John G. Reckenbeil, LLC, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sina Safvati, Anjelica Sarmiento, Sabine Tsuruda, UCLA School of Law Students, Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae.

Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Duncan

wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Senior Judge Davis wrote a dissenting opinion.

DUNCAN

, Circuit Judge:

Appellee William Gault (Gault) terminated Appellant Melanie Lawson (Lawson) from her position as a deputy clerk in the Clerk of Court's Office of Union County, South Carolina. Lawson filed suit, challenging her termination on First Amendment grounds. Gault moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion, holding that Lawson occupied a confidential or policymaking position and was subject to termination for campaigning against her boss. We disagree that Gault has established as a matter of law that Lawson held a position for which political loyalty was required, and we are unable to affirm on any other grounds based on the record as currently presented. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The dissent is so hyperbolic that it seems necessary to stress exactly what is at issue in this appeal. The majority simply reverses the grant of summary judgment to Gault and remands. What the dissent is so exercised about is that the majority does not grant summary judgment to Lawson, who never moved for summary judgment nor otherwise sought such relief. To the extent there is anything remarkable about this opinion, either jurisprudentially or otherwise, it is the dissent's determination to overleap precedent and procedure, and preclude the development of any record evidence, solely to grant Lawson relief she did not ask for and which Gault had no notice of . As we explain below, the issue before this court on appeal is narrow: whether Gault's motion for summary judgment had merit. We conclude that it did not, and our opinion steps beyond that simple question only insofar as we must address the dissent's gratuitous overreach.

I.
A.

This action arises out of Union County, South Carolina's 2012 election for Clerk of Court. Because of the unique statutory characteristics of that position, we begin by describing it briefly.

The South Carolina Constitution creates the position of Clerk of Court for each county. S.C. Const. art. V, § 24

. The Clerk is elected to a four-year term through partisan elections, with the Governor empowered to fill any vacancies that arise between elections. S.C. Code Ann. § 14–17–30. The General Assembly prescribes the Clerk's duties. S.C. Const. art. V, § 24. The Supreme Court of South Carolina approves guidelines for the Clerk in connection with the court's responsibility to make rules of court administration. Id. art. V, § 4; see, e.g. , Administrative Order Adopting Clerk of Court Manual Revision, S.C. Sup. Ct. Administrative Order No. 2014–05–21–01, dated May 21, 2014, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=201405–21–01. The Clerk is essentially responsible for all the duties typically associated with court administration. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 14–17–210 to 14–17–760.

South Carolina law authorizes the Clerk to appoint deputy clerks to aid in executing the Clerk's statutory duties. Id. § 14–17–60. Once sworn into office, a deputy clerk is authorized to carry out any of the Clerk's statutory duties. See id. A deputy clerk serves at the pleasure of the Clerk. See id.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina has issued a Clerk Manual, which emphasizes the Clerk's “public relations” role as the sole face of the state court system for many individuals. See Clerk of Court Manual § 1.21 “Public Relations,” http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/ClerkOfCourtManual/displaychapter.cfm?chapter=1#1.21. In the Family Court/Child Support Division, where Lawson worked, the sensitive nature of the proceedings gives the Clerk's public relations role greater importance. See id. § 7.18, “Confidentiality in the Family Court,” http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/clerkOfCourtManual/displaychapter.cfm?chapter=7#7.18.

Because all Family Court filings are submitted through the Clerk, the Family Court/Child Support Division of the Clerk's Office routinely handles sensitive filings. Cases concerning legal infractions by minors, child neglect and abuse, child custody, divorce, adoption, termination of parental rights, and spousal and child support all originate in Family Court. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63–3–510

, 63–3–530. Further, many Family Court filings, unlike most court documents, are strictly confidential. See, e.g. , id. § 44–41–32 (unemancipated minors seeking abortions without parental consent); id. § 63–19–2040 (alleged state law violations by minors); id. § 63–9–780(B) (adoptions). In addition, South Carolina law protects the integrity of filings related to adoptions by making it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, to disseminate or allow the unauthorized dissemination of such records. Id. § 63–9–780(F)(2). The Family Court/Child Support Division of the Clerk's Office is also responsible for managing the child support account and working with other staff in the Clerk's Office to process the account's monthly statements. See J.A. 96.

B.

Lawson was an employee in the Union County Clerk's Office from 1992 until 2012, beginning as a child-support clerk under June Miller (“Miller”), who at that time was the Clerk of Court. Miller named Lawson the Family Court coordinator before Miller retired from her position as Clerk in 2003.

Lawson continued to work in the Family Court/Child Support Division under Miller's successor, Brad Morris (“Morris”). Morris served as Clerk from 2003 until October of 2009, when he resigned after pleading guilty to embezzling more than $200,000 in public funds from the Clerk's Office. During his term in office, Morris stole cash receivables and falsified deposit slips, beginning with funds from child support receivables and eventually including accounts across the Clerk's Office. Lawson applied for appointment to the vacant position after Morris resigned, but the Governor appointed William F. Gault to serve as Clerk through the next election cycle instead.

At the time Gault took over as Clerk, the office had ten full-time staff members. Gault thereafter received approval and funding from the Judicial Council1 to hire Miller, the former Clerk of Court, as a part-time employee for six months. The parties have stipulated that Gault hired Miller “to perform bank reconciliations in an effort to prevent another lapse like the one that had allowed Mr. Morris to embezzle hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Clerk's Office.” J.A. 20.

Gault retained Miller after the six-month period ended, paying her with funds from the child support account. He also selected Lawson to supervise the Family Court/Child Support Division of the Clerk's Office as his deputy. In their respective capacities, Lawson and Miller would interact when Miller had questions about the monthly child support account statements.

C.

Gault opted to run for a full term as Clerk in the November 2012 election, entering the race as a Republican. On March 30, 2012, Lawson declared her candidacy for the Democratic primary,2 with plans to oppose Gault in the general election. After Lawson informed Gault of her action, Gault placed her on unpaid leave for the duration of her campaign.

Lawson acknowledges that, as her campaign progressed, June Miller became a campaign issue. According to Lawson, she “made statements concerning June Miller's employment with the Clerk's Office.” J.A. 186. Specifically, Lawson expressed concern over “where the funds were coming from to pay Ms. Miller,” given that Miller continued working after her six-month authorization expired. Id. Lawson explained that she “had a heightened sense of alertness, especially when it involved funds of the Clerk's Office” given Morris's embezzlement scandal. J.A. 187.

Shortly after his election, Gault set up a meeting with Lawson. At that November 14, 2012, meeting, Gault terminated Lawson, telling her that he had to do what was in the best interest of the office.” J.A. 21. Gault would later testify that he terminated Lawson in part for making statements during her campaign regarding Miller's employment at the Clerk's Office, and in part because he was concerned that her continued employment would undermine his authority as Clerk.

Gault explained that, on numerous occasions during the campaign, it was brought to his attention that Lawson was making statements identifying Miller by name. These statements questioned Gault's decision to continue to employ Miller given that the “county council doesn't want June Miller there.” J.A. 88. Moreover, Gault was told that Lawson was making statements to the effect that June Miller should not be in the clerk of court's office” and June Miller is already drawing her social security and her retirement.” Id. According to Gault, he “couldn't very well bring [Lawso...

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