Rice, In re
| Decision Date | 07 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 57391-3,57391-3 |
| Citation | 118 Wn.2d 876,828 P.2d 1086 |
| Parties | In re the Personal Restraint Petition of David Lewis RICE, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, and Donna L. Wise, Sr. Appellate Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
In State v. Rice, 110 Wash.2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 707 (1989), this court affirmed David Rice's convictions and death sentence on four counts of aggravated first degree murder. We later dismissed Rice's first personal restraint petition by an unpublished order. In re Rice, Cause 54575-8 (Aug. 3, 1989). Rice has filed this second personal restraint petition, principally arguing that the prosecution withheld--and his attorneys otherwise failed to discover--evidence of his mental condition which would have been favorable to him in the penalty phase of his trial. He seeks either a reversal of the sentence and retrial of the penalty phase or an order transferring the petition to the superior court for a reference hearing pursuant to RAP 16.11(b) and 16.12. In the alternative, Rice presents several additional grounds for relief, which he claims entitle him to vacation of the conviction and sentence, and a new trial. For reasons discussed below, we deny the request for a reference hearing and dismiss the petition.
Since we fully stated the facts of this case in State v. Rice, supra, we will not repeat them in detail here. On Christmas Eve of 1985, Rice gained entry into the home of attorney Charles Goldmark by posing as a delivery man and displaying a toy gun. He took Goldmark, his wife Annie, and their two sons, to an upstairs bedroom. Upon learning that guests would soon be arriving, he rendered them unconscious with chloroform. He then beat them over their heads Police apprehended Rice on December 26, 1985, and he gave a complete confession. The State charged him with four counts of aggravated first degree murder, and sought the death penalty. Rice entered a general plea of not guilty as well as a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
with a steam iron and stabbed them with a knife. Annie Goldmark died at the scene, while the others died at various times within the next 5 weeks
There was no question at trial that Rice had committed the murders. Rice's defense was that he was unable to fully distinguish between right and wrong because he possessed delusional ideas about an imminent communist invasion of the United States. Rice contended that he believed he was a "soldier" in a battle against communism and that he thought that what he had done was right.
Dr. Kenneth Muscatel, a clinical psychologist appointed by the trial court as requested by the defense, opined that Rice was "an extremely disturbed man". Dr. Muscatel explained that Rice was not truly delusional but "was nonetheless suspicious, felt that the world is a hostile place, felt that the world would do wrong to him if the opportunity was provided." Dr. Muscatel diagnosed Rice as having a "schizotypal personality disorder"; that is, "a personality disorder with schizoid or schizophrenic type features, but not reaching the level or degree of a schizophrenic disorder, a chronic psychotic disorder." Rather, he described Rice's condition as a "severe and chronic disorder of personality functions." Dr. Muscatel believed that Rice's confused thinking and weak ego boundaries, combined with the tacit encouragement of people around Rice who shared his extreme political views, led him to believe that what he had done was justified.
Nonetheless, Dr. Muscatel opined that Rice was legally sane when he committed the crimes. In reference to the ability to distinguish right from wrong, Dr. Muscatel testified that the planning leading up to the crimes, the manner in which Rice committed the crimes, his actions following the crimes, and the statements he made to others all indicated The prosecution focused on Rice's conduct and statements following arrest to support its theory that Rice's purported mental disorder was largely a recent fabrication. After his arrest, Rice was calm and coherent and did not mention any of the delusional beliefs which later surfaced as purported reasons for the killings. A psychiatric evaluation specialist at the King County Jail, who administered a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory on Rice, testified that neither the test results nor observations of Rice indicated that he had any psychiatric disorder or that he suffered from any delusions or other thought disturbances. Rather, the specialist said, Rice had more of a character disorder indicating a cold, distant, and self-centered personality.
that he was able to appreciate that what he had done was wrong, even though he might have felt that his actions were justified.
The prosecution pointed out these inconsistencies in its closing argument. It also emphasized that greater reliance should be placed on the statements Rice made soon after his arrest than on those he made months later in support of his mental illness defense.
The jury found Rice guilty as charged. At the penalty phase, the defense presented no new evidence of Rice's mental condition, but again emphasized that condition during closing argument. The defense also presented testimony by members of Rice's family to show that he had suffered a troubled childhood but had never been violent. The jury nonetheless found insufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, and the court sentenced Rice to death.
Following this court's dismissal of Rice's first personal restraint petition, the trial court set an execution date of November 1, 1989. On October 23, 1989, Rice filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. The execution date was stayed, and the District Court appointed counsel for Rice and ordered that he be examined by three psychiatrists to determine his current competency to assist in his defense as well as his competence at time of sentencing and appeal.
While the federal action was pending, Rice filed this second personal restraint petition on July 23, 1990. In his petition, Rice raises numerous issues, but he mainly argues that the prosecution withheld favorable evidence on his mental condition, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to discover this evidence. Rice's allegations specifically concern a diagnosis purportedly made by Dr. G. Christian Harris, a psychiatrist whom the State had retained to assist the prosecution. On June 6, 1986, the day after the jury found Rice guilty, Dr. Harris wrote the prosecutors a letter opining that Rice was not particularly suggestible and was not legally insane when he committed the murders. (See appendix.) Rice's present attorneys now allege that they first discovered in the spring of 1990 that, at the time of trial, Dr. Harris had also diagnosed Rice as suffering from a condition called "paranoid delusional disorder". They further allege that the prosecution knew of this designation and failed to disclose it to Rice's trial counsel. Rice argues that Dr. Harris' evaluation would have bolstered his claim that he suffered from a severe mental disorder which justified sparing his life.
The State did not file a response to Rice's petition pursuant to RAP 16.9, but filed only an answering brief under RAP 16.10(b). In its brief, the State did not contest the fact of Dr. Harris' alleged diagnosis. Instead, the State focused on the materiality of any such evidence, arguing that disclosure was not required.
In order to facilitate the evaluation of Rice's claims, this court directed Rice's attorneys to provide a more detailed statement of the facts upon which they based their allegations and the evidence available to support them, pursuant to RAP 16.7(a). The court also directed the State to file a response answering the allegations and identifying the disputed questions of fact.
The materials Rice provided indicate that Dr. Harris had, in fact, diagnosed Rice as suffering from paranoid delusional disorder in addition to the opinion expressed in his letter. In the spring of 1990, pursuant to the federal District Rice also offered the affidavits of his trial attorneys, Bill Lanning and Anthony Savage. Mr. Savage says that he believes he saw the June 6, 1986, letter expressing Dr. Harris' opinion to the prosecutors prior to the penalty phase. Both attorneys aver that the prosecution did not disclose Dr. Harris' additional diagnosis to them, that had they known of the designation, they would have contacted Dr. Harris in anticipation of having him testify at the penalty phase, and that such evidence would have been critical in making a case for leniency and rebutting the State's argument that Rice had fabricated his mental illness.
Court's order, three appointed psychiatrists filed reports on Rice's mental competency, including Dr. Harris, whom the State had selected. Rice's attorney, Peter Offenbecher, learned of Dr. Harris' designation of "paranoid delusional disorder" at that time. In his current report, Dr. Harris opined that Rice suffers from a continuing paranoid delusional disorder and that he had suffered from that disorder at the time of his trial. At a hearing before the District Court, Dr. Harris confirmed this diagnosis. Offenbecher asserts that he personally contacted Dr. Harris and that Harris said he had diagnosed Rice as suffering from paranoid delusional disorder when he first examined Rice in 1986. Dr. Harris declined to discuss the matter further, however, because he had been retained by the State in connection with the federal proceeding
Finally, attorney Offenbecher asserts that at a reference hearing he would offer the...
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